Update Linux to v5.10.109
Sourced from [1]
[1] https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/linux-5.10.109.tar.xz
Change-Id: I19bca9fc6762d4e63bcf3e4cba88bbe560d9c76c
Signed-off-by: Olivier Deprez <olivier.deprez@arm.com>
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 5a187e9..5d52aea 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -94,6 +94,8 @@
#include <linux/sched/debug.h>
#include <linux/sched/stat.h>
#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
+#include <linux/time_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/resctrl.h>
#include <trace/events/oom.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "fd.h"
@@ -704,13 +706,21 @@
* May current process learn task's sched/cmdline info (for hide_pid_min=1)
* or euid/egid (for hide_pid_min=2)?
*/
-static bool has_pid_permissions(struct pid_namespace *pid,
+static bool has_pid_permissions(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info,
struct task_struct *task,
- int hide_pid_min)
+ enum proc_hidepid hide_pid_min)
{
- if (pid->hide_pid < hide_pid_min)
+ /*
+ * If 'hidpid' mount option is set force a ptrace check,
+ * we indicate that we are using a filesystem syscall
+ * by passing PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS
+ */
+ if (fs_info->hide_pid == HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE)
+ return ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
+
+ if (fs_info->hide_pid < hide_pid_min)
return true;
- if (in_group_p(pid->pid_gid))
+ if (in_group_p(fs_info->pid_gid))
return true;
return ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
}
@@ -718,18 +728,18 @@
static int proc_pid_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
- struct pid_namespace *pid = proc_pid_ns(inode);
+ struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(inode->i_sb);
struct task_struct *task;
bool has_perms;
task = get_proc_task(inode);
if (!task)
return -ESRCH;
- has_perms = has_pid_permissions(pid, task, HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS);
+ has_perms = has_pid_permissions(fs_info, task, HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS);
put_task_struct(task);
if (!has_perms) {
- if (pid->hide_pid == HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) {
+ if (fs_info->hide_pid == HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) {
/*
* Let's make getdents(), stat(), and open()
* consistent with each other. If a process
@@ -753,7 +763,7 @@
static int proc_single_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
struct inode *inode = m->private;
- struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode);
+ struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode->i_sb);
struct pid *pid = proc_pid(inode);
struct task_struct *task;
int ret;
@@ -1039,6 +1049,8 @@
oom_adj = (task->signal->oom_score_adj * -OOM_DISABLE) /
OOM_SCORE_ADJ_MAX;
put_task_struct(task);
+ if (oom_adj > OOM_ADJUST_MAX)
+ oom_adj = OOM_ADJUST_MAX;
len = snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%d\n", oom_adj);
return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, buffer, len);
}
@@ -1258,6 +1270,10 @@
kuid_t kloginuid;
int rv;
+ /* Don't let kthreads write their own loginuid */
+ if (current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)
+ return -EPERM;
+
rcu_read_lock();
if (current != pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -1421,7 +1437,7 @@
static int sched_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
struct inode *inode = m->private;
- struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode);
+ struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode->i_sb);
struct task_struct *p;
p = get_proc_task(inode);
@@ -1541,6 +1557,108 @@
#endif /* CONFIG_SCHED_AUTOGROUP */
+#ifdef CONFIG_TIME_NS
+static int timens_offsets_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+{
+ struct task_struct *p;
+
+ p = get_proc_task(file_inode(m->file));
+ if (!p)
+ return -ESRCH;
+ proc_timens_show_offsets(p, m);
+
+ put_task_struct(p);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t timens_offsets_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+ struct proc_timens_offset offsets[2];
+ char *kbuf = NULL, *pos, *next_line;
+ struct task_struct *p;
+ int ret, noffsets;
+
+ /* Only allow < page size writes at the beginning of the file */
+ if ((*ppos != 0) || (count >= PAGE_SIZE))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Slurp in the user data */
+ kbuf = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+ if (IS_ERR(kbuf))
+ return PTR_ERR(kbuf);
+
+ /* Parse the user data */
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ noffsets = 0;
+ for (pos = kbuf; pos; pos = next_line) {
+ struct proc_timens_offset *off = &offsets[noffsets];
+ char clock[10];
+ int err;
+
+ /* Find the end of line and ensure we don't look past it */
+ next_line = strchr(pos, '\n');
+ if (next_line) {
+ *next_line = '\0';
+ next_line++;
+ if (*next_line == '\0')
+ next_line = NULL;
+ }
+
+ err = sscanf(pos, "%9s %lld %lu", clock,
+ &off->val.tv_sec, &off->val.tv_nsec);
+ if (err != 3 || off->val.tv_nsec >= NSEC_PER_SEC)
+ goto out;
+
+ clock[sizeof(clock) - 1] = 0;
+ if (strcmp(clock, "monotonic") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(clock, __stringify(CLOCK_MONOTONIC)) == 0)
+ off->clockid = CLOCK_MONOTONIC;
+ else if (strcmp(clock, "boottime") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(clock, __stringify(CLOCK_BOOTTIME)) == 0)
+ off->clockid = CLOCK_BOOTTIME;
+ else
+ goto out;
+
+ noffsets++;
+ if (noffsets == ARRAY_SIZE(offsets)) {
+ if (next_line)
+ count = next_line - kbuf;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = -ESRCH;
+ p = get_proc_task(inode);
+ if (!p)
+ goto out;
+ ret = proc_timens_set_offset(file, p, offsets, noffsets);
+ put_task_struct(p);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = count;
+out:
+ kfree(kbuf);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int timens_offsets_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+ return single_open(filp, timens_offsets_show, inode);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations proc_timens_offsets_operations = {
+ .open = timens_offsets_open,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .write = timens_offsets_write,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .release = single_release,
+};
+#endif /* CONFIG_TIME_NS */
+
static ssize_t comm_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *offset)
{
@@ -1634,8 +1752,7 @@
if (error)
goto out;
- nd_jump_link(&path);
- return NULL;
+ error = nd_jump_link(&path);
out:
return ERR_PTR(error);
}
@@ -1751,11 +1868,25 @@
*rgid = gid;
}
+void proc_pid_evict_inode(struct proc_inode *ei)
+{
+ struct pid *pid = ei->pid;
+
+ if (S_ISDIR(ei->vfs_inode.i_mode)) {
+ spin_lock(&pid->lock);
+ hlist_del_init_rcu(&ei->sibling_inodes);
+ spin_unlock(&pid->lock);
+ }
+
+ put_pid(pid);
+}
+
struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode(struct super_block * sb,
struct task_struct *task, umode_t mode)
{
struct inode * inode;
struct proc_inode *ei;
+ struct pid *pid;
/* We need a new inode */
@@ -1773,10 +1904,18 @@
/*
* grab the reference to task.
*/
- ei->pid = get_task_pid(task, PIDTYPE_PID);
- if (!ei->pid)
+ pid = get_task_pid(task, PIDTYPE_PID);
+ if (!pid)
goto out_unlock;
+ /* Let the pid remember us for quick removal */
+ ei->pid = pid;
+ if (S_ISDIR(mode)) {
+ spin_lock(&pid->lock);
+ hlist_add_head_rcu(&ei->sibling_inodes, &pid->inodes);
+ spin_unlock(&pid->lock);
+ }
+
task_dump_owner(task, 0, &inode->i_uid, &inode->i_gid);
security_task_to_inode(task, inode);
@@ -1792,7 +1931,7 @@
u32 request_mask, unsigned int query_flags)
{
struct inode *inode = d_inode(path->dentry);
- struct pid_namespace *pid = proc_pid_ns(inode);
+ struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(inode->i_sb);
struct task_struct *task;
generic_fillattr(inode, stat);
@@ -1802,7 +1941,7 @@
rcu_read_lock();
task = pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID);
if (task) {
- if (!has_pid_permissions(pid, task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)) {
+ if (!has_pid_permissions(fs_info, task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
/*
* This doesn't prevent learning whether PID exists,
@@ -1987,11 +2126,11 @@
goto out;
if (!dname_to_vma_addr(dentry, &vm_start, &vm_end)) {
- status = down_read_killable(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ status = mmap_read_lock_killable(mm);
if (!status) {
exact_vma_exists = !!find_exact_vma(mm, vm_start,
vm_end);
- up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ mmap_read_unlock(mm);
}
}
@@ -2038,7 +2177,7 @@
if (rc)
goto out_mmput;
- rc = down_read_killable(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ rc = mmap_read_lock_killable(mm);
if (rc)
goto out_mmput;
@@ -2049,7 +2188,7 @@
path_get(path);
rc = 0;
}
- up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ mmap_read_unlock(mm);
out_mmput:
mmput(mm);
@@ -2064,16 +2203,16 @@
};
/*
- * Only allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN to follow the links, due to concerns about how the
- * symlinks may be used to bypass permissions on ancestor directories in the
- * path to the file in question.
+ * Only allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE to follow the links, due
+ * to concerns about how the symlinks may be used to bypass permissions on
+ * ancestor directories in the path to the file in question.
*/
static const char *
proc_map_files_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode,
struct delayed_call *done)
{
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(&init_user_ns))
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
return proc_pid_get_link(dentry, inode, done);
@@ -2139,7 +2278,7 @@
goto out_put_task;
result = ERR_PTR(-EINTR);
- if (down_read_killable(&mm->mmap_sem))
+ if (mmap_read_lock_killable(mm))
goto out_put_mm;
result = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
@@ -2152,7 +2291,7 @@
(void *)(unsigned long)vma->vm_file->f_mode);
out_no_vma:
- up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ mmap_read_unlock(mm);
out_put_mm:
mmput(mm);
out_put_task:
@@ -2197,7 +2336,7 @@
if (!mm)
goto out_put_task;
- ret = down_read_killable(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ ret = mmap_read_lock_killable(mm);
if (ret) {
mmput(mm);
goto out_put_task;
@@ -2208,11 +2347,11 @@
/*
* We need two passes here:
*
- * 1) Collect vmas of mapped files with mmap_sem taken
- * 2) Release mmap_sem and instantiate entries
+ * 1) Collect vmas of mapped files with mmap_lock taken
+ * 2) Release mmap_lock and instantiate entries
*
* otherwise we get lockdep complained, since filldir()
- * routine might require mmap_sem taken in might_fault().
+ * routine might require mmap_lock taken in might_fault().
*/
for (vma = mm->mmap, pos = 2; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
@@ -2224,7 +2363,7 @@
p = genradix_ptr_alloc(&fa, nr_files++, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
- up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ mmap_read_unlock(mm);
mmput(mm);
goto out_put_task;
}
@@ -2233,7 +2372,7 @@
p->end = vma->vm_end;
p->mode = vma->vm_file->f_mode;
}
- up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ mmap_read_unlock(mm);
mmput(mm);
for (i = 0; i < nr_files; i++) {
@@ -2353,7 +2492,7 @@
return -ENOMEM;
tp->pid = proc_pid(inode);
- tp->ns = proc_pid_ns(inode);
+ tp->ns = proc_pid_ns(inode->i_sb);
return 0;
}
@@ -2666,6 +2805,15 @@
LSM_DIR_OPS(smack);
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR
+static const struct pid_entry apparmor_attr_dir_stuff[] = {
+ ATTR("apparmor", "current", 0666),
+ ATTR("apparmor", "prev", 0444),
+ ATTR("apparmor", "exec", 0666),
+};
+LSM_DIR_OPS(apparmor);
+#endif
+
static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
ATTR(NULL, "current", 0666),
ATTR(NULL, "prev", 0444),
@@ -2677,6 +2825,10 @@
DIR("smack", 0555,
proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR
+ DIR("apparmor", 0555,
+ proc_apparmor_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_apparmor_attr_dir_ops),
+#endif
};
static int proc_attr_dir_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
@@ -3037,6 +3189,9 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_AUTOGROUP
REG("autogroup", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_pid_sched_autogroup_operations),
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_TIME_NS
+ REG("timens_offsets", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_timens_offsets_operations),
+#endif
REG("comm", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_pid_set_comm_operations),
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
ONE("syscall", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_syscall),
@@ -3082,6 +3237,9 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS
ONE("cgroup", S_IRUGO, proc_cgroup_show),
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_CPU_RESCTRL
+ ONE("cpu_resctrl_groups", S_IRUGO, proc_resctrl_show),
+#endif
ONE("oom_score", S_IRUGO, proc_oom_score),
REG("oom_adj", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_oom_adj_operations),
REG("oom_score_adj", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_oom_score_adj_operations),
@@ -3154,90 +3312,28 @@
.permission = proc_pid_permission,
};
-static void proc_flush_task_mnt(struct vfsmount *mnt, pid_t pid, pid_t tgid)
-{
- struct dentry *dentry, *leader, *dir;
- char buf[10 + 1];
- struct qstr name;
-
- name.name = buf;
- name.len = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u", pid);
- /* no ->d_hash() rejects on procfs */
- dentry = d_hash_and_lookup(mnt->mnt_root, &name);
- if (dentry) {
- d_invalidate(dentry);
- dput(dentry);
- }
-
- if (pid == tgid)
- return;
-
- name.name = buf;
- name.len = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u", tgid);
- leader = d_hash_and_lookup(mnt->mnt_root, &name);
- if (!leader)
- goto out;
-
- name.name = "task";
- name.len = strlen(name.name);
- dir = d_hash_and_lookup(leader, &name);
- if (!dir)
- goto out_put_leader;
-
- name.name = buf;
- name.len = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u", pid);
- dentry = d_hash_and_lookup(dir, &name);
- if (dentry) {
- d_invalidate(dentry);
- dput(dentry);
- }
-
- dput(dir);
-out_put_leader:
- dput(leader);
-out:
- return;
-}
-
/**
- * proc_flush_task - Remove dcache entries for @task from the /proc dcache.
- * @task: task that should be flushed.
+ * proc_flush_pid - Remove dcache entries for @pid from the /proc dcache.
+ * @pid: pid that should be flushed.
*
- * When flushing dentries from proc, one needs to flush them from global
- * proc (proc_mnt) and from all the namespaces' procs this task was seen
- * in. This call is supposed to do all of this job.
- *
- * Looks in the dcache for
- * /proc/@pid
- * /proc/@tgid/task/@pid
- * if either directory is present flushes it and all of it'ts children
- * from the dcache.
+ * This function walks a list of inodes (that belong to any proc
+ * filesystem) that are attached to the pid and flushes them from
+ * the dentry cache.
*
* It is safe and reasonable to cache /proc entries for a task until
* that task exits. After that they just clog up the dcache with
* useless entries, possibly causing useful dcache entries to be
- * flushed instead. This routine is proved to flush those useless
- * dcache entries at process exit time.
+ * flushed instead. This routine is provided to flush those useless
+ * dcache entries when a process is reaped.
*
* NOTE: This routine is just an optimization so it does not guarantee
- * that no dcache entries will exist at process exit time it
- * just makes it very unlikely that any will persist.
+ * that no dcache entries will exist after a process is reaped
+ * it just makes it very unlikely that any will persist.
*/
-void proc_flush_task(struct task_struct *task)
+void proc_flush_pid(struct pid *pid)
{
- int i;
- struct pid *pid, *tgid;
- struct upid *upid;
-
- pid = task_pid(task);
- tgid = task_tgid(task);
-
- for (i = 0; i <= pid->level; i++) {
- upid = &pid->numbers[i];
- proc_flush_task_mnt(upid->ns->proc_mnt, upid->nr,
- tgid->numbers[i].nr);
- }
+ proc_invalidate_siblings_dcache(&pid->inodes, &pid->lock);
}
static struct dentry *proc_pid_instantiate(struct dentry * dentry,
@@ -3264,6 +3360,7 @@
{
struct task_struct *task;
unsigned tgid;
+ struct proc_fs_info *fs_info;
struct pid_namespace *ns;
struct dentry *result = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
@@ -3271,7 +3368,8 @@
if (tgid == ~0U)
goto out;
- ns = dentry->d_sb->s_fs_info;
+ fs_info = proc_sb_info(dentry->d_sb);
+ ns = fs_info->pid_ns;
rcu_read_lock();
task = find_task_by_pid_ns(tgid, ns);
if (task)
@@ -3280,7 +3378,14 @@
if (!task)
goto out;
+ /* Limit procfs to only ptraceable tasks */
+ if (fs_info->hide_pid == HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE) {
+ if (!has_pid_permissions(fs_info, task, HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS))
+ goto out_put_task;
+ }
+
result = proc_pid_instantiate(dentry, task, NULL);
+out_put_task:
put_task_struct(task);
out:
return result;
@@ -3306,20 +3411,8 @@
pid = find_ge_pid(iter.tgid, ns);
if (pid) {
iter.tgid = pid_nr_ns(pid, ns);
- iter.task = pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_PID);
- /* What we to know is if the pid we have find is the
- * pid of a thread_group_leader. Testing for task
- * being a thread_group_leader is the obvious thing
- * todo but there is a window when it fails, due to
- * the pid transfer logic in de_thread.
- *
- * So we perform the straight forward test of seeing
- * if the pid we have found is the pid of a thread
- * group leader, and don't worry if the task we have
- * found doesn't happen to be a thread group leader.
- * As we don't care in the case of readdir.
- */
- if (!iter.task || !has_group_leader_pid(iter.task)) {
+ iter.task = pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_TGID);
+ if (!iter.task) {
iter.tgid += 1;
goto retry;
}
@@ -3335,20 +3428,21 @@
int proc_pid_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
{
struct tgid_iter iter;
- struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(file_inode(file));
+ struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(file_inode(file)->i_sb);
+ struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(file_inode(file)->i_sb);
loff_t pos = ctx->pos;
if (pos >= PID_MAX_LIMIT + TGID_OFFSET)
return 0;
if (pos == TGID_OFFSET - 2) {
- struct inode *inode = d_inode(ns->proc_self);
+ struct inode *inode = d_inode(fs_info->proc_self);
if (!dir_emit(ctx, "self", 4, inode->i_ino, DT_LNK))
return 0;
ctx->pos = pos = pos + 1;
}
if (pos == TGID_OFFSET - 1) {
- struct inode *inode = d_inode(ns->proc_thread_self);
+ struct inode *inode = d_inode(fs_info->proc_thread_self);
if (!dir_emit(ctx, "thread-self", 11, inode->i_ino, DT_LNK))
return 0;
ctx->pos = pos = pos + 1;
@@ -3362,7 +3456,7 @@
unsigned int len;
cond_resched();
- if (!has_pid_permissions(ns, iter.task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE))
+ if (!has_pid_permissions(fs_info, iter.task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE))
continue;
len = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%u", iter.tgid);
@@ -3482,6 +3576,9 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS
ONE("cgroup", S_IRUGO, proc_cgroup_show),
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_CPU_RESCTRL
+ ONE("cpu_resctrl_groups", S_IRUGO, proc_resctrl_show),
+#endif
ONE("oom_score", S_IRUGO, proc_oom_score),
REG("oom_adj", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_oom_adj_operations),
REG("oom_score_adj", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_oom_score_adj_operations),
@@ -3559,6 +3656,7 @@
struct task_struct *task;
struct task_struct *leader = get_proc_task(dir);
unsigned tid;
+ struct proc_fs_info *fs_info;
struct pid_namespace *ns;
struct dentry *result = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
@@ -3569,7 +3667,8 @@
if (tid == ~0U)
goto out;
- ns = dentry->d_sb->s_fs_info;
+ fs_info = proc_sb_info(dentry->d_sb);
+ ns = fs_info->pid_ns;
rcu_read_lock();
task = find_task_by_pid_ns(tid, ns);
if (task)
@@ -3683,7 +3782,7 @@
/* f_version caches the tgid value that the last readdir call couldn't
* return. lseek aka telldir automagically resets f_version to 0.
*/
- ns = proc_pid_ns(inode);
+ ns = proc_pid_ns(inode->i_sb);
tid = (int)file->f_version;
file->f_version = 0;
for (task = first_tid(proc_pid(inode), tid, ctx->pos - 2, ns);