Update Linux to v5.10.109
Sourced from [1]
[1] https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/linux-5.10.109.tar.xz
Change-Id: I19bca9fc6762d4e63bcf3e4cba88bbe560d9c76c
Signed-off-by: Olivier Deprez <olivier.deprez@arm.com>
diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c
index f470a03..332736a 100644
--- a/kernel/panic.c
+++ b/kernel/panic.c
@@ -36,6 +36,14 @@
#define PANIC_TIMER_STEP 100
#define PANIC_BLINK_SPD 18
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+/*
+ * Should we dump all CPUs backtraces in an oops event?
+ * Defaults to 0, can be changed via sysctl.
+ */
+unsigned int __read_mostly sysctl_oops_all_cpu_backtrace;
+#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
+
int panic_on_oops = CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS_VALUE;
static unsigned long tainted_mask =
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT) ? (1 << TAINT_RANDSTRUCT) : 0;
@@ -44,6 +52,8 @@
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pause_on_oops_lock);
bool crash_kexec_post_notifiers;
int panic_on_warn __read_mostly;
+unsigned long panic_on_taint;
+bool panic_on_taint_nousertaint = false;
int panic_timeout = CONFIG_PANIC_TIMEOUT;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(panic_timeout);
@@ -434,6 +444,11 @@
pr_warn("Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint\n");
set_bit(flag, &tainted_mask);
+
+ if (tainted_mask & panic_on_taint) {
+ panic_on_taint = 0;
+ panic("panic_on_taint set ...");
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_taint);
@@ -490,7 +505,7 @@
* Return true if the calling CPU is allowed to print oops-related info.
* This is a bit racy..
*/
-int oops_may_print(void)
+bool oops_may_print(void)
{
return pause_on_oops_flag == 0;
}
@@ -515,6 +530,9 @@
/* can't trust the integrity of the kernel anymore: */
debug_locks_off();
do_oops_enter_exit();
+
+ if (sysctl_oops_all_cpu_backtrace)
+ trigger_all_cpu_backtrace();
}
/*
@@ -533,7 +551,7 @@
}
late_initcall(init_oops_id);
-void print_oops_end_marker(void)
+static void print_oops_end_marker(void)
{
init_oops_id();
pr_warn("---[ end trace %016llx ]---\n", (unsigned long long)oops_id);
@@ -571,6 +589,11 @@
if (args)
vprintk(args->fmt, args->args);
+ print_modules();
+
+ if (regs)
+ show_regs(regs);
+
if (panic_on_warn) {
/*
* This thread may hit another WARN() in the panic path.
@@ -582,11 +605,7 @@
panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
}
- print_modules();
-
- if (regs)
- show_regs(regs);
- else
+ if (!regs)
dump_stack();
print_irqtrace_events(current);
@@ -662,26 +681,17 @@
* Called when gcc's -fstack-protector feature is used, and
* gcc detects corruption of the on-stack canary value
*/
-__visible void __stack_chk_fail(void)
+__visible noinstr void __stack_chk_fail(void)
{
+ instrumentation_begin();
panic("stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: %pB",
__builtin_return_address(0));
+ instrumentation_end();
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__stack_chk_fail);
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT
-void refcount_error_report(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *err)
-{
- WARN_RATELIMIT(1, "refcount_t %s at %pB in %s[%d], uid/euid: %u/%u\n",
- err, (void *)instruction_pointer(regs),
- current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
- from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, current_uid()),
- from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, current_euid()));
-}
-#endif
-
core_param(panic, panic_timeout, int, 0644);
core_param(panic_print, panic_print, ulong, 0644);
core_param(pause_on_oops, pause_on_oops, int, 0644);
@@ -697,3 +707,30 @@
return 0;
}
early_param("oops", oops_setup);
+
+static int __init panic_on_taint_setup(char *s)
+{
+ char *taint_str;
+
+ if (!s)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ taint_str = strsep(&s, ",");
+ if (kstrtoul(taint_str, 16, &panic_on_taint))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* make sure panic_on_taint doesn't hold out-of-range TAINT flags */
+ panic_on_taint &= TAINT_FLAGS_MAX;
+
+ if (!panic_on_taint)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (s && !strcmp(s, "nousertaint"))
+ panic_on_taint_nousertaint = true;
+
+ pr_info("panic_on_taint: bitmask=0x%lx nousertaint_mode=%sabled\n",
+ panic_on_taint, panic_on_taint_nousertaint ? "en" : "dis");
+
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("panic_on_taint", panic_on_taint_setup);