diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig
index 1157f82..4a53cb9 100644
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #
 menuconfig CRYPTO
 	tristate "Cryptographic API"
+	select LIB_MEMNEQ
 	help
 	  This option provides the core Cryptographic API.
 
@@ -1936,7 +1937,6 @@
 config CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
 	bool
 
-source "lib/crypto/Kconfig"
 source "drivers/crypto/Kconfig"
 source "crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig"
 source "certs/Kconfig"
diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile
index b279483..3d53cc1 100644
--- a/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 #
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO) += crypto.o
-crypto-y := api.o cipher.o compress.o memneq.o
+crypto-y := api.o cipher.o compress.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ENGINE) += crypto_engine.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS) += fips.o
diff --git a/crypto/akcipher.c b/crypto/akcipher.c
index f866085..ab975a4 100644
--- a/crypto/akcipher.c
+++ b/crypto/akcipher.c
@@ -120,6 +120,12 @@
 	return -ENOSYS;
 }
 
+static int akcipher_default_set_key(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm,
+				     const void *key, unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	return -ENOSYS;
+}
+
 int crypto_register_akcipher(struct akcipher_alg *alg)
 {
 	struct crypto_alg *base = &alg->base;
@@ -132,6 +138,8 @@
 		alg->encrypt = akcipher_default_op;
 	if (!alg->decrypt)
 		alg->decrypt = akcipher_default_op;
+	if (!alg->set_priv_key)
+		alg->set_priv_key = akcipher_default_set_key;
 
 	akcipher_prepare_alg(alg);
 	return crypto_register_alg(base);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index 788a4ba..cf9b7ac 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -260,6 +260,10 @@
 
 	BUG_ON(!sig->data);
 
+	/* SM2 signatures always use the SM3 hash algorithm */
+	if (!sig->hash_algo || strcmp(sig->hash_algo, "sm3") != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	ret = sm2_compute_z_digest(tfm_pkey, SM2_DEFAULT_USERID,
 					SM2_DEFAULT_USERID_LEN, dgst);
 	if (ret)
@@ -356,8 +360,7 @@
 	if (ret)
 		goto error_free_key;
 
-	if (sig->pkey_algo && strcmp(sig->pkey_algo, "sm2") == 0 &&
-	    sig->data_size) {
+	if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "sm2") == 0 && sig->data_size) {
 		ret = cert_sig_digest_update(sig, tfm);
 		if (ret)
 			goto error_free_key;
diff --git a/crypto/authenc.c b/crypto/authenc.c
index 670bf1a..17f674a 100644
--- a/crypto/authenc.c
+++ b/crypto/authenc.c
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@
 		dst = scatterwalk_ffwd(areq_ctx->dst, req->dst, req->assoclen);
 
 	skcipher_request_set_tfm(skreq, ctx->enc);
-	skcipher_request_set_callback(skreq, aead_request_flags(req),
+	skcipher_request_set_callback(skreq, flags,
 				      req->base.complete, req->base.data);
 	skcipher_request_set_crypt(skreq, src, dst,
 				   req->cryptlen - authsize, req->iv);
diff --git a/crypto/blake2s_generic.c b/crypto/blake2s_generic.c
index 005783f..5f96a21 100644
--- a/crypto/blake2s_generic.c
+++ b/crypto/blake2s_generic.c
@@ -1,149 +1,55 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT
 /*
+ * shash interface to the generic implementation of BLAKE2s
+ *
  * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
  */
 
 #include <crypto/internal/blake2s.h>
-#include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
 
 #include <linux/types.h>
-#include <linux/jump_label.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 
-static int crypto_blake2s_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *key,
-				 unsigned int keylen)
+static int crypto_blake2s_update_generic(struct shash_desc *desc,
+					 const u8 *in, unsigned int inlen)
 {
-	struct blake2s_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm);
-
-	if (keylen == 0 || keylen > BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	memcpy(tctx->key, key, keylen);
-	tctx->keylen = keylen;
-
-	return 0;
+	return crypto_blake2s_update(desc, in, inlen, true);
 }
 
-static int crypto_blake2s_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+static int crypto_blake2s_final_generic(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
 {
-	struct blake2s_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
-	struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
-	const int outlen = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
-
-	if (tctx->keylen)
-		blake2s_init_key(state, outlen, tctx->key, tctx->keylen);
-	else
-		blake2s_init(state, outlen);
-
-	return 0;
+	return crypto_blake2s_final(desc, out, true);
 }
 
-static int crypto_blake2s_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *in,
-				 unsigned int inlen)
-{
-	struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
-	const size_t fill = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen;
-
-	if (unlikely(!inlen))
-		return 0;
-	if (inlen > fill) {
-		memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, fill);
-		blake2s_compress_generic(state, state->buf, 1, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
-		state->buflen = 0;
-		in += fill;
-		inlen -= fill;
+#define BLAKE2S_ALG(name, driver_name, digest_size)			\
+	{								\
+		.base.cra_name		= name,				\
+		.base.cra_driver_name	= driver_name,			\
+		.base.cra_priority	= 100,				\
+		.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,	\
+		.base.cra_blocksize	= BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,		\
+		.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx), \
+		.base.cra_module	= THIS_MODULE,			\
+		.digestsize		= digest_size,			\
+		.setkey			= crypto_blake2s_setkey,	\
+		.init			= crypto_blake2s_init,		\
+		.update			= crypto_blake2s_update_generic, \
+		.final			= crypto_blake2s_final_generic,	\
+		.descsize		= sizeof(struct blake2s_state),	\
 	}
-	if (inlen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
-		const size_t nblocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(inlen, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
-		/* Hash one less (full) block than strictly possible */
-		blake2s_compress_generic(state, in, nblocks - 1, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
-		in += BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
-		inlen -= BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
-	}
-	memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, inlen);
-	state->buflen += inlen;
 
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int crypto_blake2s_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
-{
-	struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
-
-	blake2s_set_lastblock(state);
-	memset(state->buf + state->buflen, 0,
-	       BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen); /* Padding */
-	blake2s_compress_generic(state, state->buf, 1, state->buflen);
-	cpu_to_le32_array(state->h, ARRAY_SIZE(state->h));
-	memcpy(out, state->h, state->outlen);
-	memzero_explicit(state, sizeof(*state));
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static struct shash_alg blake2s_algs[] = {{
-	.base.cra_name		= "blake2s-128",
-	.base.cra_driver_name	= "blake2s-128-generic",
-	.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
-	.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
-	.base.cra_priority	= 200,
-	.base.cra_blocksize     = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
-	.base.cra_module	= THIS_MODULE,
-
-	.digestsize		= BLAKE2S_128_HASH_SIZE,
-	.setkey			= crypto_blake2s_setkey,
-	.init			= crypto_blake2s_init,
-	.update			= crypto_blake2s_update,
-	.final			= crypto_blake2s_final,
-	.descsize		= sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
-}, {
-	.base.cra_name		= "blake2s-160",
-	.base.cra_driver_name	= "blake2s-160-generic",
-	.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
-	.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
-	.base.cra_priority	= 200,
-	.base.cra_blocksize     = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
-	.base.cra_module	= THIS_MODULE,
-
-	.digestsize		= BLAKE2S_160_HASH_SIZE,
-	.setkey			= crypto_blake2s_setkey,
-	.init			= crypto_blake2s_init,
-	.update			= crypto_blake2s_update,
-	.final			= crypto_blake2s_final,
-	.descsize		= sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
-}, {
-	.base.cra_name		= "blake2s-224",
-	.base.cra_driver_name	= "blake2s-224-generic",
-	.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
-	.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
-	.base.cra_priority	= 200,
-	.base.cra_blocksize     = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
-	.base.cra_module	= THIS_MODULE,
-
-	.digestsize		= BLAKE2S_224_HASH_SIZE,
-	.setkey			= crypto_blake2s_setkey,
-	.init			= crypto_blake2s_init,
-	.update			= crypto_blake2s_update,
-	.final			= crypto_blake2s_final,
-	.descsize		= sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
-}, {
-	.base.cra_name		= "blake2s-256",
-	.base.cra_driver_name	= "blake2s-256-generic",
-	.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
-	.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
-	.base.cra_priority	= 200,
-	.base.cra_blocksize     = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
-	.base.cra_module	= THIS_MODULE,
-
-	.digestsize		= BLAKE2S_256_HASH_SIZE,
-	.setkey			= crypto_blake2s_setkey,
-	.init			= crypto_blake2s_init,
-	.update			= crypto_blake2s_update,
-	.final			= crypto_blake2s_final,
-	.descsize		= sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
-}};
+static struct shash_alg blake2s_algs[] = {
+	BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-128", "blake2s-128-generic",
+		    BLAKE2S_128_HASH_SIZE),
+	BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-160", "blake2s-160-generic",
+		    BLAKE2S_160_HASH_SIZE),
+	BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-224", "blake2s-224-generic",
+		    BLAKE2S_224_HASH_SIZE),
+	BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-256", "blake2s-256-generic",
+		    BLAKE2S_256_HASH_SIZE),
+};
 
 static int __init blake2s_mod_init(void)
 {
diff --git a/crypto/cryptd.c b/crypto/cryptd.c
index a1bea0f..668095e 100644
--- a/crypto/cryptd.c
+++ b/crypto/cryptd.c
@@ -39,6 +39,10 @@
 };
 
 struct cryptd_queue {
+	/*
+	 * Protected by disabling BH to allow enqueueing from softinterrupt and
+	 * dequeuing from kworker (cryptd_queue_worker()).
+	 */
 	struct cryptd_cpu_queue __percpu *cpu_queue;
 };
 
@@ -125,28 +129,28 @@
 static int cryptd_enqueue_request(struct cryptd_queue *queue,
 				  struct crypto_async_request *request)
 {
-	int cpu, err;
+	int err;
 	struct cryptd_cpu_queue *cpu_queue;
 	refcount_t *refcnt;
 
-	cpu = get_cpu();
+	local_bh_disable();
 	cpu_queue = this_cpu_ptr(queue->cpu_queue);
 	err = crypto_enqueue_request(&cpu_queue->queue, request);
 
 	refcnt = crypto_tfm_ctx(request->tfm);
 
 	if (err == -ENOSPC)
-		goto out_put_cpu;
+		goto out;
 
-	queue_work_on(cpu, cryptd_wq, &cpu_queue->work);
+	queue_work_on(smp_processor_id(), cryptd_wq, &cpu_queue->work);
 
 	if (!refcount_read(refcnt))
-		goto out_put_cpu;
+		goto out;
 
 	refcount_inc(refcnt);
 
-out_put_cpu:
-	put_cpu();
+out:
+	local_bh_enable();
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -162,15 +166,10 @@
 	cpu_queue = container_of(work, struct cryptd_cpu_queue, work);
 	/*
 	 * Only handle one request at a time to avoid hogging crypto workqueue.
-	 * preempt_disable/enable is used to prevent being preempted by
-	 * cryptd_enqueue_request(). local_bh_disable/enable is used to prevent
-	 * cryptd_enqueue_request() being accessed from software interrupts.
 	 */
 	local_bh_disable();
-	preempt_disable();
 	backlog = crypto_get_backlog(&cpu_queue->queue);
 	req = crypto_dequeue_request(&cpu_queue->queue);
-	preempt_enable();
 	local_bh_enable();
 
 	if (!req)
diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c
index 3132967..a4b5d6d 100644
--- a/crypto/drbg.c
+++ b/crypto/drbg.c
@@ -1035,17 +1035,38 @@
  ******************************************************************/
 
 static inline int __drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct list_head *seed,
-			      int reseed)
+			      int reseed, enum drbg_seed_state new_seed_state)
 {
 	int ret = drbg->d_ops->update(drbg, seed, reseed);
 
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	drbg->seeded = true;
+	drbg->seeded = new_seed_state;
 	/* 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 step 5 */
 	drbg->reseed_ctr = 1;
 
+	switch (drbg->seeded) {
+	case DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED:
+		/* Impossible, but handle it to silence compiler warnings. */
+		fallthrough;
+	case DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL:
+		/*
+		 * Require frequent reseeds until the seed source is
+		 * fully initialized.
+		 */
+		drbg->reseed_threshold = 50;
+		break;
+
+	case DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL:
+		/*
+		 * Seed source has become fully initialized, frequent
+		 * reseeds no longer required.
+		 */
+		drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg);
+		break;
+	}
+
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -1065,12 +1086,10 @@
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void drbg_async_seed(struct work_struct *work)
+static int drbg_seed_from_random(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 {
 	struct drbg_string data;
 	LIST_HEAD(seedlist);
-	struct drbg_state *drbg = container_of(work, struct drbg_state,
-					       seed_work);
 	unsigned int entropylen = drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags);
 	unsigned char entropy[32];
 	int ret;
@@ -1081,26 +1100,15 @@
 	drbg_string_fill(&data, entropy, entropylen);
 	list_add_tail(&data.list, &seedlist);
 
-	mutex_lock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
-
 	ret = drbg_get_random_bytes(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
 	if (ret)
-		goto unlock;
+		goto out;
 
-	/* Set seeded to false so that if __drbg_seed fails the
-	 * next generate call will trigger a reseed.
-	 */
-	drbg->seeded = false;
+	ret = __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, true, DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL);
 
-	__drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, true);
-
-	if (drbg->seeded)
-		drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg);
-
-unlock:
-	mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
-
+out:
 	memzero_explicit(entropy, entropylen);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1122,6 +1130,7 @@
 	unsigned int entropylen = drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags);
 	struct drbg_string data1;
 	LIST_HEAD(seedlist);
+	enum drbg_seed_state new_seed_state = DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL;
 
 	/* 9.1 / 9.2 / 9.3.1 step 3 */
 	if (pers && pers->len > (drbg_max_addtl(drbg))) {
@@ -1149,6 +1158,9 @@
 		BUG_ON((entropylen * 2) > sizeof(entropy));
 
 		/* Get seed from in-kernel /dev/urandom */
+		if (!rng_is_initialized())
+			new_seed_state = DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL;
+
 		ret = drbg_get_random_bytes(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
 		if (ret)
 			goto out;
@@ -1205,7 +1217,7 @@
 		memset(drbg->C, 0, drbg_statelen(drbg));
 	}
 
-	ret = __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, reseed);
+	ret = __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, reseed, new_seed_state);
 
 out:
 	memzero_explicit(entropy, entropylen * 2);
@@ -1385,19 +1397,25 @@
 	 * here. The spec is a bit convoluted here, we make it simpler.
 	 */
 	if (drbg->reseed_threshold < drbg->reseed_ctr)
-		drbg->seeded = false;
+		drbg->seeded = DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED;
 
-	if (drbg->pr || !drbg->seeded) {
+	if (drbg->pr || drbg->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED) {
 		pr_devel("DRBG: reseeding before generation (prediction "
 			 "resistance: %s, state %s)\n",
 			 drbg->pr ? "true" : "false",
-			 drbg->seeded ? "seeded" : "unseeded");
+			 (drbg->seeded ==  DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL ?
+			  "seeded" : "unseeded"));
 		/* 9.3.1 steps 7.1 through 7.3 */
 		len = drbg_seed(drbg, addtl, true);
 		if (len)
 			goto err;
 		/* 9.3.1 step 7.4 */
 		addtl = NULL;
+	} else if (rng_is_initialized() &&
+		   drbg->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL) {
+		len = drbg_seed_from_random(drbg);
+		if (len)
+			goto err;
 	}
 
 	if (addtl && 0 < addtl->len)
@@ -1490,51 +1508,15 @@
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void drbg_schedule_async_seed(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
-{
-	struct drbg_state *drbg = container_of(rdy, struct drbg_state,
-					       random_ready);
-
-	schedule_work(&drbg->seed_work);
-}
-
 static int drbg_prepare_hrng(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 {
-	int err;
-
 	/* We do not need an HRNG in test mode. */
 	if (list_empty(&drbg->test_data.list))
 		return 0;
 
 	drbg->jent = crypto_alloc_rng("jitterentropy_rng", 0, 0);
 
-	INIT_WORK(&drbg->seed_work, drbg_async_seed);
-
-	drbg->random_ready.owner = THIS_MODULE;
-	drbg->random_ready.func = drbg_schedule_async_seed;
-
-	err = add_random_ready_callback(&drbg->random_ready);
-
-	switch (err) {
-	case 0:
-		break;
-
-	case -EALREADY:
-		err = 0;
-		fallthrough;
-
-	default:
-		drbg->random_ready.func = NULL;
-		return err;
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * Require frequent reseeds until the seed source is fully
-	 * initialized.
-	 */
-	drbg->reseed_threshold = 50;
-
-	return err;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1577,7 +1559,7 @@
 	if (!drbg->core) {
 		drbg->core = &drbg_cores[coreref];
 		drbg->pr = pr;
-		drbg->seeded = false;
+		drbg->seeded = DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED;
 		drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg);
 
 		ret = drbg_alloc_state(drbg);
@@ -1628,11 +1610,6 @@
  */
 static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 {
-	if (drbg->random_ready.func) {
-		del_random_ready_callback(&drbg->random_ready);
-		cancel_work_sync(&drbg->seed_work);
-	}
-
 	if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(drbg->jent))
 		crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent);
 	drbg->jent = NULL;
diff --git a/crypto/ecrdsa.c b/crypto/ecrdsa.c
index 6a3fd09..f7ed430 100644
--- a/crypto/ecrdsa.c
+++ b/crypto/ecrdsa.c
@@ -113,15 +113,15 @@
 
 	/* Step 1: verify that 0 < r < q, 0 < s < q */
 	if (vli_is_zero(r, ndigits) ||
-	    vli_cmp(r, ctx->curve->n, ndigits) == 1 ||
+	    vli_cmp(r, ctx->curve->n, ndigits) >= 0 ||
 	    vli_is_zero(s, ndigits) ||
-	    vli_cmp(s, ctx->curve->n, ndigits) == 1)
+	    vli_cmp(s, ctx->curve->n, ndigits) >= 0)
 		return -EKEYREJECTED;
 
 	/* Step 2: calculate hash (h) of the message (passed as input) */
 	/* Step 3: calculate e = h \mod q */
 	vli_from_le64(e, digest, ndigits);
-	if (vli_cmp(e, ctx->curve->n, ndigits) == 1)
+	if (vli_cmp(e, ctx->curve->n, ndigits) >= 0)
 		vli_sub(e, e, ctx->curve->n, ndigits);
 	if (vli_is_zero(e, ndigits))
 		e[0] = 1;
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@
 	/* Step 6: calculate point C = z_1P + z_2Q, and R = x_c \mod q */
 	ecc_point_mult_shamir(&cc, z1, &ctx->curve->g, z2, &ctx->pub_key,
 			      ctx->curve);
-	if (vli_cmp(cc.x, ctx->curve->n, ndigits) == 1)
+	if (vli_cmp(cc.x, ctx->curve->n, ndigits) >= 0)
 		vli_sub(cc.x, cc.x, ctx->curve->n, ndigits);
 
 	/* Step 7: if R == r signature is valid */
diff --git a/crypto/memneq.c b/crypto/memneq.c
deleted file mode 100644
index afed1bd..0000000
--- a/crypto/memneq.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,168 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Constant-time equality testing of memory regions.
- *
- * Authors:
- *
- *   James Yonan <james@openvpn.net>
- *   Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
- *
- * This file is provided under a dual BSD/GPLv2 license.  When using or
- * redistributing this file, you may do so under either license.
- *
- * GPL LICENSE SUMMARY
- *
- * Copyright(c) 2013 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. All rights reserved.
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public License as
- * published by the Free Software Foundation.
- *
- * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
- * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
- * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
- * General Public License for more details.
- *
- * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
- * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St - Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
- * The full GNU General Public License is included in this distribution
- * in the file called LICENSE.GPL.
- *
- * BSD LICENSE
- *
- * Copyright(c) 2013 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- *   * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *   * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *     the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *     distribution.
- *   * Neither the name of OpenVPN Technologies nor the names of its
- *     contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
- *     from this software without specific prior written permission.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
- * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
- * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
- * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
- * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
- * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
- * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include <crypto/algapi.h>
-
-#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_CRYPTO_MEMNEQ
-
-/* Generic path for arbitrary size */
-static inline unsigned long
-__crypto_memneq_generic(const void *a, const void *b, size_t size)
-{
-	unsigned long neq = 0;
-
-#if defined(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)
-	while (size >= sizeof(unsigned long)) {
-		neq |= *(unsigned long *)a ^ *(unsigned long *)b;
-		OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq);
-		a += sizeof(unsigned long);
-		b += sizeof(unsigned long);
-		size -= sizeof(unsigned long);
-	}
-#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS */
-	while (size > 0) {
-		neq |= *(unsigned char *)a ^ *(unsigned char *)b;
-		OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq);
-		a += 1;
-		b += 1;
-		size -= 1;
-	}
-	return neq;
-}
-
-/* Loop-free fast-path for frequently used 16-byte size */
-static inline unsigned long __crypto_memneq_16(const void *a, const void *b)
-{
-	unsigned long neq = 0;
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
-	if (sizeof(unsigned long) == 8) {
-		neq |= *(unsigned long *)(a)   ^ *(unsigned long *)(b);
-		OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq);
-		neq |= *(unsigned long *)(a+8) ^ *(unsigned long *)(b+8);
-		OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq);
-	} else if (sizeof(unsigned int) == 4) {
-		neq |= *(unsigned int *)(a)    ^ *(unsigned int *)(b);
-		OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq);
-		neq |= *(unsigned int *)(a+4)  ^ *(unsigned int *)(b+4);
-		OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq);
-		neq |= *(unsigned int *)(a+8)  ^ *(unsigned int *)(b+8);
-		OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq);
-		neq |= *(unsigned int *)(a+12) ^ *(unsigned int *)(b+12);
-		OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq);
-	} else
-#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS */
-	{
-		neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a)    ^ *(unsigned char *)(b);
-		OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq);
-		neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a+1)  ^ *(unsigned char *)(b+1);
-		OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq);
-		neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a+2)  ^ *(unsigned char *)(b+2);
-		OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq);
-		neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a+3)  ^ *(unsigned char *)(b+3);
-		OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq);
-		neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a+4)  ^ *(unsigned char *)(b+4);
-		OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq);
-		neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a+5)  ^ *(unsigned char *)(b+5);
-		OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq);
-		neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a+6)  ^ *(unsigned char *)(b+6);
-		OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq);
-		neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a+7)  ^ *(unsigned char *)(b+7);
-		OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq);
-		neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a+8)  ^ *(unsigned char *)(b+8);
-		OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq);
-		neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a+9)  ^ *(unsigned char *)(b+9);
-		OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq);
-		neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a+10) ^ *(unsigned char *)(b+10);
-		OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq);
-		neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a+11) ^ *(unsigned char *)(b+11);
-		OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq);
-		neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a+12) ^ *(unsigned char *)(b+12);
-		OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq);
-		neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a+13) ^ *(unsigned char *)(b+13);
-		OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq);
-		neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a+14) ^ *(unsigned char *)(b+14);
-		OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq);
-		neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a+15) ^ *(unsigned char *)(b+15);
-		OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq);
-	}
-
-	return neq;
-}
-
-/* Compare two areas of memory without leaking timing information,
- * and with special optimizations for common sizes.  Users should
- * not call this function directly, but should instead use
- * crypto_memneq defined in crypto/algapi.h.
- */
-noinline unsigned long __crypto_memneq(const void *a, const void *b,
-				       size_t size)
-{
-	switch (size) {
-	case 16:
-		return __crypto_memneq_16(a, b);
-	default:
-		return __crypto_memneq_generic(a, b, size);
-	}
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(__crypto_memneq);
-
-#endif /* __HAVE_ARCH_CRYPTO_MEMNEQ */
diff --git a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c
index 8ac3e73..9d80483 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c
@@ -476,6 +476,8 @@
 	pos++;
 
 	if (digest_info) {
+		if (digest_info->size > dst_len - pos)
+			goto done;
 		if (crypto_memneq(out_buf + pos, digest_info->data,
 				  digest_info->size))
 			goto done;
@@ -495,7 +497,7 @@
 			   sg_nents_for_len(req->src,
 					    req->src_len + req->dst_len),
 			   req_ctx->out_buf + ctx->key_size,
-			   req->dst_len, ctx->key_size);
+			   req->dst_len, req->src_len);
 	/* Do the actual verification step. */
 	if (memcmp(req_ctx->out_buf + ctx->key_size, out_buf + pos,
 		   req->dst_len) != 0)
@@ -538,7 +540,7 @@
 
 	if (WARN_ON(req->dst) ||
 	    WARN_ON(!req->dst_len) ||
-	    !ctx->key_size || req->src_len < ctx->key_size)
+	    !ctx->key_size || req->src_len != ctx->key_size)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	req_ctx->out_buf = kmalloc(ctx->key_size + req->dst_len, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -621,6 +623,11 @@
 
 	rsa_alg = crypto_spawn_akcipher_alg(&ctx->spawn);
 
+	if (strcmp(rsa_alg->base.cra_name, "rsa") != 0) {
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto err_free_inst;
+	}
+
 	err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
 	hash_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[2]);
 	if (IS_ERR(hash_name)) {