v4.19.13 snapshot.
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..73f7211
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3944 @@
+/*
+ BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux
+ Copyright (C) 2011 Nokia Corporation and/or its subsidiary(-ies).
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ published by the Free Software Foundation;
+
+ THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
+ OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+ FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS.
+ IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES
+ WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+
+ ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS,
+ COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS
+ SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED.
+*/
+
+#include <linux/debugfs.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
+#include <crypto/b128ops.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/kpp.h>
+
+#include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
+#include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
+#include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
+#include <net/bluetooth/mgmt.h>
+
+#include "ecdh_helper.h"
+#include "smp.h"
+
+#define SMP_DEV(hdev) \
+ ((struct smp_dev *)((struct l2cap_chan *)((hdev)->smp_data))->data)
+
+/* Low-level debug macros to be used for stuff that we don't want
+ * accidentially in dmesg, i.e. the values of the various crypto keys
+ * and the inputs & outputs of crypto functions.
+ */
+#ifdef DEBUG
+#define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \
+ ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#else
+#define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) no_printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \
+ ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#endif
+
+#define SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, code) set_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd)
+
+/* Keys which are not distributed with Secure Connections */
+#define SMP_SC_NO_DIST (SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY);
+
+#define SMP_TIMEOUT msecs_to_jiffies(30000)
+
+#define AUTH_REQ_MASK(dev) (hci_dev_test_flag(dev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) ? \
+ 0x3f : 0x07)
+#define KEY_DIST_MASK 0x07
+
+/* Maximum message length that can be passed to aes_cmac */
+#define CMAC_MSG_MAX 80
+
+enum {
+ SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID,
+ SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING,
+ SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH,
+ SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE,
+ SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR,
+ SMP_FLAG_SC,
+ SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK,
+ SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY,
+ SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER,
+ SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING,
+ SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB,
+ SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB,
+ SMP_FLAG_CT2,
+};
+
+struct smp_dev {
+ /* Secure Connections OOB data */
+ bool local_oob;
+ u8 local_pk[64];
+ u8 local_rand[16];
+ bool debug_key;
+
+ u8 min_key_size;
+ u8 max_key_size;
+
+ struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes;
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
+ struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
+};
+
+struct smp_chan {
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn;
+ struct delayed_work security_timer;
+ unsigned long allow_cmd; /* Bitmask of allowed commands */
+
+ u8 preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */
+ u8 prsp[7]; /* SMP Pairing Response */
+ u8 prnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (local) */
+ u8 rrnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (remote) */
+ u8 pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */
+ u8 tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */
+ u8 rr[16]; /* Remote OOB ra/rb value */
+ u8 lr[16]; /* Local OOB ra/rb value */
+ u8 enc_key_size;
+ u8 remote_key_dist;
+ bdaddr_t id_addr;
+ u8 id_addr_type;
+ u8 irk[16];
+ struct smp_csrk *csrk;
+ struct smp_csrk *slave_csrk;
+ struct smp_ltk *ltk;
+ struct smp_ltk *slave_ltk;
+ struct smp_irk *remote_irk;
+ u8 *link_key;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ u8 method;
+ u8 passkey_round;
+
+ /* Secure Connections variables */
+ u8 local_pk[64];
+ u8 remote_pk[64];
+ u8 dhkey[32];
+ u8 mackey[16];
+
+ struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes;
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
+ struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
+};
+
+/* These debug key values are defined in the SMP section of the core
+ * specification. debug_pk is the public debug key and debug_sk the
+ * private debug key.
+ */
+static const u8 debug_pk[64] = {
+ 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
+ 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
+ 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
+ 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20,
+
+ 0x8b, 0xd2, 0x89, 0x15, 0xd0, 0x8e, 0x1c, 0x74,
+ 0x24, 0x30, 0xed, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x45, 0x63, 0x76,
+ 0x5c, 0x15, 0x52, 0x5a, 0xbf, 0x9a, 0x32, 0x63,
+ 0x6d, 0xeb, 0x2a, 0x65, 0x49, 0x9c, 0x80, 0xdc,
+};
+
+static const u8 debug_sk[32] = {
+ 0xbd, 0x1a, 0x3c, 0xcd, 0xa6, 0xb8, 0x99, 0x58,
+ 0x99, 0xb7, 0x40, 0xeb, 0x7b, 0x60, 0xff, 0x4a,
+ 0x50, 0x3f, 0x10, 0xd2, 0xe3, 0xb3, 0xc9, 0x74,
+ 0x38, 0x5f, 0xc5, 0xa3, 0xd4, 0xf6, 0x49, 0x3f,
+};
+
+static inline void swap_buf(const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+ dst[len - 1 - i] = src[i];
+}
+
+/* The following functions map to the LE SC SMP crypto functions
+ * AES-CMAC, f4, f5, f6, g2 and h6.
+ */
+
+static int aes_cmac(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 k[16], const u8 *m,
+ size_t len, u8 mac[16])
+{
+ uint8_t tmp[16], mac_msb[16], msg_msb[CMAC_MSG_MAX];
+ SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
+ int err;
+
+ if (len > CMAC_MSG_MAX)
+ return -EFBIG;
+
+ if (!tfm) {
+ BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ desc->tfm = tfm;
+ desc->flags = 0;
+
+ /* Swap key and message from LSB to MSB */
+ swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
+ swap_buf(m, msg_msb, len);
+
+ SMP_DBG("msg (len %zu) %*phN", len, (int) len, m);
+ SMP_DBG("key %16phN", k);
+
+ err = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16);
+ if (err) {
+ BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, msg_msb, len, mac_msb);
+ shash_desc_zero(desc);
+ if (err) {
+ BT_ERR("Hash computation error %d", err);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ swap_buf(mac_msb, mac, 16);
+
+ SMP_DBG("mac %16phN", mac);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_f4(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32],
+ const u8 v[32], const u8 x[16], u8 z, u8 res[16])
+{
+ u8 m[65];
+ int err;
+
+ SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u);
+ SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v);
+ SMP_DBG("x %16phN z %02x", x, z);
+
+ m[0] = z;
+ memcpy(m + 1, v, 32);
+ memcpy(m + 33, u, 32);
+
+ err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), res);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int smp_f5(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[32],
+ const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 a1[7],
+ const u8 a2[7], u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
+{
+ /* The btle, salt and length "magic" values are as defined in
+ * the SMP section of the Bluetooth core specification. In ASCII
+ * the btle value ends up being 'btle'. The salt is just a
+ * random number whereas length is the value 256 in little
+ * endian format.
+ */
+ const u8 btle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x62 };
+ const u8 salt[16] = { 0xbe, 0x83, 0x60, 0x5a, 0xdb, 0x0b, 0x37, 0x60,
+ 0x38, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x91, 0x83, 0x88, 0x6c };
+ const u8 length[2] = { 0x00, 0x01 };
+ u8 m[53], t[16];
+ int err;
+
+ SMP_DBG("w %32phN", w);
+ SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
+ SMP_DBG("a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", a1, a2);
+
+ err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 32, t);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ SMP_DBG("t %16phN", t);
+
+ memcpy(m, length, 2);
+ memcpy(m + 2, a2, 7);
+ memcpy(m + 9, a1, 7);
+ memcpy(m + 16, n2, 16);
+ memcpy(m + 32, n1, 16);
+ memcpy(m + 48, btle, 4);
+
+ m[52] = 0; /* Counter */
+
+ err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), mackey);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ SMP_DBG("mackey %16phN", mackey);
+
+ m[52] = 1; /* Counter */
+
+ err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), ltk);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ SMP_DBG("ltk %16phN", ltk);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_f6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
+ const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 r[16],
+ const u8 io_cap[3], const u8 a1[7], const u8 a2[7],
+ u8 res[16])
+{
+ u8 m[65];
+ int err;
+
+ SMP_DBG("w %16phN", w);
+ SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
+ SMP_DBG("r %16phN io_cap %3phN a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", r, io_cap, a1, a2);
+
+ memcpy(m, a2, 7);
+ memcpy(m + 7, a1, 7);
+ memcpy(m + 14, io_cap, 3);
+ memcpy(m + 17, r, 16);
+ memcpy(m + 33, n2, 16);
+ memcpy(m + 49, n1, 16);
+
+ err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, m, sizeof(m), res);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int smp_g2(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32],
+ const u8 x[16], const u8 y[16], u32 *val)
+{
+ u8 m[80], tmp[16];
+ int err;
+
+ SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u);
+ SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v);
+ SMP_DBG("x %16phN y %16phN", x, y);
+
+ memcpy(m, y, 16);
+ memcpy(m + 16, v, 32);
+ memcpy(m + 48, u, 32);
+
+ err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), tmp);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ *val = get_unaligned_le32(tmp);
+ *val %= 1000000;
+
+ SMP_DBG("val %06u", *val);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
+ const u8 key_id[4], u8 res[16])
+{
+ int err;
+
+ SMP_DBG("w %16phN key_id %4phN", w, key_id);
+
+ err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, 4, res);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int smp_h7(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
+ const u8 salt[16], u8 res[16])
+{
+ int err;
+
+ SMP_DBG("w %16phN salt %16phN", w, salt);
+
+ err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 16, res);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/* The following functions map to the legacy SMP crypto functions e, c1,
+ * s1 and ah.
+ */
+
+static int smp_e(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r)
+{
+ uint8_t tmp[16], data[16];
+ int err;
+
+ SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r);
+
+ if (!tfm) {
+ BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* The most significant octet of key corresponds to k[0] */
+ swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
+
+ err = crypto_cipher_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16);
+ if (err) {
+ BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /* Most significant octet of plaintextData corresponds to data[0] */
+ swap_buf(r, data, 16);
+
+ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, data, data);
+
+ /* Most significant octet of encryptedData corresponds to data[0] */
+ swap_buf(data, r, 16);
+
+ SMP_DBG("r %16phN", r);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int smp_c1(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes, const u8 k[16],
+ const u8 r[16], const u8 preq[7], const u8 pres[7], u8 _iat,
+ const bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat, const bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16])
+{
+ u8 p1[16], p2[16];
+ int err;
+
+ SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r);
+ SMP_DBG("iat %u ia %6phN rat %u ra %6phN", _iat, ia, _rat, ra);
+ SMP_DBG("preq %7phN pres %7phN", preq, pres);
+
+ memset(p1, 0, 16);
+
+ /* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */
+ p1[0] = _iat;
+ p1[1] = _rat;
+ memcpy(p1 + 2, preq, 7);
+ memcpy(p1 + 9, pres, 7);
+
+ SMP_DBG("p1 %16phN", p1);
+
+ /* res = r XOR p1 */
+ u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) r, (u128 *) p1);
+
+ /* res = e(k, res) */
+ err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, res);
+ if (err) {
+ BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /* p2 = padding || ia || ra */
+ memcpy(p2, ra, 6);
+ memcpy(p2 + 6, ia, 6);
+ memset(p2 + 12, 0, 4);
+
+ SMP_DBG("p2 %16phN", p2);
+
+ /* res = res XOR p2 */
+ u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) res, (u128 *) p2);
+
+ /* res = e(k, res) */
+ err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, res);
+ if (err)
+ BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int smp_s1(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes, const u8 k[16],
+ const u8 r1[16], const u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16])
+{
+ int err;
+
+ /* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */
+ memcpy(_r, r2, 8);
+ memcpy(_r + 8, r1, 8);
+
+ err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, _r);
+ if (err)
+ BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int smp_ah(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, const u8 irk[16],
+ const u8 r[3], u8 res[3])
+{
+ u8 _res[16];
+ int err;
+
+ /* r' = padding || r */
+ memcpy(_res, r, 3);
+ memset(_res + 3, 0, 13);
+
+ err = smp_e(tfm, irk, _res);
+ if (err) {
+ BT_ERR("Encrypt error");
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /* The output of the random address function ah is:
+ * ah(k, r) = e(k, r') mod 2^24
+ * The output of the security function e is then truncated to 24 bits
+ * by taking the least significant 24 bits of the output of e as the
+ * result of ah.
+ */
+ memcpy(res, _res, 3);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16],
+ const bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
+{
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
+ struct smp_dev *smp;
+ u8 hash[3];
+ int err;
+
+ if (!chan || !chan->data)
+ return false;
+
+ smp = chan->data;
+
+ BT_DBG("RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk);
+
+ err = smp_ah(smp->tfm_aes, irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash);
+ if (err)
+ return false;
+
+ return !crypto_memneq(bdaddr->b, hash, 3);
+}
+
+int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
+{
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
+ struct smp_dev *smp;
+ int err;
+
+ if (!chan || !chan->data)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ smp = chan->data;
+
+ get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3);
+
+ rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f; /* Clear two most significant bits */
+ rpa->b[5] |= 0x40; /* Set second most significant bit */
+
+ err = smp_ah(smp->tfm_aes, irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+
+ BT_DBG("RPA %pMR", rpa);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16])
+{
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
+ struct smp_dev *smp;
+ int err;
+
+ if (!chan || !chan->data)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ smp = chan->data;
+
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
+ BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
+ err = set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
+ smp->debug_key = true;
+ } else {
+ while (true) {
+ /* Generate key pair for Secure Connections */
+ err = generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
+ * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
+ */
+ if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64))
+ break;
+ }
+ smp->debug_key = false;
+ }
+
+ SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
+ SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
+
+ get_random_bytes(smp->local_rand, 16);
+
+ err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->local_pk,
+ smp->local_rand, 0, hash);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+
+ memcpy(rand, smp->local_rand, 16);
+
+ smp->local_oob = true;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
+{
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp;
+ struct kvec iv[2];
+ struct msghdr msg;
+
+ if (!chan)
+ return;
+
+ BT_DBG("code 0x%2.2x", code);
+
+ iv[0].iov_base = &code;
+ iv[0].iov_len = 1;
+
+ iv[1].iov_base = data;
+ iv[1].iov_len = len;
+
+ memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
+
+ iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE | ITER_KVEC, iv, 2, 1 + len);
+
+ l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, 1 + len);
+
+ if (!chan->data)
+ return;
+
+ smp = chan->data;
+
+ cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
+ schedule_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer, SMP_TIMEOUT);
+}
+
+static u8 authreq_to_seclevel(u8 authreq)
+{
+ if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM) {
+ if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)
+ return BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
+ else
+ return BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
+ } else {
+ return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
+ }
+}
+
+static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 sec_level)
+{
+ switch (sec_level) {
+ case BT_SECURITY_FIPS:
+ case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
+ return SMP_AUTH_MITM | SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
+ case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
+ return SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
+ default:
+ return SMP_AUTH_NONE;
+ }
+}
+
+static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp, __u8 authreq)
+{
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+ u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0, oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
+
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) {
+ local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
+ remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
+ authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
+ } else {
+ authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
+ }
+
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING))
+ remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
+
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY))
+ local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
+
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) &&
+ (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)) {
+ struct oob_data *oob_data;
+ u8 bdaddr_type;
+
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED)) {
+ local_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
+ remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
+ }
+
+ if (hcon->dst_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC)
+ bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
+ else
+ bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
+
+ oob_data = hci_find_remote_oob_data(hdev, &hcon->dst,
+ bdaddr_type);
+ if (oob_data && oob_data->present) {
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags);
+ oob_flag = SMP_OOB_PRESENT;
+ memcpy(smp->rr, oob_data->rand256, 16);
+ memcpy(smp->pcnf, oob_data->hash256, 16);
+ SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Confirmation: %16phN", smp->pcnf);
+ SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Random: %16phN", smp->rr);
+ }
+
+ } else {
+ authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_SC;
+ }
+
+ if (rsp == NULL) {
+ req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
+ req->oob_flag = oob_flag;
+ req->max_key_size = SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size;
+ req->init_key_dist = local_dist;
+ req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist;
+ req->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
+
+ smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ rsp->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
+ rsp->oob_flag = oob_flag;
+ rsp->max_key_size = SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size;
+ rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
+ rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
+ rsp->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
+
+ smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
+}
+
+static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size)
+{
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+
+ if (max_key_size > SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size ||
+ max_key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE)
+ return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+
+ smp->enc_key_size = max_key_size;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
+{
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ bool complete;
+
+ BUG_ON(!smp);
+
+ cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
+
+ complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
+ mgmt_smp_complete(hcon, complete);
+
+ kzfree(smp->csrk);
+ kzfree(smp->slave_csrk);
+ kzfree(smp->link_key);
+
+ crypto_free_cipher(smp->tfm_aes);
+ crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
+ crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
+
+ /* Ensure that we don't leave any debug key around if debug key
+ * support hasn't been explicitly enabled.
+ */
+ if (smp->ltk && smp->ltk->type == SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG &&
+ !hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
+ list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list);
+ kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
+ smp->ltk = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */
+ if (!complete) {
+ if (smp->ltk) {
+ list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list);
+ kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
+ }
+
+ if (smp->slave_ltk) {
+ list_del_rcu(&smp->slave_ltk->list);
+ kfree_rcu(smp->slave_ltk, rcu);
+ }
+
+ if (smp->remote_irk) {
+ list_del_rcu(&smp->remote_irk->list);
+ kfree_rcu(smp->remote_irk, rcu);
+ }
+ }
+
+ chan->data = NULL;
+ kzfree(smp);
+ hci_conn_drop(hcon);
+}
+
+static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason)
+{
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+
+ if (reason)
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason),
+ &reason);
+
+ mgmt_auth_failed(hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
+
+ if (chan->data)
+ smp_chan_destroy(conn);
+}
+
+#define JUST_WORKS 0x00
+#define JUST_CFM 0x01
+#define REQ_PASSKEY 0x02
+#define CFM_PASSKEY 0x03
+#define REQ_OOB 0x04
+#define DSP_PASSKEY 0x05
+#define OVERLAP 0xFF
+
+static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = {
+ { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
+ { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
+ { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
+ { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM },
+ { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP },
+};
+
+static const u8 sc_method[5][5] = {
+ { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
+ { JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
+ { DSP_PASSKEY, DSP_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, DSP_PASSKEY },
+ { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM },
+ { DSP_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
+};
+
+static u8 get_auth_method(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
+{
+ /* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST_CFM (which gets
+ * converted later to JUST_WORKS if we're initiators.
+ */
+ if (local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY ||
+ remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY)
+ return JUST_CFM;
+
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
+ return sc_method[remote_io][local_io];
+
+ return gen_method[remote_io][local_io];
+}
+
+static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
+ u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
+{
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+ u32 passkey = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /* Initialize key for JUST WORKS */
+ memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
+ clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
+
+ BT_DBG("tk_request: auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, remote_io);
+
+ /* If neither side wants MITM, either "just" confirm an incoming
+ * request or use just-works for outgoing ones. The JUST_CFM
+ * will be converted to JUST_WORKS if necessary later in this
+ * function. If either side has MITM look up the method from the
+ * table.
+ */
+ if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM))
+ smp->method = JUST_CFM;
+ else
+ smp->method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
+
+ /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
+ if (smp->method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR,
+ &smp->flags))
+ smp->method = JUST_WORKS;
+
+ /* Don't bother user space with no IO capabilities */
+ if (smp->method == JUST_CFM &&
+ hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
+ smp->method = JUST_WORKS;
+
+ /* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK */
+ if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS) {
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* If this function is used for SC -> legacy fallback we
+ * can only recover the just-works case.
+ */
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */
+ if (smp->method != JUST_CFM) {
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->flags);
+ if (hcon->pending_sec_level < BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
+ hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
+ }
+
+ /* If both devices have Keyoard-Display I/O, the master
+ * Confirms and the slave Enters the passkey.
+ */
+ if (smp->method == OVERLAP) {
+ if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
+ smp->method = CFM_PASSKEY;
+ else
+ smp->method = REQ_PASSKEY;
+ }
+
+ /* Generate random passkey. */
+ if (smp->method == CFM_PASSKEY) {
+ memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
+ get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey));
+ passkey %= 1000000;
+ put_unaligned_le32(passkey, smp->tk);
+ BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", passkey);
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
+ }
+
+ if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY)
+ ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
+ hcon->type, hcon->dst_type);
+ else if (smp->method == JUST_CFM)
+ ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
+ hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
+ passkey, 1);
+ else
+ ret = mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
+ hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
+ passkey, 0);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static u8 smp_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
+ int ret;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+ ret = smp_c1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
+ conn->hcon->init_addr_type, &conn->hcon->init_addr,
+ conn->hcon->resp_addr_type, &conn->hcon->resp_addr,
+ cp.confirm_val);
+ if (ret)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
+
+ smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+
+ if (conn->hcon->out)
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+ else
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ u8 confirm[16];
+ int ret;
+
+ if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(smp->tfm_aes))
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
+
+ ret = smp_c1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
+ hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr,
+ hcon->resp_addr_type, &hcon->resp_addr, confirm);
+ if (ret)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, confirm, sizeof(smp->pcnf))) {
+ bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "pairing failed "
+ "(confirmation values mismatch)");
+ return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ if (hcon->out) {
+ u8 stk[16];
+ __le64 rand = 0;
+ __le16 ediv = 0;
+
+ smp_s1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk);
+
+ if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ hci_le_start_enc(hcon, ediv, rand, stk, smp->enc_key_size);
+ hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
+ set_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
+ } else {
+ u8 stk[16], auth;
+ __le64 rand = 0;
+ __le16 ediv = 0;
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
+ smp->prnd);
+
+ smp_s1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk);
+
+ if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
+ auth = 1;
+ else
+ auth = 0;
+
+ /* Even though there's no _SLAVE suffix this is the
+ * slave STK we're adding for later lookup (the master
+ * STK never needs to be stored).
+ */
+ hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
+ SMP_STK, auth, stk, smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
+{
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
+ bool persistent;
+
+ if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
+ if (hcon->key_type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION)
+ persistent = false;
+ else
+ persistent = !test_bit(HCI_CONN_FLUSH_KEY,
+ &hcon->flags);
+ } else {
+ /* The LTKs, IRKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if
+ * both sides had the bonding bit set in their
+ * authentication requests.
+ */
+ persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) &
+ SMP_AUTH_BONDING);
+ }
+
+ if (smp->remote_irk) {
+ mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk, persistent);
+
+ /* Now that user space can be considered to know the
+ * identity address track the connection based on it
+ * from now on (assuming this is an LE link).
+ */
+ if (hcon->type == LE_LINK) {
+ bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr);
+ hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type;
+ queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &conn->id_addr_update_work);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (smp->csrk) {
+ smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
+ bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
+ mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent);
+ }
+
+ if (smp->slave_csrk) {
+ smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
+ bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
+ mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent);
+ }
+
+ if (smp->ltk) {
+ smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
+ bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
+ mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent);
+ }
+
+ if (smp->slave_ltk) {
+ smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
+ bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
+ mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent);
+ }
+
+ if (smp->link_key) {
+ struct link_key *key;
+ u8 type;
+
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
+ type = HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION;
+ else if (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
+ type = HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256;
+ else
+ type = HCI_LK_UNAUTH_COMBINATION_P256;
+
+ key = hci_add_link_key(hdev, smp->conn->hcon, &hcon->dst,
+ smp->link_key, type, 0, &persistent);
+ if (key) {
+ mgmt_new_link_key(hdev, key, persistent);
+
+ /* Don't keep debug keys around if the relevant
+ * flag is not set.
+ */
+ if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS) &&
+ key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION) {
+ list_del_rcu(&key->list);
+ kfree_rcu(key, rcu);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void sc_add_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
+ u8 key_type, auth;
+
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
+ key_type = SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG;
+ else
+ key_type = SMP_LTK_P256;
+
+ if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
+ auth = 1;
+ else
+ auth = 0;
+
+ smp->ltk = hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
+ key_type, auth, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
+ 0, 0);
+}
+
+static void sc_generate_link_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+ /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'lebr'. */
+ const u8 lebr[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c };
+
+ smp->link_key = kzalloc(16, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!smp->link_key)
+ return;
+
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags)) {
+ /* SALT = 0x00000000000000000000000000000000746D7031 */
+ const u8 salt[16] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
+
+ if (smp_h7(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, salt, smp->link_key)) {
+ kzfree(smp->link_key);
+ smp->link_key = NULL;
+ return;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'tmp1'. */
+ const u8 tmp1[4] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
+
+ if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, tmp1, smp->link_key)) {
+ kzfree(smp->link_key);
+ smp->link_key = NULL;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->link_key, lebr, smp->link_key)) {
+ kzfree(smp->link_key);
+ smp->link_key = NULL;
+ return;
+ }
+}
+
+static void smp_allow_key_dist(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+ /* Allow the first expected phase 3 PDU. The rest of the PDUs
+ * will be allowed in each PDU handler to ensure we receive
+ * them in the correct order.
+ */
+ if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY)
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO);
+ else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);
+ else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
+}
+
+static void sc_generate_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+ /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'brle'. */
+ const u8 brle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x72, 0x62 };
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+ struct link_key *key;
+
+ key = hci_find_link_key(hdev, &hcon->dst);
+ if (!key) {
+ bt_dev_err(hdev, "no Link Key found to generate LTK");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION)
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
+
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags)) {
+ /* SALT = 0x00000000000000000000000000000000746D7032 */
+ const u8 salt[16] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
+
+ if (smp_h7(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, salt, smp->tk))
+ return;
+ } else {
+ /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'tmp2'. */
+ const u8 tmp2[4] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
+
+ if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, tmp2, smp->tk))
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, brle, smp->tk))
+ return;
+
+ sc_add_ltk(smp);
+}
+
+static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+ __u8 *keydist;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+ rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
+
+ /* The responder sends its keys first */
+ if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) {
+ smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+
+ if (hcon->out) {
+ keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist;
+ *keydist &= req->init_key_dist;
+ } else {
+ keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist;
+ *keydist &= req->resp_key_dist;
+ }
+
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
+ if (hcon->type == LE_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY))
+ sc_generate_link_key(smp);
+ if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY))
+ sc_generate_ltk(smp);
+
+ /* Clear the keys which are generated but not distributed */
+ *keydist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
+ }
+
+ BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist);
+
+ if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
+ struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc;
+ struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident;
+ struct smp_ltk *ltk;
+ u8 authenticated;
+ __le16 ediv;
+ __le64 rand;
+
+ /* Make sure we generate only the significant amount of
+ * bytes based on the encryption key size, and set the rest
+ * of the value to zeroes.
+ */
+ get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, smp->enc_key_size);
+ memset(enc.ltk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
+ sizeof(enc.ltk) - smp->enc_key_size);
+
+ get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv));
+ get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand));
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc);
+
+ authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
+ ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
+ SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk,
+ smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
+ smp->slave_ltk = ltk;
+
+ ident.ediv = ediv;
+ ident.rand = rand;
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident);
+
+ *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
+ }
+
+ if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) {
+ struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo;
+ struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo;
+
+ memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk));
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo);
+
+ /* The hci_conn contains the local identity address
+ * after the connection has been established.
+ *
+ * This is true even when the connection has been
+ * established using a resolvable random address.
+ */
+ bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src);
+ addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type;
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo),
+ &addrinfo);
+
+ *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
+ }
+
+ if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) {
+ struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign;
+ struct smp_csrk *csrk;
+
+ /* Generate a new random key */
+ get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk));
+
+ csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (csrk) {
+ if (hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
+ csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_AUTHENTICATED;
+ else
+ csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_UNAUTHENTICATED;
+ memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
+ }
+ smp->slave_csrk = csrk;
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign);
+
+ *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
+ }
+
+ /* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */
+ if (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK) {
+ smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
+ smp_notify_keys(conn);
+
+ smp_chan_destroy(conn);
+}
+
+static void smp_timeout(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan,
+ security_timer.work);
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+ hci_disconnect(conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM);
+}
+
+static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
+{
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp;
+
+ smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!smp)
+ return NULL;
+
+ smp->tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_aes)) {
+ BT_ERR("Unable to create AES crypto context");
+ goto zfree_smp;
+ }
+
+ smp->tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_cmac)) {
+ BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
+ goto free_cipher;
+ }
+
+ smp->tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_ecdh)) {
+ BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
+ goto free_shash;
+ }
+
+ smp->conn = conn;
+ chan->data = smp;
+
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL);
+
+ INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&smp->security_timer, smp_timeout);
+
+ hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon);
+
+ return smp;
+
+free_shash:
+ crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
+free_cipher:
+ crypto_free_cipher(smp->tfm_aes);
+zfree_smp:
+ kzfree(smp);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int sc_mackey_and_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
+{
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
+ u8 *na, *nb, a[7], b[7];
+
+ if (hcon->out) {
+ na = smp->prnd;
+ nb = smp->rrnd;
+ } else {
+ na = smp->rrnd;
+ nb = smp->prnd;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
+ memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
+ a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
+ b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
+
+ return smp_f5(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->dhkey, na, nb, a, b, mackey, ltk);
+}
+
+static void sc_dhkey_check(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
+ struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check check;
+ u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
+ u8 io_cap[3], r[16];
+
+ memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
+ memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
+ a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
+ b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
+
+ if (hcon->out) {
+ local_addr = a;
+ remote_addr = b;
+ memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
+ } else {
+ local_addr = b;
+ remote_addr = a;
+ memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
+ }
+
+ memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
+
+ if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
+ put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
+
+ if (smp->method == REQ_OOB)
+ memcpy(r, smp->rr, 16);
+
+ smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, r, io_cap,
+ local_addr, remote_addr, check.e);
+
+ smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK, sizeof(check), &check);
+}
+
+static u8 sc_passkey_send_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
+ u8 r;
+
+ r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01);
+ r |= 0x80;
+
+ get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
+
+ if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd, r,
+ cfm.confirm_val))
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 sc_passkey_round(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 smp_op)
+{
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+ u8 cfm[16], r;
+
+ /* Ignore the PDU if we've already done 20 rounds (0 - 19) */
+ if (smp->passkey_round >= 20)
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (smp_op) {
+ case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
+ r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01);
+ r |= 0x80;
+
+ if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
+ smp->rrnd, r, cfm))
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
+ return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
+
+ smp->passkey_round++;
+
+ if (smp->passkey_round == 20) {
+ /* Generate MacKey and LTK */
+ if (sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk))
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+ }
+
+ /* The round is only complete when the initiator
+ * receives pairing random.
+ */
+ if (!hcon->out) {
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
+ sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
+ if (smp->passkey_round == 20)
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+ else
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Start the next round */
+ if (smp->passkey_round != 20)
+ return sc_passkey_round(smp, 0);
+
+ /* Passkey rounds are complete - start DHKey Check */
+ sc_dhkey_check(smp);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+
+ if (hcon->out) {
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
+ sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp);
+
+ case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
+ default:
+ /* Initiating device starts the round */
+ if (!hcon->out)
+ return 0;
+
+ BT_DBG("%s Starting passkey round %u", hdev->name,
+ smp->passkey_round + 1);
+
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+
+ return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sc_user_reply(struct smp_chan *smp, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
+{
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ u8 smp_op;
+
+ clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
+
+ switch (mgmt_op) {
+ case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
+ smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
+ return 0;
+ case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
+ smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_NUMERIC_COMP_FAILED);
+ return 0;
+ case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
+ hcon->passkey_notify = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
+ smp->passkey_round = 0;
+
+ if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags))
+ smp_op = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM;
+ else
+ smp_op = 0;
+
+ if (sc_passkey_round(smp, smp_op))
+ return -EIO;
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Initiator sends DHKey check first */
+ if (hcon->out) {
+ sc_dhkey_check(smp);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+ } else if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
+ sc_dhkey_check(smp);
+ sc_add_ltk(smp);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
+{
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan;
+ struct smp_chan *smp;
+ u32 value;
+ int err;
+
+ BT_DBG("");
+
+ if (!conn)
+ return -ENOTCONN;
+
+ chan = conn->smp;
+ if (!chan)
+ return -ENOTCONN;
+
+ l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
+ if (!chan->data) {
+ err = -ENOTCONN;
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+
+ smp = chan->data;
+
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
+ err = sc_user_reply(smp, mgmt_op, passkey);
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+
+ switch (mgmt_op) {
+ case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
+ value = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
+ memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
+ BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", value);
+ put_unaligned_le32(value, smp->tk);
+ /* Fall Through */
+ case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY:
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
+ break;
+ case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
+ case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
+ smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
+ err = 0;
+ goto unlock;
+ default:
+ smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
+ err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+
+ err = 0;
+
+ /* If it is our turn to send Pairing Confirm, do so now */
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
+ u8 rsp = smp_confirm(smp);
+ if (rsp)
+ smp_failure(conn, rsp);
+ }
+
+unlock:
+ l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static void build_bredr_pairing_cmd(struct smp_chan *smp,
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp)
+{
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
+ u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0;
+
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) {
+ local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
+ remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
+ }
+
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING))
+ remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
+
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY))
+ local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
+
+ if (!rsp) {
+ memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req));
+
+ req->auth_req = SMP_AUTH_CT2;
+ req->init_key_dist = local_dist;
+ req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist;
+ req->max_key_size = conn->hcon->enc_key_size;
+
+ smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
+
+ return;
+ }
+
+ memset(rsp, 0, sizeof(*rsp));
+
+ rsp->auth_req = SMP_AUTH_CT2;
+ rsp->max_key_size = conn->hcon->enc_key_size;
+ rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
+ rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
+
+ smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
+}
+
+static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
+ struct smp_chan *smp;
+ u8 key_size, auth, sec_level;
+ int ret;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+ if (skb->len < sizeof(*req))
+ return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+ if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
+ return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
+
+ if (!chan->data)
+ smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
+ else
+ smp = chan->data;
+
+ if (!smp)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ /* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
+ auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
+
+ if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) &&
+ (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
+ return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
+
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
+ return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
+
+ smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
+ memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
+ skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
+
+ /* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has
+ * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the
+ * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use.
+ */
+ if (req->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT && SMP_DEV(hdev)->local_oob)
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags);
+
+ /* SMP over BR/EDR requires special treatment */
+ if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
+ /* We must have a BR/EDR SC link */
+ if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->hcon->flags) &&
+ !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
+ return SMP_CROSS_TRANSP_NOT_ALLOWED;
+
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
+
+ build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, req, &rsp);
+
+ if (req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2)
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags);
+
+ key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
+ if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
+ return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+
+ /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
+ smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
+
+ smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
+ memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
+
+ smp_distribute_keys(smp);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth);
+
+ if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) {
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
+
+ if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2)
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags);
+ }
+
+ if (conn->hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
+ sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
+ else
+ sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
+
+ if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level)
+ conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
+
+ /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
+ if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
+ u8 method;
+
+ method = get_auth_method(smp, conn->hcon->io_capability,
+ req->io_capability);
+ if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
+ return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
+ }
+
+ key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
+ if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
+ return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+
+ get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
+
+ smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
+ memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
+
+ clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
+
+ /* Strictly speaking we shouldn't allow Pairing Confirm for the
+ * SC case, however some implementations incorrectly copy RFU auth
+ * req bits from our security request, which may create a false
+ * positive SC enablement.
+ */
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
+ /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
+ smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
+ /* Wait for Public Key from Initiating Device */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Request setup of TK */
+ ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp.io_capability, req->io_capability);
+ if (ret)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = smp->conn->hcon->hdev;
+
+ BT_DBG("");
+
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
+ struct smp_dev *smp_dev;
+
+ if (!chan || !chan->data)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ smp_dev = chan->data;
+
+ memcpy(smp->local_pk, smp_dev->local_pk, 64);
+ memcpy(smp->lr, smp_dev->local_rand, 16);
+
+ if (smp_dev->debug_key)
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
+
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
+ BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
+ if (set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk))
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+ memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
+ } else {
+ while (true) {
+ /* Generate key pair for Secure Connections */
+ if (generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk))
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
+ * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
+ */
+ if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64))
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+done:
+ SMP_DBG("Local Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
+ SMP_DBG("Local Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
+
+ smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY, 64, smp->local_pk);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
+ u8 key_size, auth;
+ int ret;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+ if (skb->len < sizeof(*rsp))
+ return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+ if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
+ return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
+
+ skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp));
+
+ req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+
+ key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp->max_key_size);
+ if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
+ return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+
+ auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
+
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
+ return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
+
+ /* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has
+ * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the
+ * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use.
+ */
+ if (rsp->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT && SMP_DEV(hdev)->local_oob)
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags);
+
+ smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
+ memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
+
+ /* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
+ * some bits that we had enabled in our request.
+ */
+ smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
+
+ if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_CT2))
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags);
+
+ /* For BR/EDR this means we're done and can start phase 3 */
+ if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
+ /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
+ smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
+ smp_distribute_keys(smp);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
+ else if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
+ conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
+
+ /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
+ if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
+ u8 method;
+
+ method = get_auth_method(smp, req->io_capability,
+ rsp->io_capability);
+ if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
+ return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
+ }
+
+ get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
+
+ /* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
+ * some bits that we had enabled in our request.
+ */
+ smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
+
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
+ /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
+ smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
+ return sc_send_public_key(smp);
+ }
+
+ auth |= req->auth_req;
+
+ ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, req->io_capability, rsp->io_capability);
+ if (ret)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
+
+ /* Can't compose response until we have been confirmed */
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
+ return smp_confirm(smp);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 sc_check_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+
+ BT_DBG("");
+
+ if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
+ return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+
+ if (conn->hcon->out) {
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
+ smp->prnd);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Work-around for some implementations that incorrectly copy RFU bits
+ * from our security request and thereby create the impression that
+ * we're doing SC when in fact the remote doesn't support it.
+ */
+static int fixup_sc_false_positive(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
+ u8 auth;
+
+ /* The issue is only observed when we're in slave role */
+ if (hcon->out)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY)) {
+ bt_dev_err(hdev, "refusing legacy fallback in SC-only mode");
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+ }
+
+ bt_dev_err(hdev, "trying to fall back to legacy SMP");
+
+ req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+ rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
+
+ /* Rebuild key dist flags which may have been cleared for SC */
+ smp->remote_key_dist = (req->init_key_dist & rsp->resp_key_dist);
+
+ auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
+
+ if (tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp->io_capability, req->io_capability)) {
+ bt_dev_err(hdev, "failed to fall back to legacy SMP");
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+ }
+
+ clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
+
+ if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf))
+ return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+ memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
+ skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
+
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Public Key exchange must happen before any other steps */
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags))
+ return sc_check_confirm(smp);
+
+ BT_ERR("Unexpected SMP Pairing Confirm");
+
+ ret = fixup_sc_false_positive(smp);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->hcon->out) {
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
+ smp->prnd);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
+ return smp_confirm(smp);
+
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ u8 *pkax, *pkbx, *na, *nb;
+ u32 passkey;
+ int err;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+ if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->rrnd))
+ return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+ memcpy(smp->rrnd, skb->data, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
+ skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
+
+ if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
+ return smp_random(smp);
+
+ if (hcon->out) {
+ pkax = smp->local_pk;
+ pkbx = smp->remote_pk;
+ na = smp->prnd;
+ nb = smp->rrnd;
+ } else {
+ pkax = smp->remote_pk;
+ pkbx = smp->local_pk;
+ na = smp->rrnd;
+ nb = smp->prnd;
+ }
+
+ if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
+ if (!hcon->out)
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
+ sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+ goto mackey_and_ltk;
+ }
+
+ /* Passkey entry has special treatment */
+ if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
+ return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+
+ if (hcon->out) {
+ u8 cfm[16];
+
+ err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
+ smp->rrnd, 0, cfm);
+ if (err)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
+ return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
+ } else {
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
+ smp->prnd);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+ }
+
+mackey_and_ltk:
+ /* Generate MacKey and LTK */
+ err = sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk);
+ if (err)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
+ if (hcon->out) {
+ sc_dhkey_check(smp);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey);
+ if (err)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
+ hcon->dst_type, passkey, 0);
+ if (err)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level)
+{
+ struct smp_ltk *key;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+
+ key = hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role);
+ if (!key)
+ return false;
+
+ if (smp_ltk_sec_level(key) < sec_level)
+ return false;
+
+ if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
+ return true;
+
+ hci_le_start_enc(hcon, key->ediv, key->rand, key->val, key->enc_size);
+ hcon->enc_key_size = key->enc_size;
+
+ /* We never store STKs for master role, so clear this flag */
+ clear_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level,
+ enum smp_key_pref key_pref)
+{
+ if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW)
+ return true;
+
+ /* If we're encrypted with an STK but the caller prefers using
+ * LTK claim insufficient security. This way we allow the
+ * connection to be re-encrypted with an LTK, even if the LTK
+ * provides the same level of security. Only exception is if we
+ * don't have an LTK (e.g. because of key distribution bits).
+ */
+ if (key_pref == SMP_USE_LTK &&
+ test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) &&
+ hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role))
+ return false;
+
+ if (hcon->sec_level >= sec_level)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data;
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+ struct smp_chan *smp;
+ u8 sec_level, auth;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+ if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
+ return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+ if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
+ return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
+
+ auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
+
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
+ return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
+
+ if (hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
+ sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
+ else
+ sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
+
+ if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK)) {
+ /* If link is already encrypted with sufficient security we
+ * still need refresh encryption as per Core Spec 5.0 Vol 3,
+ * Part H 2.4.6
+ */
+ smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->sec_level);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
+ hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
+
+ if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
+ return 0;
+
+ smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
+ if (!smp)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) &&
+ (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
+ return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
+
+ skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
+
+ memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
+ build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, auth);
+
+ smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
+ memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
+{
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan;
+ struct smp_chan *smp;
+ __u8 authreq;
+ int ret;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, sec_level);
+
+ /* This may be NULL if there's an unexpected disconnection */
+ if (!conn)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
+ hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
+
+ if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
+ if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
+ return 0;
+
+ chan = conn->smp;
+ if (!chan) {
+ bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "security requested but not available");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
+
+ /* If SMP is already in progress ignore this request */
+ if (chan->data) {
+ ret = 0;
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+
+ smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
+ if (!smp) {
+ ret = 1;
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+
+ authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level);
+
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED)) {
+ authreq |= SMP_AUTH_SC;
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED))
+ authreq |= SMP_AUTH_CT2;
+ }
+
+ /* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level
+ * requires it.
+ */
+ if (hcon->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT ||
+ hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
+ authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM;
+
+ if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) {
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
+
+ build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq);
+ smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
+ memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
+ } else {
+ struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
+ cp.auth_req = authreq;
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ);
+ }
+
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
+ ret = 0;
+
+unlock:
+ l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int smp_cancel_and_remove_pairing(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
+ u8 addr_type)
+{
+ struct hci_conn *hcon;
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan;
+ struct smp_chan *smp;
+ int err;
+
+ err = hci_remove_ltk(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type);
+ hci_remove_irk(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type);
+
+ hcon = hci_conn_hash_lookup_le(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type);
+ if (!hcon)
+ goto done;
+
+ conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
+ if (!conn)
+ goto done;
+
+ chan = conn->smp;
+ if (!chan)
+ goto done;
+
+ l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
+
+ smp = chan->data;
+ if (smp) {
+ /* Set keys to NULL to make sure smp_failure() does not try to
+ * remove and free already invalidated rcu list entries. */
+ smp->ltk = NULL;
+ smp->slave_ltk = NULL;
+ smp->remote_irk = NULL;
+
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags))
+ smp_failure(conn, 0);
+ else
+ smp_failure(conn, SMP_UNSPECIFIED);
+ err = 0;
+ }
+
+ l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
+
+done:
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+ if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
+ return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT);
+
+ skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
+
+ memcpy(smp->tk, rp->ltk, sizeof(smp->tk));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct smp_cmd_master_ident *rp = (void *) skb->data;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct smp_ltk *ltk;
+ u8 authenticated;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+ if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
+ return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+ /* Mark the information as received */
+ smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
+
+ if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);
+ else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
+
+ skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
+
+ authenticated = (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH);
+ ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, SMP_LTK,
+ authenticated, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
+ rp->ediv, rp->rand);
+ smp->ltk = ltk;
+ if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK))
+ smp_distribute_keys(smp);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_cmd_ident_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct smp_cmd_ident_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+
+ BT_DBG("");
+
+ if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
+ return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO);
+
+ skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
+
+ memcpy(smp->irk, info->irk, 16);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ bdaddr_t rpa;
+
+ BT_DBG("");
+
+ if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
+ return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+ /* Mark the information as received */
+ smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
+
+ if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
+
+ skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
+
+ /* Strictly speaking the Core Specification (4.1) allows sending
+ * an empty address which would force us to rely on just the IRK
+ * as "identity information". However, since such
+ * implementations are not known of and in order to not over
+ * complicate our implementation, simply pretend that we never
+ * received an IRK for such a device.
+ *
+ * The Identity Address must also be a Static Random or Public
+ * Address, which hci_is_identity_address() checks for.
+ */
+ if (!bacmp(&info->bdaddr, BDADDR_ANY) ||
+ !hci_is_identity_address(&info->bdaddr, info->addr_type)) {
+ bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "ignoring IRK with no identity address");
+ goto distribute;
+ }
+
+ bacpy(&smp->id_addr, &info->bdaddr);
+ smp->id_addr_type = info->addr_type;
+
+ if (hci_bdaddr_is_rpa(&hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type))
+ bacpy(&rpa, &hcon->dst);
+ else
+ bacpy(&rpa, BDADDR_ANY);
+
+ smp->remote_irk = hci_add_irk(conn->hcon->hdev, &smp->id_addr,
+ smp->id_addr_type, smp->irk, &rpa);
+
+distribute:
+ if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK))
+ smp_distribute_keys(smp);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct smp_cmd_sign_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+ struct smp_csrk *csrk;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+ if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
+ return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+ /* Mark the information as received */
+ smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
+
+ skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
+
+ csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (csrk) {
+ if (conn->hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
+ csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_AUTHENTICATED;
+ else
+ csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_UNAUTHENTICATED;
+ memcpy(csrk->val, rp->csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
+ }
+ smp->csrk = csrk;
+ smp_distribute_keys(smp);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 sc_select_method(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing *local, *remote;
+ u8 local_mitm, remote_mitm, local_io, remote_io, method;
+
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags) ||
+ test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags))
+ return REQ_OOB;
+
+ /* The preq/prsp contain the raw Pairing Request/Response PDUs
+ * which are needed as inputs to some crypto functions. To get
+ * the "struct smp_cmd_pairing" from them we need to skip the
+ * first byte which contains the opcode.
+ */
+ if (hcon->out) {
+ local = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+ remote = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
+ } else {
+ local = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
+ remote = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+ }
+
+ local_io = local->io_capability;
+ remote_io = remote->io_capability;
+
+ local_mitm = (local->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM);
+ remote_mitm = (remote->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM);
+
+ /* If either side wants MITM, look up the method from the table,
+ * otherwise use JUST WORKS.
+ */
+ if (local_mitm || remote_mitm)
+ method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
+ else
+ method = JUST_WORKS;
+
+ /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
+ if (method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
+ method = JUST_WORKS;
+
+ return method;
+}
+
+static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct smp_cmd_public_key *key = (void *) skb->data;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+ struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
+ int err;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+ if (skb->len < sizeof(*key))
+ return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+ memcpy(smp->remote_pk, key, 64);
+
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
+ err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->remote_pk,
+ smp->rr, 0, cfm.confirm_val);
+ if (err)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ if (crypto_memneq(cfm.confirm_val, smp->pcnf, 16))
+ return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Non-initiating device sends its public key after receiving
+ * the key from the initiating device.
+ */
+ if (!hcon->out) {
+ err = sc_send_public_key(smp);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key X: %32phN", smp->remote_pk);
+ SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->remote_pk + 32);
+
+ /* Compute the shared secret on the same crypto tfm on which the private
+ * key was set/generated.
+ */
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
+ struct l2cap_chan *hchan = hdev->smp_data;
+ struct smp_dev *smp_dev;
+
+ if (!hchan || !hchan->data)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ smp_dev = hchan->data;
+
+ tfm_ecdh = smp_dev->tfm_ecdh;
+ } else {
+ tfm_ecdh = smp->tfm_ecdh;
+ }
+
+ if (compute_ecdh_secret(tfm_ecdh, smp->remote_pk, smp->dhkey))
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ SMP_DBG("DHKey %32phN", smp->dhkey);
+
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags);
+
+ smp->method = sc_select_method(smp);
+
+ BT_DBG("%s selected method 0x%02x", hdev->name, smp->method);
+
+ /* JUST_WORKS and JUST_CFM result in an unauthenticated key */
+ if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == JUST_CFM)
+ hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
+ else
+ hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
+
+ if (!crypto_memneq(debug_pk, smp->remote_pk, 64))
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
+
+ if (smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) {
+ get_random_bytes(&hcon->passkey_notify,
+ sizeof(hcon->passkey_notify));
+ hcon->passkey_notify %= 1000000;
+ hcon->passkey_entered = 0;
+ smp->passkey_round = 0;
+ if (mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
+ hcon->dst_type,
+ hcon->passkey_notify,
+ hcon->passkey_entered))
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+ return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
+ }
+
+ if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
+ if (hcon->out)
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
+ sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
+
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (hcon->out)
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+
+ if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY) {
+ if (mgmt_user_passkey_request(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
+ hcon->dst_type))
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* The Initiating device waits for the non-initiating device to
+ * send the confirm value.
+ */
+ if (conn->hcon->out)
+ return 0;
+
+ err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd,
+ 0, cfm.confirm_val);
+ if (err)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check *check = (void *) skb->data;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+ u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
+ u8 io_cap[3], r[16], e[16];
+ int err;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+ if (skb->len < sizeof(*check))
+ return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+ memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
+ memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
+ a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
+ b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
+
+ if (hcon->out) {
+ local_addr = a;
+ remote_addr = b;
+ memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
+ } else {
+ local_addr = b;
+ remote_addr = a;
+ memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
+ }
+
+ memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
+
+ if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
+ put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
+ else if (smp->method == REQ_OOB)
+ memcpy(r, smp->lr, 16);
+
+ err = smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, r,
+ io_cap, remote_addr, local_addr, e);
+ if (err)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ if (crypto_memneq(check->e, e, 16))
+ return SMP_DHKEY_CHECK_FAILED;
+
+ if (!hcon->out) {
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Slave sends DHKey check as response to master */
+ sc_dhkey_check(smp);
+ }
+
+ sc_add_ltk(smp);
+
+ if (hcon->out) {
+ hci_le_start_enc(hcon, 0, 0, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size);
+ hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_cmd_keypress_notify(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct smp_cmd_keypress_notify *kp = (void *) skb->data;
+
+ BT_DBG("value 0x%02x", kp->value);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct smp_chan *smp;
+ __u8 code, reason;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ if (skb->len < 1)
+ return -EILSEQ;
+
+ if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED)) {
+ reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ code = skb->data[0];
+ skb_pull(skb, sizeof(code));
+
+ smp = chan->data;
+
+ if (code > SMP_CMD_MAX)
+ goto drop;
+
+ if (smp && !test_and_clear_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd))
+ goto drop;
+
+ /* If we don't have a context the only allowed commands are
+ * pairing request and security request.
+ */
+ if (!smp && code != SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ && code != SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ)
+ goto drop;
+
+ switch (code) {
+ case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ:
+ reason = smp_cmd_pairing_req(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL:
+ smp_failure(conn, 0);
+ err = -EPERM;
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP:
+ reason = smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ:
+ reason = smp_cmd_security_req(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
+ reason = smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
+ reason = smp_cmd_pairing_random(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO:
+ reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT:
+ reason = smp_cmd_master_ident(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO:
+ reason = smp_cmd_ident_info(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO:
+ reason = smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO:
+ reason = smp_cmd_sign_info(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
+ reason = smp_cmd_public_key(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK:
+ reason = smp_cmd_dhkey_check(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_KEYPRESS_NOTIFY:
+ reason = smp_cmd_keypress_notify(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);
+ reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+done:
+ if (!err) {
+ if (reason)
+ smp_failure(conn, reason);
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ }
+
+ return err;
+
+drop:
+ bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "unexpected SMP command 0x%02x from %pMR",
+ code, &hcon->dst);
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)
+{
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
+
+ BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
+
+ if (chan->data)
+ smp_chan_destroy(conn);
+
+ conn->smp = NULL;
+ l2cap_chan_put(chan);
+}
+
+static void bredr_pairing(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
+{
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing req;
+ struct smp_chan *smp;
+
+ BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
+
+ /* Only new pairings are interesting */
+ if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_NEW_LINK_KEY, &hcon->flags))
+ return;
+
+ /* Don't bother if we're not encrypted */
+ if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
+ return;
+
+ /* Only master may initiate SMP over BR/EDR */
+ if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
+ return;
+
+ /* Secure Connections support must be enabled */
+ if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED))
+ return;
+
+ /* BR/EDR must use Secure Connections for SMP */
+ if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &hcon->flags) &&
+ !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
+ return;
+
+ /* If our LE support is not enabled don't do anything */
+ if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED))
+ return;
+
+ /* Don't bother if remote LE support is not enabled */
+ if (!lmp_host_le_capable(hcon))
+ return;
+
+ /* Remote must support SMP fixed chan for BR/EDR */
+ if (!(conn->remote_fixed_chan & L2CAP_FC_SMP_BREDR))
+ return;
+
+ /* Don't bother if SMP is already ongoing */
+ if (chan->data)
+ return;
+
+ smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
+ if (!smp) {
+ bt_dev_err(hdev, "unable to create SMP context for BR/EDR");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
+
+ BT_DBG("%s starting SMP over BR/EDR", hdev->name);
+
+ /* Prepare and send the BR/EDR SMP Pairing Request */
+ build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, &req, NULL);
+
+ smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
+ memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &req, sizeof(req));
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(req), &req);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
+}
+
+static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
+{
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+
+ BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
+
+ if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
+ bredr_pairing(chan);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!smp)
+ return;
+
+ if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
+ return;
+
+ cancel_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer);
+
+ smp_distribute_keys(smp);
+}
+
+static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
+{
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+
+ BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
+
+ /* No need to call l2cap_chan_hold() here since we already own
+ * the reference taken in smp_new_conn_cb(). This is just the
+ * first time that we tie it to a specific pointer. The code in
+ * l2cap_core.c ensures that there's no risk this function wont
+ * get called if smp_new_conn_cb was previously called.
+ */
+ conn->smp = chan;
+
+ if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
+ bredr_pairing(chan);
+}
+
+static int smp_recv_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
+
+ err = smp_sig_channel(chan, skb);
+ if (err) {
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+
+ if (smp)
+ cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
+
+ hci_disconnect(chan->conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static struct sk_buff *smp_alloc_skb_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan,
+ unsigned long hdr_len,
+ unsigned long len, int nb)
+{
+ struct sk_buff *skb;
+
+ skb = bt_skb_alloc(hdr_len + len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!skb)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ skb->priority = HCI_PRIO_MAX;
+ bt_cb(skb)->l2cap.chan = chan;
+
+ return skb;
+}
+
+static const struct l2cap_ops smp_chan_ops = {
+ .name = "Security Manager",
+ .ready = smp_ready_cb,
+ .recv = smp_recv_cb,
+ .alloc_skb = smp_alloc_skb_cb,
+ .teardown = smp_teardown_cb,
+ .resume = smp_resume_cb,
+
+ .new_connection = l2cap_chan_no_new_connection,
+ .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change,
+ .close = l2cap_chan_no_close,
+ .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer,
+ .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
+ .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
+ .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
+};
+
+static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan)
+{
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan;
+
+ BT_DBG("pchan %p", pchan);
+
+ chan = l2cap_chan_create();
+ if (!chan)
+ return NULL;
+
+ chan->chan_type = pchan->chan_type;
+ chan->ops = &smp_chan_ops;
+ chan->scid = pchan->scid;
+ chan->dcid = chan->scid;
+ chan->imtu = pchan->imtu;
+ chan->omtu = pchan->omtu;
+ chan->mode = pchan->mode;
+
+ /* Other L2CAP channels may request SMP routines in order to
+ * change the security level. This means that the SMP channel
+ * lock must be considered in its own category to avoid lockdep
+ * warnings.
+ */
+ atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_SMP);
+
+ BT_DBG("created chan %p", chan);
+
+ return chan;
+}
+
+static const struct l2cap_ops smp_root_chan_ops = {
+ .name = "Security Manager Root",
+ .new_connection = smp_new_conn_cb,
+
+ /* None of these are implemented for the root channel */
+ .close = l2cap_chan_no_close,
+ .alloc_skb = l2cap_chan_no_alloc_skb,
+ .recv = l2cap_chan_no_recv,
+ .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change,
+ .teardown = l2cap_chan_no_teardown,
+ .ready = l2cap_chan_no_ready,
+ .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer,
+ .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
+ .resume = l2cap_chan_no_resume,
+ .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
+ .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
+};
+
+static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 cid)
+{
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan;
+ struct smp_dev *smp;
+ struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes;
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
+ struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
+
+ if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR) {
+ smp = NULL;
+ goto create_chan;
+ }
+
+ smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!smp)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) {
+ BT_ERR("Unable to create AES crypto context");
+ kzfree(smp);
+ return ERR_CAST(tfm_aes);
+ }
+
+ tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
+ BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
+ crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes);
+ kzfree(smp);
+ return ERR_CAST(tfm_cmac);
+ }
+
+ tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) {
+ BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
+ crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes);
+ kzfree(smp);
+ return ERR_CAST(tfm_ecdh);
+ }
+
+ smp->local_oob = false;
+ smp->tfm_aes = tfm_aes;
+ smp->tfm_cmac = tfm_cmac;
+ smp->tfm_ecdh = tfm_ecdh;
+ smp->min_key_size = SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+ smp->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+
+create_chan:
+ chan = l2cap_chan_create();
+ if (!chan) {
+ if (smp) {
+ crypto_free_cipher(smp->tfm_aes);
+ crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
+ crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
+ kzfree(smp);
+ }
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ }
+
+ chan->data = smp;
+
+ l2cap_add_scid(chan, cid);
+
+ l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan);
+
+ if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP) {
+ u8 bdaddr_type;
+
+ hci_copy_identity_address(hdev, &chan->src, &bdaddr_type);
+
+ if (bdaddr_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC)
+ chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
+ else
+ chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
+ } else {
+ bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr);
+ chan->src_type = BDADDR_BREDR;
+ }
+
+ chan->state = BT_LISTEN;
+ chan->mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC;
+ chan->imtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU;
+ chan->ops = &smp_root_chan_ops;
+
+ /* Set correct nesting level for a parent/listening channel */
+ atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_PARENT);
+
+ return chan;
+}
+
+static void smp_del_chan(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
+{
+ struct smp_dev *smp;
+
+ BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
+
+ smp = chan->data;
+ if (smp) {
+ chan->data = NULL;
+ crypto_free_cipher(smp->tfm_aes);
+ crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
+ crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
+ kzfree(smp);
+ }
+
+ l2cap_chan_put(chan);
+}
+
+static ssize_t force_bredr_smp_read(struct file *file,
+ char __user *user_buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
+ char buf[3];
+
+ buf[0] = hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP) ? 'Y': 'N';
+ buf[1] = '\n';
+ buf[2] = '\0';
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, 2);
+}
+
+static ssize_t force_bredr_smp_write(struct file *file,
+ const char __user *user_buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
+ bool enable;
+ int err;
+
+ err = kstrtobool_from_user(user_buf, count, &enable);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (enable == hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
+ return -EALREADY;
+
+ if (enable) {
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan;
+
+ chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR);
+ if (IS_ERR(chan))
+ return PTR_ERR(chan);
+
+ hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan;
+ } else {
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan;
+
+ chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
+ hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
+ smp_del_chan(chan);
+ }
+
+ hci_dev_change_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP);
+
+ return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations force_bredr_smp_fops = {
+ .open = simple_open,
+ .read = force_bredr_smp_read,
+ .write = force_bredr_smp_write,
+ .llseek = default_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t le_min_key_size_read(struct file *file,
+ char __user *user_buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
+ char buf[4];
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%2u\n", SMP_DEV(hdev)->min_key_size);
+
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, strlen(buf));
+}
+
+static ssize_t le_min_key_size_write(struct file *file,
+ const char __user *user_buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
+ char buf[32];
+ size_t buf_size = min(count, (sizeof(buf) - 1));
+ u8 key_size;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, buf_size))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ buf[buf_size] = '\0';
+
+ sscanf(buf, "%hhu", &key_size);
+
+ if (key_size > SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size ||
+ key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ SMP_DEV(hdev)->min_key_size = key_size;
+
+ return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations le_min_key_size_fops = {
+ .open = simple_open,
+ .read = le_min_key_size_read,
+ .write = le_min_key_size_write,
+ .llseek = default_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t le_max_key_size_read(struct file *file,
+ char __user *user_buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
+ char buf[4];
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%2u\n", SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size);
+
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, strlen(buf));
+}
+
+static ssize_t le_max_key_size_write(struct file *file,
+ const char __user *user_buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
+ char buf[32];
+ size_t buf_size = min(count, (sizeof(buf) - 1));
+ u8 key_size;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, buf_size))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ buf[buf_size] = '\0';
+
+ sscanf(buf, "%hhu", &key_size);
+
+ if (key_size > SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE ||
+ key_size < SMP_DEV(hdev)->min_key_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size = key_size;
+
+ return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations le_max_key_size_fops = {
+ .open = simple_open,
+ .read = le_max_key_size_read,
+ .write = le_max_key_size_write,
+ .llseek = default_llseek,
+};
+
+int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev)
+{
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan;
+
+ BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name);
+
+ /* If the controller does not support Low Energy operation, then
+ * there is also no need to register any SMP channel.
+ */
+ if (!lmp_le_capable(hdev))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_data)) {
+ chan = hdev->smp_data;
+ hdev->smp_data = NULL;
+ smp_del_chan(chan);
+ }
+
+ chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP);
+ if (IS_ERR(chan))
+ return PTR_ERR(chan);
+
+ hdev->smp_data = chan;
+
+ debugfs_create_file("le_min_key_size", 0644, hdev->debugfs, hdev,
+ &le_min_key_size_fops);
+ debugfs_create_file("le_max_key_size", 0644, hdev->debugfs, hdev,
+ &le_max_key_size_fops);
+
+ /* If the controller does not support BR/EDR Secure Connections
+ * feature, then the BR/EDR SMP channel shall not be present.
+ *
+ * To test this with Bluetooth 4.0 controllers, create a debugfs
+ * switch that allows forcing BR/EDR SMP support and accepting
+ * cross-transport pairing on non-AES encrypted connections.
+ */
+ if (!lmp_sc_capable(hdev)) {
+ debugfs_create_file("force_bredr_smp", 0644, hdev->debugfs,
+ hdev, &force_bredr_smp_fops);
+
+ /* Flag can be already set here (due to power toggle) */
+ if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_bredr_data)) {
+ chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
+ hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
+ smp_del_chan(chan);
+ }
+
+ chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR);
+ if (IS_ERR(chan)) {
+ int err = PTR_ERR(chan);
+ chan = hdev->smp_data;
+ hdev->smp_data = NULL;
+ smp_del_chan(chan);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev)
+{
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan;
+
+ if (hdev->smp_bredr_data) {
+ chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
+ hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
+ smp_del_chan(chan);
+ }
+
+ if (hdev->smp_data) {
+ chan = hdev->smp_data;
+ hdev->smp_data = NULL;
+ smp_del_chan(chan);
+ }
+}
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_SELFTEST_SMP)
+
+static int __init test_debug_key(struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh)
+{
+ u8 pk[64];
+ int err;
+
+ err = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm_ecdh, debug_sk);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ err = generate_ecdh_public_key(tfm_ecdh, pk);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (crypto_memneq(pk, debug_pk, 64))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init test_ah(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes)
+{
+ const u8 irk[16] = {
+ 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
+ 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
+ const u8 r[3] = { 0x94, 0x81, 0x70 };
+ const u8 exp[3] = { 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x0d };
+ u8 res[3];
+ int err;
+
+ err = smp_ah(tfm_aes, irk, r, res);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 3))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init test_c1(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes)
+{
+ const u8 k[16] = {
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
+ const u8 r[16] = {
+ 0xe0, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc6, 0x4e, 0x27, 0x88, 0x63,
+ 0x0e, 0x6f, 0xad, 0x56, 0x21, 0xd5, 0x83, 0x57 };
+ const u8 preq[7] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x07, 0x07 };
+ const u8 pres[7] = { 0x02, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x05 };
+ const u8 _iat = 0x01;
+ const u8 _rat = 0x00;
+ const bdaddr_t ra = { { 0xb6, 0xb5, 0xb4, 0xb3, 0xb2, 0xb1 } };
+ const bdaddr_t ia = { { 0xa6, 0xa5, 0xa4, 0xa3, 0xa2, 0xa1 } };
+ const u8 exp[16] = {
+ 0x86, 0x3b, 0xf1, 0xbe, 0xc5, 0x4d, 0xa7, 0xd2,
+ 0xea, 0x88, 0x89, 0x87, 0xef, 0x3f, 0x1e, 0x1e };
+ u8 res[16];
+ int err;
+
+ err = smp_c1(tfm_aes, k, r, preq, pres, _iat, &ia, _rat, &ra, res);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init test_s1(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes)
+{
+ const u8 k[16] = {
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
+ const u8 r1[16] = {
+ 0x88, 0x77, 0x66, 0x55, 0x44, 0x33, 0x22, 0x11 };
+ const u8 r2[16] = {
+ 0x00, 0xff, 0xee, 0xdd, 0xcc, 0xbb, 0xaa, 0x99 };
+ const u8 exp[16] = {
+ 0x62, 0xa0, 0x6d, 0x79, 0xae, 0x16, 0x42, 0x5b,
+ 0x9b, 0xf4, 0xb0, 0xe8, 0xf0, 0xe1, 0x1f, 0x9a };
+ u8 res[16];
+ int err;
+
+ err = smp_s1(tfm_aes, k, r1, r2, res);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init test_f4(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
+{
+ const u8 u[32] = {
+ 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
+ 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
+ 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
+ 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 };
+ const u8 v[32] = {
+ 0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b,
+ 0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59,
+ 0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90,
+ 0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 };
+ const u8 x[16] = {
+ 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
+ 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
+ const u8 z = 0x00;
+ const u8 exp[16] = {
+ 0x2d, 0x87, 0x74, 0xa9, 0xbe, 0xa1, 0xed, 0xf1,
+ 0x1c, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0x07, 0xf1, 0x16, 0xc9, 0xf2 };
+ u8 res[16];
+ int err;
+
+ err = smp_f4(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, z, res);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init test_f5(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
+{
+ const u8 w[32] = {
+ 0x98, 0xa6, 0xbf, 0x73, 0xf3, 0x34, 0x8d, 0x86,
+ 0xf1, 0x66, 0xf8, 0xb4, 0x13, 0x6b, 0x79, 0x99,
+ 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
+ 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
+ const u8 n1[16] = {
+ 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
+ 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
+ const u8 n2[16] = {
+ 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
+ 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
+ const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 };
+ const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 };
+ const u8 exp_ltk[16] = {
+ 0x38, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x94, 0xb5, 0x22, 0x05, 0x98,
+ 0x23, 0xcd, 0xd7, 0x69, 0x11, 0x79, 0x86, 0x69 };
+ const u8 exp_mackey[16] = {
+ 0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd,
+ 0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 };
+ u8 mackey[16], ltk[16];
+ int err;
+
+ err = smp_f5(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, a1, a2, mackey, ltk);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (crypto_memneq(mackey, exp_mackey, 16))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (crypto_memneq(ltk, exp_ltk, 16))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init test_f6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
+{
+ const u8 w[16] = {
+ 0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd,
+ 0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 };
+ const u8 n1[16] = {
+ 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
+ 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
+ const u8 n2[16] = {
+ 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
+ 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
+ const u8 r[16] = {
+ 0xc8, 0x0f, 0x2d, 0x0c, 0xd2, 0x42, 0xda, 0x08,
+ 0x54, 0xbb, 0x53, 0xb4, 0x3b, 0x34, 0xa3, 0x12 };
+ const u8 io_cap[3] = { 0x02, 0x01, 0x01 };
+ const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 };
+ const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 };
+ const u8 exp[16] = {
+ 0x61, 0x8f, 0x95, 0xda, 0x09, 0x0b, 0x6c, 0xd2,
+ 0xc5, 0xe8, 0xd0, 0x9c, 0x98, 0x73, 0xc4, 0xe3 };
+ u8 res[16];
+ int err;
+
+ err = smp_f6(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, r, io_cap, a1, a2, res);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init test_g2(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
+{
+ const u8 u[32] = {
+ 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
+ 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
+ 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
+ 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 };
+ const u8 v[32] = {
+ 0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b,
+ 0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59,
+ 0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90,
+ 0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 };
+ const u8 x[16] = {
+ 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
+ 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
+ const u8 y[16] = {
+ 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
+ 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
+ const u32 exp_val = 0x2f9ed5ba % 1000000;
+ u32 val;
+ int err;
+
+ err = smp_g2(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, y, &val);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (val != exp_val)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init test_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
+{
+ const u8 w[16] = {
+ 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
+ 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
+ const u8 key_id[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c };
+ const u8 exp[16] = {
+ 0x99, 0x63, 0xb1, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xa9, 0xd3, 0xe8,
+ 0x1c, 0xc9, 0x6d, 0xe7, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x9a, 0x2d };
+ u8 res[16];
+ int err;
+
+ err = smp_h6(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, res);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static char test_smp_buffer[32];
+
+static ssize_t test_smp_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, test_smp_buffer,
+ strlen(test_smp_buffer));
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations test_smp_fops = {
+ .open = simple_open,
+ .read = test_smp_read,
+ .llseek = default_llseek,
+};
+
+static int __init run_selftests(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes,
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac,
+ struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh)
+{
+ ktime_t calltime, delta, rettime;
+ unsigned long long duration;
+ int err;
+
+ calltime = ktime_get();
+
+ err = test_debug_key(tfm_ecdh);
+ if (err) {
+ BT_ERR("debug_key test failed");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ err = test_ah(tfm_aes);
+ if (err) {
+ BT_ERR("smp_ah test failed");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ err = test_c1(tfm_aes);
+ if (err) {
+ BT_ERR("smp_c1 test failed");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ err = test_s1(tfm_aes);
+ if (err) {
+ BT_ERR("smp_s1 test failed");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ err = test_f4(tfm_cmac);
+ if (err) {
+ BT_ERR("smp_f4 test failed");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ err = test_f5(tfm_cmac);
+ if (err) {
+ BT_ERR("smp_f5 test failed");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ err = test_f6(tfm_cmac);
+ if (err) {
+ BT_ERR("smp_f6 test failed");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ err = test_g2(tfm_cmac);
+ if (err) {
+ BT_ERR("smp_g2 test failed");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ err = test_h6(tfm_cmac);
+ if (err) {
+ BT_ERR("smp_h6 test failed");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ rettime = ktime_get();
+ delta = ktime_sub(rettime, calltime);
+ duration = (unsigned long long) ktime_to_ns(delta) >> 10;
+
+ BT_INFO("SMP test passed in %llu usecs", duration);
+
+done:
+ if (!err)
+ snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer),
+ "PASS (%llu usecs)\n", duration);
+ else
+ snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer), "FAIL\n");
+
+ debugfs_create_file("selftest_smp", 0444, bt_debugfs, NULL,
+ &test_smp_fops);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+int __init bt_selftest_smp(void)
+{
+ struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes;
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
+ struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
+ int err;
+
+ tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) {
+ BT_ERR("Unable to create AES crypto context");
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm_aes);
+ }
+
+ tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
+ BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
+ crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes);
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm_cmac);
+ }
+
+ tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) {
+ BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
+ crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes);
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm_ecdh);
+ }
+
+ err = run_selftests(tfm_aes, tfm_cmac, tfm_ecdh);
+
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
+ crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes);
+ crypto_free_kpp(tfm_ecdh);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+#endif