v4.19.13 snapshot.
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..faac9ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Leendert van Doorn <leendert@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * File: ima_init.c
+ * initialization and cleanup functions
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+/* name for boot aggregate entry */
+static const char *boot_aggregate_name = "boot_aggregate";
+struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip;
+
+/* Add the boot aggregate to the IMA measurement list and extend
+ * the PCR register.
+ *
+ * Calculate the boot aggregate, a SHA1 over tpm registers 0-7,
+ * assuming a TPM chip exists, and zeroes if the TPM chip does not
+ * exist. Add the boot aggregate measurement to the measurement
+ * list and extend the PCR register.
+ *
+ * If a tpm chip does not exist, indicate the core root of trust is
+ * not hardware based by invalidating the aggregate PCR value.
+ * (The aggregate PCR value is invalidated by adding one value to
+ * the measurement list and extending the aggregate PCR value with
+ * a different value.) Violations add a zero entry to the measurement
+ * list and extend the aggregate PCR value with ff...ff's.
+ */
+static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
+{
+ static const char op[] = "add_boot_aggregate";
+ const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
+ struct ima_template_entry *entry;
+ struct integrity_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint;
+ struct ima_event_data event_data = {iint, NULL, boot_aggregate_name,
+ NULL, 0, NULL};
+ int result = -ENOMEM;
+ int violation = 0;
+ struct {
+ struct ima_digest_data hdr;
+ char digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ } hash;
+
+ memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
+ memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
+ iint->ima_hash = &hash.hdr;
+ iint->ima_hash->algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+ iint->ima_hash->length = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
+
+ if (ima_tpm_chip) {
+ result = ima_calc_boot_aggregate(&hash.hdr);
+ if (result < 0) {
+ audit_cause = "hashing_error";
+ goto err_out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry);
+ if (result < 0) {
+ audit_cause = "alloc_entry";
+ goto err_out;
+ }
+
+ result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL,
+ boot_aggregate_name,
+ CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX);
+ if (result < 0) {
+ ima_free_template_entry(entry);
+ audit_cause = "store_entry";
+ goto err_out;
+ }
+ return 0;
+err_out:
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, boot_aggregate_name, op,
+ audit_cause, result, 0);
+ return result;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509
+void __init ima_load_x509(void)
+{
+ int unset_flags = ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE;
+
+ ima_policy_flag &= ~unset_flags;
+ integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH);
+ ima_policy_flag |= unset_flags;
+}
+#endif
+
+int __init ima_init(void)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ ima_tpm_chip = tpm_default_chip();
+ if (!ima_tpm_chip)
+ pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n");
+
+ rc = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = ima_init_crypto();
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = ima_init_template();
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ ima_load_kexec_buffer();
+
+ rc = ima_add_boot_aggregate(); /* boot aggregate must be first entry */
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ ima_init_policy();
+
+ return ima_fs_init();
+}