v4.19.13 snapshot.
diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c b/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..85b31cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,877 @@
+/*
+ * fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
+ *
+ * Encryption and hashing operations relating to NTLM, NTLMv2. See MS-NLMP
+ * for more detailed information
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) International Business Machines Corp., 2005,2013
+ * Author(s): Steve French (sfrench@us.ibm.com)
+ *
+ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published
+ * by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See
+ * the GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
+ * along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
+ */
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include "cifspdu.h"
+#include "cifsglob.h"
+#include "cifs_debug.h"
+#include "cifs_unicode.h"
+#include "cifsproto.h"
+#include "ntlmssp.h"
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/aead.h>
+
+int __cifs_calc_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst,
+ struct TCP_Server_Info *server, char *signature,
+ struct shash_desc *shash)
+{
+ int i;
+ int rc;
+ struct kvec *iov = rqst->rq_iov;
+ int n_vec = rqst->rq_nvec;
+ int is_smb2 = server->vals->header_preamble_size == 0;
+
+ /* iov[0] is actual data and not the rfc1002 length for SMB2+ */
+ if (is_smb2) {
+ if (iov[0].iov_len <= 4)
+ return -EIO;
+ i = 0;
+ } else {
+ if (n_vec < 2 || iov[0].iov_len != 4)
+ return -EIO;
+ i = 1; /* skip rfc1002 length */
+ }
+
+ for (; i < n_vec; i++) {
+ if (iov[i].iov_len == 0)
+ continue;
+ if (iov[i].iov_base == NULL) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "null iovec entry\n");
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ rc = crypto_shash_update(shash,
+ iov[i].iov_base, iov[i].iov_len);
+ if (rc) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with payload\n",
+ __func__);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* now hash over the rq_pages array */
+ for (i = 0; i < rqst->rq_npages; i++) {
+ void *kaddr;
+ unsigned int len, offset;
+
+ rqst_page_get_length(rqst, i, &len, &offset);
+
+ kaddr = (char *) kmap(rqst->rq_pages[i]) + offset;
+
+ rc = crypto_shash_update(shash, kaddr, len);
+ if (rc) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with payload\n",
+ __func__);
+ kunmap(rqst->rq_pages[i]);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ kunmap(rqst->rq_pages[i]);
+ }
+
+ rc = crypto_shash_final(shash, signature);
+ if (rc)
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate hash\n", __func__);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate and return the CIFS signature based on the mac key and SMB PDU.
+ * The 16 byte signature must be allocated by the caller. Note we only use the
+ * 1st eight bytes and that the smb header signature field on input contains
+ * the sequence number before this function is called. Also, this function
+ * should be called with the server->srv_mutex held.
+ */
+static int cifs_calc_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst,
+ struct TCP_Server_Info *server, char *signature)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!rqst->rq_iov || !signature || !server)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ rc = cifs_alloc_hash("md5", &server->secmech.md5,
+ &server->secmech.sdescmd5);
+ if (rc)
+ return -1;
+
+ rc = crypto_shash_init(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash);
+ if (rc) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not init md5\n", __func__);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = crypto_shash_update(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash,
+ server->session_key.response, server->session_key.len);
+ if (rc) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with response\n", __func__);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return __cifs_calc_signature(rqst, server, signature,
+ &server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash);
+}
+
+/* must be called with server->srv_mutex held */
+int cifs_sign_rqst(struct smb_rqst *rqst, struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
+ __u32 *pexpected_response_sequence_number)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ char smb_signature[20];
+ struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu = (struct smb_hdr *)rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_base;
+
+ if (rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_len != 4 ||
+ rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_base + 4 != rqst->rq_iov[1].iov_base)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ if ((cifs_pdu == NULL) || (server == NULL))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!(cifs_pdu->Flags2 & SMBFLG2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE) ||
+ server->tcpStatus == CifsNeedNegotiate)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (!server->session_estab) {
+ memcpy(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, "BSRSPYL", 8);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.SequenceNumber =
+ cpu_to_le32(server->sequence_number);
+ cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.Reserved = 0;
+
+ *pexpected_response_sequence_number = ++server->sequence_number;
+ ++server->sequence_number;
+
+ rc = cifs_calc_signature(rqst, server, smb_signature);
+ if (rc)
+ memset(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, 0, 8);
+ else
+ memcpy(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, smb_signature, 8);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int cifs_sign_smbv(struct kvec *iov, int n_vec, struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
+ __u32 *pexpected_response_sequence)
+{
+ struct smb_rqst rqst = { .rq_iov = iov,
+ .rq_nvec = n_vec };
+
+ return cifs_sign_rqst(&rqst, server, pexpected_response_sequence);
+}
+
+/* must be called with server->srv_mutex held */
+int cifs_sign_smb(struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu, struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
+ __u32 *pexpected_response_sequence_number)
+{
+ struct kvec iov[2];
+
+ iov[0].iov_base = cifs_pdu;
+ iov[0].iov_len = 4;
+ iov[1].iov_base = (char *)cifs_pdu + 4;
+ iov[1].iov_len = be32_to_cpu(cifs_pdu->smb_buf_length);
+
+ return cifs_sign_smbv(iov, 2, server,
+ pexpected_response_sequence_number);
+}
+
+int cifs_verify_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst,
+ struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
+ __u32 expected_sequence_number)
+{
+ unsigned int rc;
+ char server_response_sig[8];
+ char what_we_think_sig_should_be[20];
+ struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu = (struct smb_hdr *)rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_base;
+
+ if (rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_len != 4 ||
+ rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_base + 4 != rqst->rq_iov[1].iov_base)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ if (cifs_pdu == NULL || server == NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!server->session_estab)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (cifs_pdu->Command == SMB_COM_LOCKING_ANDX) {
+ struct smb_com_lock_req *pSMB =
+ (struct smb_com_lock_req *)cifs_pdu;
+ if (pSMB->LockType & LOCKING_ANDX_OPLOCK_RELEASE)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* BB what if signatures are supposed to be on for session but
+ server does not send one? BB */
+
+ /* Do not need to verify session setups with signature "BSRSPYL " */
+ if (memcmp(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, "BSRSPYL ", 8) == 0)
+ cifs_dbg(FYI, "dummy signature received for smb command 0x%x\n",
+ cifs_pdu->Command);
+
+ /* save off the origiginal signature so we can modify the smb and check
+ its signature against what the server sent */
+ memcpy(server_response_sig, cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, 8);
+
+ cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.SequenceNumber =
+ cpu_to_le32(expected_sequence_number);
+ cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.Reserved = 0;
+
+ mutex_lock(&server->srv_mutex);
+ rc = cifs_calc_signature(rqst, server, what_we_think_sig_should_be);
+ mutex_unlock(&server->srv_mutex);
+
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+/* cifs_dump_mem("what we think it should be: ",
+ what_we_think_sig_should_be, 16); */
+
+ if (memcmp(server_response_sig, what_we_think_sig_should_be, 8))
+ return -EACCES;
+ else
+ return 0;
+
+}
+
+/* first calculate 24 bytes ntlm response and then 16 byte session key */
+int setup_ntlm_response(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ unsigned int temp_len = CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE + CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE;
+ char temp_key[CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE];
+
+ if (!ses)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ses->auth_key.response = kmalloc(temp_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ses->auth_key.response)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ses->auth_key.len = temp_len;
+
+ rc = SMBNTencrypt(ses->password, ses->server->cryptkey,
+ ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE, nls_cp);
+ if (rc) {
+ cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s Can't generate NTLM response, error: %d\n",
+ __func__, rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = E_md4hash(ses->password, temp_key, nls_cp);
+ if (rc) {
+ cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s Can't generate NT hash, error: %d\n",
+ __func__, rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = mdfour(ses->auth_key.response, temp_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+ if (rc)
+ cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s Can't generate NTLM session key, error: %d\n",
+ __func__, rc);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
+int calc_lanman_hash(const char *password, const char *cryptkey, bool encrypt,
+ char *lnm_session_key)
+{
+ int i;
+ int rc;
+ char password_with_pad[CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE] = {0};
+
+ if (password)
+ strncpy(password_with_pad, password, CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE);
+
+ if (!encrypt && global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_PLNTXT) {
+ memcpy(lnm_session_key, password_with_pad,
+ CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* calculate old style session key */
+ /* calling toupper is less broken than repeatedly
+ calling nls_toupper would be since that will never
+ work for UTF8, but neither handles multibyte code pages
+ but the only alternative would be converting to UCS-16 (Unicode)
+ (using a routine something like UniStrupr) then
+ uppercasing and then converting back from Unicode - which
+ would only worth doing it if we knew it were utf8. Basically
+ utf8 and other multibyte codepages each need their own strupper
+ function since a byte at a time will ont work. */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE; i++)
+ password_with_pad[i] = toupper(password_with_pad[i]);
+
+ rc = SMBencrypt(password_with_pad, cryptkey, lnm_session_key);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+#endif /* CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH */
+
+/* Build a proper attribute value/target info pairs blob.
+ * Fill in netbios and dns domain name and workstation name
+ * and client time (total five av pairs and + one end of fields indicator.
+ * Allocate domain name which gets freed when session struct is deallocated.
+ */
+static int
+build_avpair_blob(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
+{
+ unsigned int dlen;
+ unsigned int size = 2 * sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name);
+ char *defdmname = "WORKGROUP";
+ unsigned char *blobptr;
+ struct ntlmssp2_name *attrptr;
+
+ if (!ses->domainName) {
+ ses->domainName = kstrdup(defdmname, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ses->domainName)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ dlen = strlen(ses->domainName);
+
+ /*
+ * The length of this blob is two times the size of a
+ * structure (av pair) which holds name/size
+ * ( for NTLMSSP_AV_NB_DOMAIN_NAME followed by NTLMSSP_AV_EOL ) +
+ * unicode length of a netbios domain name
+ */
+ ses->auth_key.len = size + 2 * dlen;
+ ses->auth_key.response = kzalloc(ses->auth_key.len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ses->auth_key.response) {
+ ses->auth_key.len = 0;
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ blobptr = ses->auth_key.response;
+ attrptr = (struct ntlmssp2_name *) blobptr;
+
+ /*
+ * As defined in MS-NTLM 3.3.2, just this av pair field
+ * is sufficient as part of the temp
+ */
+ attrptr->type = cpu_to_le16(NTLMSSP_AV_NB_DOMAIN_NAME);
+ attrptr->length = cpu_to_le16(2 * dlen);
+ blobptr = (unsigned char *)attrptr + sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name);
+ cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)blobptr, ses->domainName, dlen, nls_cp);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Server has provided av pairs/target info in the type 2 challenge
+ * packet and we have plucked it and stored within smb session.
+ * We parse that blob here to find netbios domain name to be used
+ * as part of ntlmv2 authentication (in Target String), if not already
+ * specified on the command line.
+ * If this function returns without any error but without fetching
+ * domain name, authentication may fail against some server but
+ * may not fail against other (those who are not very particular
+ * about target string i.e. for some, just user name might suffice.
+ */
+static int
+find_domain_name(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
+{
+ unsigned int attrsize;
+ unsigned int type;
+ unsigned int onesize = sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name);
+ unsigned char *blobptr;
+ unsigned char *blobend;
+ struct ntlmssp2_name *attrptr;
+
+ if (!ses->auth_key.len || !ses->auth_key.response)
+ return 0;
+
+ blobptr = ses->auth_key.response;
+ blobend = blobptr + ses->auth_key.len;
+
+ while (blobptr + onesize < blobend) {
+ attrptr = (struct ntlmssp2_name *) blobptr;
+ type = le16_to_cpu(attrptr->type);
+ if (type == NTLMSSP_AV_EOL)
+ break;
+ blobptr += 2; /* advance attr type */
+ attrsize = le16_to_cpu(attrptr->length);
+ blobptr += 2; /* advance attr size */
+ if (blobptr + attrsize > blobend)
+ break;
+ if (type == NTLMSSP_AV_NB_DOMAIN_NAME) {
+ if (!attrsize || attrsize >= CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN)
+ break;
+ if (!ses->domainName) {
+ ses->domainName =
+ kmalloc(attrsize + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ses->domainName)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ cifs_from_utf16(ses->domainName,
+ (__le16 *)blobptr, attrsize, attrsize,
+ nls_cp, NO_MAP_UNI_RSVD);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ blobptr += attrsize; /* advance attr value */
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Server has provided av pairs/target info in the type 2 challenge
+ * packet and we have plucked it and stored within smb session.
+ * We parse that blob here to find the server given timestamp
+ * as part of ntlmv2 authentication (or local current time as
+ * default in case of failure)
+ */
+static __le64
+find_timestamp(struct cifs_ses *ses)
+{
+ unsigned int attrsize;
+ unsigned int type;
+ unsigned int onesize = sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name);
+ unsigned char *blobptr;
+ unsigned char *blobend;
+ struct ntlmssp2_name *attrptr;
+ struct timespec64 ts;
+
+ if (!ses->auth_key.len || !ses->auth_key.response)
+ return 0;
+
+ blobptr = ses->auth_key.response;
+ blobend = blobptr + ses->auth_key.len;
+
+ while (blobptr + onesize < blobend) {
+ attrptr = (struct ntlmssp2_name *) blobptr;
+ type = le16_to_cpu(attrptr->type);
+ if (type == NTLMSSP_AV_EOL)
+ break;
+ blobptr += 2; /* advance attr type */
+ attrsize = le16_to_cpu(attrptr->length);
+ blobptr += 2; /* advance attr size */
+ if (blobptr + attrsize > blobend)
+ break;
+ if (type == NTLMSSP_AV_TIMESTAMP) {
+ if (attrsize == sizeof(u64))
+ return *((__le64 *)blobptr);
+ }
+ blobptr += attrsize; /* advance attr value */
+ }
+
+ ktime_get_real_ts64(&ts);
+ return cpu_to_le64(cifs_UnixTimeToNT(ts));
+}
+
+static int calc_ntlmv2_hash(struct cifs_ses *ses, char *ntlmv2_hash,
+ const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ int len;
+ char nt_hash[CIFS_NTHASH_SIZE];
+ __le16 *user;
+ wchar_t *domain;
+ wchar_t *server;
+
+ if (!ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: can't generate ntlmv2 hash\n", __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* calculate md4 hash of password */
+ E_md4hash(ses->password, nt_hash, nls_cp);
+
+ rc = crypto_shash_setkey(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5, nt_hash,
+ CIFS_NTHASH_SIZE);
+ if (rc) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not set NT Hash as a key\n", __func__);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = crypto_shash_init(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash);
+ if (rc) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: could not init hmacmd5\n", __func__);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ /* convert ses->user_name to unicode */
+ len = ses->user_name ? strlen(ses->user_name) : 0;
+ user = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (user == NULL) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if (len) {
+ len = cifs_strtoUTF16(user, ses->user_name, len, nls_cp);
+ UniStrupr(user);
+ } else {
+ memset(user, '\0', 2);
+ }
+
+ rc = crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+ (char *)user, 2 * len);
+ kfree(user);
+ if (rc) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with user\n", __func__);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ /* convert ses->domainName to unicode and uppercase */
+ if (ses->domainName) {
+ len = strlen(ses->domainName);
+
+ domain = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (domain == NULL) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ return rc;
+ }
+ len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)domain, ses->domainName, len,
+ nls_cp);
+ rc =
+ crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+ (char *)domain, 2 * len);
+ kfree(domain);
+ if (rc) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with domain\n",
+ __func__);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* We use ses->serverName if no domain name available */
+ len = strlen(ses->serverName);
+
+ server = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (server == NULL) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ return rc;
+ }
+ len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)server, ses->serverName, len,
+ nls_cp);
+ rc =
+ crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+ (char *)server, 2 * len);
+ kfree(server);
+ if (rc) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with server\n",
+ __func__);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rc = crypto_shash_final(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+ ntlmv2_hash);
+ if (rc)
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate md5 hash\n", __func__);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int
+CalcNTLMv2_response(const struct cifs_ses *ses, char *ntlmv2_hash)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct ntlmv2_resp *ntlmv2 = (struct ntlmv2_resp *)
+ (ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+ unsigned int hash_len;
+
+ /* The MD5 hash starts at challenge_key.key */
+ hash_len = ses->auth_key.len - (CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE +
+ offsetof(struct ntlmv2_resp, challenge.key[0]));
+
+ if (!ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: can't generate ntlmv2 hash\n", __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ rc = crypto_shash_setkey(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5,
+ ntlmv2_hash, CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE);
+ if (rc) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not set NTLMV2 Hash as a key\n",
+ __func__);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = crypto_shash_init(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash);
+ if (rc) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: could not init hmacmd5\n", __func__);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if (ses->server->negflavor == CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_EXTENDED)
+ memcpy(ntlmv2->challenge.key,
+ ses->ntlmssp->cryptkey, CIFS_SERVER_CHALLENGE_SIZE);
+ else
+ memcpy(ntlmv2->challenge.key,
+ ses->server->cryptkey, CIFS_SERVER_CHALLENGE_SIZE);
+ rc = crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+ ntlmv2->challenge.key, hash_len);
+ if (rc) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with response\n", __func__);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ /* Note that the MD5 digest over writes anon.challenge_key.key */
+ rc = crypto_shash_final(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+ ntlmv2->ntlmv2_hash);
+ if (rc)
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate md5 hash\n", __func__);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int
+setup_ntlmv2_rsp(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
+{
+ int rc;
+ int baselen;
+ unsigned int tilen;
+ struct ntlmv2_resp *ntlmv2;
+ char ntlmv2_hash[16];
+ unsigned char *tiblob = NULL; /* target info blob */
+ __le64 rsp_timestamp;
+
+ if (ses->server->negflavor == CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_EXTENDED) {
+ if (!ses->domainName) {
+ if (ses->domainAuto) {
+ rc = find_domain_name(ses, nls_cp);
+ if (rc) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "error %d finding domain name\n",
+ rc);
+ goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ses->domainName = kstrdup("", GFP_KERNEL);
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ rc = build_avpair_blob(ses, nls_cp);
+ if (rc) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "error %d building av pair blob\n", rc);
+ goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Must be within 5 minutes of the server (or in range +/-2h
+ * in case of Mac OS X), so simply carry over server timestamp
+ * (as Windows 7 does)
+ */
+ rsp_timestamp = find_timestamp(ses);
+
+ baselen = CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE + sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp);
+ tilen = ses->auth_key.len;
+ tiblob = ses->auth_key.response;
+
+ ses->auth_key.response = kmalloc(baselen + tilen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ses->auth_key.response) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ ses->auth_key.len = 0;
+ goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
+ }
+ ses->auth_key.len += baselen;
+
+ ntlmv2 = (struct ntlmv2_resp *)
+ (ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+ ntlmv2->blob_signature = cpu_to_le32(0x00000101);
+ ntlmv2->reserved = 0;
+ ntlmv2->time = rsp_timestamp;
+
+ get_random_bytes(&ntlmv2->client_chal, sizeof(ntlmv2->client_chal));
+ ntlmv2->reserved2 = 0;
+
+ memcpy(ses->auth_key.response + baselen, tiblob, tilen);
+
+ mutex_lock(&ses->server->srv_mutex);
+
+ rc = cifs_alloc_hash("hmac(md5)",
+ &ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5,
+ &ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5);
+ if (rc) {
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+
+ /* calculate ntlmv2_hash */
+ rc = calc_ntlmv2_hash(ses, ntlmv2_hash, nls_cp);
+ if (rc) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not get v2 hash rc %d\n", rc);
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+
+ /* calculate first part of the client response (CR1) */
+ rc = CalcNTLMv2_response(ses, ntlmv2_hash);
+ if (rc) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "Could not calculate CR1 rc: %d\n", rc);
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+
+ /* now calculate the session key for NTLMv2 */
+ rc = crypto_shash_setkey(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5,
+ ntlmv2_hash, CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE);
+ if (rc) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not set NTLMV2 Hash as a key\n",
+ __func__);
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+
+ rc = crypto_shash_init(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash);
+ if (rc) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not init hmacmd5\n", __func__);
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+
+ rc = crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+ ntlmv2->ntlmv2_hash,
+ CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE);
+ if (rc) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with response\n", __func__);
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+
+ rc = crypto_shash_final(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+ ses->auth_key.response);
+ if (rc)
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate md5 hash\n", __func__);
+
+unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&ses->server->srv_mutex);
+setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret:
+ kfree(tiblob);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int
+calc_seckey(struct cifs_ses *ses)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct crypto_skcipher *tfm_arc4;
+ struct scatterlist sgin, sgout;
+ struct skcipher_request *req;
+ unsigned char *sec_key;
+
+ sec_key = kmalloc(CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (sec_key == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ get_random_bytes(sec_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+
+ tfm_arc4 = crypto_alloc_skcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm_arc4)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(tfm_arc4);
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not allocate crypto API arc4\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm_arc4, ses->auth_key.response,
+ CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+ if (rc) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not set response as a key\n",
+ __func__);
+ goto out_free_cipher;
+ }
+
+ req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm_arc4, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!req) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not allocate crypto API arc4 request\n");
+ goto out_free_cipher;
+ }
+
+ sg_init_one(&sgin, sec_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+ sg_init_one(&sgout, ses->ntlmssp->ciphertext, CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
+
+ skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sgin, &sgout, CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE, NULL);
+
+ rc = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
+ skcipher_request_free(req);
+ if (rc) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not encrypt session key rc: %d\n", rc);
+ goto out_free_cipher;
+ }
+
+ /* make secondary_key/nonce as session key */
+ memcpy(ses->auth_key.response, sec_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+ /* and make len as that of session key only */
+ ses->auth_key.len = CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
+
+out_free_cipher:
+ crypto_free_skcipher(tfm_arc4);
+out:
+ kfree(sec_key);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+void
+cifs_crypto_secmech_release(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
+{
+ if (server->secmech.cmacaes) {
+ crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.cmacaes);
+ server->secmech.cmacaes = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (server->secmech.hmacsha256) {
+ crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.hmacsha256);
+ server->secmech.hmacsha256 = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (server->secmech.md5) {
+ crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.md5);
+ server->secmech.md5 = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (server->secmech.sha512) {
+ crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.sha512);
+ server->secmech.sha512 = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (server->secmech.hmacmd5) {
+ crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.hmacmd5);
+ server->secmech.hmacmd5 = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (server->secmech.ccmaesencrypt) {
+ crypto_free_aead(server->secmech.ccmaesencrypt);
+ server->secmech.ccmaesencrypt = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (server->secmech.ccmaesdecrypt) {
+ crypto_free_aead(server->secmech.ccmaesdecrypt);
+ server->secmech.ccmaesdecrypt = NULL;
+ }
+
+ kfree(server->secmech.sdesccmacaes);
+ server->secmech.sdesccmacaes = NULL;
+ kfree(server->secmech.sdeschmacsha256);
+ server->secmech.sdeschmacsha256 = NULL;
+ kfree(server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5);
+ server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5 = NULL;
+ kfree(server->secmech.sdescmd5);
+ server->secmech.sdescmd5 = NULL;
+ kfree(server->secmech.sdescsha512);
+ server->secmech.sdescsha512 = NULL;
+}