v4.19.13 snapshot.
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0716af2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+/*
+ * Module and Firmware Pinning Security Module
+ *
+ * Copyright 2011-2016 Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+ *
+ * This software is licensed under the terms of the GNU General Public
+ * License version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation, and
+ * may be copied, distributed, and modified under those terms.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "LoadPin: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/path.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>	/* current */
+#include <linux/string_helpers.h>
+
+static void report_load(const char *origin, struct file *file, char *operation)
+{
+	char *cmdline, *pathname;
+
+	pathname = kstrdup_quotable_file(file, GFP_KERNEL);
+	cmdline = kstrdup_quotable_cmdline(current, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+	pr_notice("%s %s obj=%s%s%s pid=%d cmdline=%s%s%s\n",
+		  origin, operation,
+		  (pathname && pathname[0] != '<') ? "\"" : "",
+		  pathname,
+		  (pathname && pathname[0] != '<') ? "\"" : "",
+		  task_pid_nr(current),
+		  cmdline ? "\"" : "", cmdline, cmdline ? "\"" : "");
+
+	kfree(cmdline);
+	kfree(pathname);
+}
+
+static int enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENABLED);
+static struct super_block *pinned_root;
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pinned_root_spinlock);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+static int zero;
+static int one = 1;
+
+static struct ctl_path loadpin_sysctl_path[] = {
+	{ .procname = "kernel", },
+	{ .procname = "loadpin", },
+	{ }
+};
+
+static struct ctl_table loadpin_sysctl_table[] = {
+	{
+		.procname       = "enabled",
+		.data           = &enabled,
+		.maxlen         = sizeof(int),
+		.mode           = 0644,
+		.proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1         = &zero,
+		.extra2         = &one,
+	},
+	{ }
+};
+
+/*
+ * This must be called after early kernel init, since then the rootdev
+ * is available.
+ */
+static void check_pinning_enforcement(struct super_block *mnt_sb)
+{
+	bool ro = false;
+
+	/*
+	 * If load pinning is not enforced via a read-only block
+	 * device, allow sysctl to change modes for testing.
+	 */
+	if (mnt_sb->s_bdev) {
+		ro = bdev_read_only(mnt_sb->s_bdev);
+		pr_info("dev(%u,%u): %s\n",
+			MAJOR(mnt_sb->s_bdev->bd_dev),
+			MINOR(mnt_sb->s_bdev->bd_dev),
+			ro ? "read-only" : "writable");
+	} else
+		pr_info("mnt_sb lacks block device, treating as: writable\n");
+
+	if (!ro) {
+		if (!register_sysctl_paths(loadpin_sysctl_path,
+					   loadpin_sysctl_table))
+			pr_notice("sysctl registration failed!\n");
+		else
+			pr_info("load pinning can be disabled.\n");
+	} else
+		pr_info("load pinning engaged.\n");
+}
+#else
+static void check_pinning_enforcement(struct super_block *mnt_sb)
+{
+	pr_info("load pinning engaged.\n");
+}
+#endif
+
+static void loadpin_sb_free_security(struct super_block *mnt_sb)
+{
+	/*
+	 * When unmounting the filesystem we were using for load
+	 * pinning, we acknowledge the superblock release, but make sure
+	 * no other modules or firmware can be loaded.
+	 */
+	if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pinned_root) && mnt_sb == pinned_root) {
+		pinned_root = ERR_PTR(-EIO);
+		pr_info("umount pinned fs: refusing further loads\n");
+	}
+}
+
+static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+	struct super_block *load_root;
+	const char *origin = kernel_read_file_id_str(id);
+
+	/* This handles the older init_module API that has a NULL file. */
+	if (!file) {
+		if (!enabled) {
+			report_load(origin, NULL, "old-api-pinning-ignored");
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		report_load(origin, NULL, "old-api-denied");
+		return -EPERM;
+	}
+
+	load_root = file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb;
+
+	/* First loaded module/firmware defines the root for all others. */
+	spin_lock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
+	/*
+	 * pinned_root is only NULL at startup. Otherwise, it is either
+	 * a valid reference, or an ERR_PTR.
+	 */
+	if (!pinned_root) {
+		pinned_root = load_root;
+		/*
+		 * Unlock now since it's only pinned_root we care about.
+		 * In the worst case, we will (correctly) report pinning
+		 * failures before we have announced that pinning is
+		 * enabled. This would be purely cosmetic.
+		 */
+		spin_unlock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
+		check_pinning_enforcement(pinned_root);
+		report_load(origin, file, "pinned");
+	} else {
+		spin_unlock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
+	}
+
+	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pinned_root) || load_root != pinned_root) {
+		if (unlikely(!enabled)) {
+			report_load(origin, file, "pinning-ignored");
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		report_load(origin, file, "denied");
+		return -EPERM;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
+{
+	return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id);
+}
+
+static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, loadpin_load_data),
+};
+
+void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void)
+{
+	pr_info("ready to pin (currently %sabled)", enabled ? "en" : "dis");
+	security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
+}
+
+/* Should not be mutable after boot, so not listed in sysfs (perm == 0). */
+module_param(enabled, int, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(enabled, "Pin module/firmware loading (default: true)");