Update Linux to v5.10.109
Sourced from [1]
[1] https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/linux-5.10.109.tar.xz
Change-Id: I19bca9fc6762d4e63bcf3e4cba88bbe560d9c76c
Signed-off-by: Olivier Deprez <olivier.deprez@arm.com>
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index ee5cb94..b12f7d9 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -11,8 +11,10 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/blkdev.h>
#include <linux/path.h>
#include <linux/sched.h> /* current */
#include <linux/string_helpers.h>
@@ -116,11 +118,21 @@
}
}
-static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
+ bool contents)
{
struct super_block *load_root;
const char *origin = kernel_read_file_id_str(id);
+ /*
+ * If we will not know that we'll be seeing the full contents
+ * then we cannot trust a load will be complete and unchanged
+ * off disk. Treat all contents=false hooks as if there were
+ * no associated file struct.
+ */
+ if (!contents)
+ file = NULL;
+
/* If the file id is excluded, ignore the pinning. */
if ((unsigned int)id < ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) &&
ignore_read_file_id[id]) {
@@ -175,9 +187,9 @@
return 0;
}
-static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
+static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
{
- return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id);
+ return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id, contents);
}
static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {