Update Linux to v5.10.109
Sourced from [1]
[1] https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/linux-5.10.109.tar.xz
Change-Id: I19bca9fc6762d4e63bcf3e4cba88bbe560d9c76c
Signed-off-by: Olivier Deprez <olivier.deprez@arm.com>
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S
index be104ee..011ec64 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S
@@ -6,20 +6,27 @@
* operations here; the indirect forms are better handled in C.
*/
+#include <asm/errno.h>
#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
#include <asm/percpu.h>
#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
-#include <asm/frame.h>
+#include <asm/segment.h>
+#include <asm/thread_info.h>
#include <asm/asm.h>
+#include <asm/frame.h>
+#include <xen/interface/xen.h>
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <../entry/calling.h>
/*
* Enable events. This clears the event mask and tests the pending
* event status with one and operation. If there are pending events,
* then enter the hypervisor to get them handled.
*/
-ENTRY(xen_irq_enable_direct)
+SYM_FUNC_START(xen_irq_enable_direct)
FRAME_BEGIN
/* Unmask events */
movb $0, PER_CPU_VAR(xen_vcpu_info) + XEN_vcpu_info_mask
@@ -38,17 +45,17 @@
1:
FRAME_END
ret
- ENDPROC(xen_irq_enable_direct)
+SYM_FUNC_END(xen_irq_enable_direct)
/*
* Disabling events is simply a matter of making the event mask
* non-zero.
*/
-ENTRY(xen_irq_disable_direct)
+SYM_FUNC_START(xen_irq_disable_direct)
movb $1, PER_CPU_VAR(xen_vcpu_info) + XEN_vcpu_info_mask
ret
-ENDPROC(xen_irq_disable_direct)
+SYM_FUNC_END(xen_irq_disable_direct)
/*
* (xen_)save_fl is used to get the current interrupt enable status.
@@ -59,12 +66,12 @@
* undefined. We need to toggle the state of the bit, because Xen and
* x86 use opposite senses (mask vs enable).
*/
-ENTRY(xen_save_fl_direct)
+SYM_FUNC_START(xen_save_fl_direct)
testb $0xff, PER_CPU_VAR(xen_vcpu_info) + XEN_vcpu_info_mask
setz %ah
addb %ah, %ah
ret
- ENDPROC(xen_save_fl_direct)
+SYM_FUNC_END(xen_save_fl_direct)
/*
@@ -74,13 +81,9 @@
* interrupt mask state, it checks for unmasked pending events and
* enters the hypervisor to get them delivered if so.
*/
-ENTRY(xen_restore_fl_direct)
+SYM_FUNC_START(xen_restore_fl_direct)
FRAME_BEGIN
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
testw $X86_EFLAGS_IF, %di
-#else
- testb $X86_EFLAGS_IF>>8, %ah
-#endif
setz PER_CPU_VAR(xen_vcpu_info) + XEN_vcpu_info_mask
/*
* Preempt here doesn't matter because that will deal with any
@@ -95,24 +98,15 @@
1:
FRAME_END
ret
- ENDPROC(xen_restore_fl_direct)
+SYM_FUNC_END(xen_restore_fl_direct)
/*
* Force an event check by making a hypercall, but preserve regs
* before making the call.
*/
-ENTRY(check_events)
+SYM_FUNC_START(check_events)
FRAME_BEGIN
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
- push %eax
- push %ecx
- push %edx
- call xen_force_evtchn_callback
- pop %edx
- pop %ecx
- pop %eax
-#else
push %rax
push %rcx
push %rdx
@@ -132,22 +126,213 @@
pop %rdx
pop %rcx
pop %rax
-#endif
FRAME_END
ret
-ENDPROC(check_events)
+SYM_FUNC_END(check_events)
-ENTRY(xen_read_cr2)
+SYM_FUNC_START(xen_read_cr2)
FRAME_BEGIN
_ASM_MOV PER_CPU_VAR(xen_vcpu), %_ASM_AX
_ASM_MOV XEN_vcpu_info_arch_cr2(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_AX
FRAME_END
ret
- ENDPROC(xen_read_cr2);
+SYM_FUNC_END(xen_read_cr2);
-ENTRY(xen_read_cr2_direct)
+SYM_FUNC_START(xen_read_cr2_direct)
FRAME_BEGIN
_ASM_MOV PER_CPU_VAR(xen_vcpu_info) + XEN_vcpu_info_arch_cr2, %_ASM_AX
FRAME_END
ret
- ENDPROC(xen_read_cr2_direct);
+SYM_FUNC_END(xen_read_cr2_direct);
+
+.macro xen_pv_trap name
+SYM_CODE_START(xen_\name)
+ pop %rcx
+ pop %r11
+ jmp \name
+SYM_CODE_END(xen_\name)
+_ASM_NOKPROBE(xen_\name)
+.endm
+
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_divide_error
+xen_pv_trap asm_xenpv_exc_debug
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_int3
+xen_pv_trap asm_xenpv_exc_nmi
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_overflow
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_bounds
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_invalid_op
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_device_not_available
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_double_fault
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_coproc_segment_overrun
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_invalid_tss
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_segment_not_present
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_stack_segment
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_general_protection
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_page_fault
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_spurious_interrupt_bug
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_coprocessor_error
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_alignment_check
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_machine_check
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_MCE */
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_simd_coprocessor_error
+#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
+xen_pv_trap entry_INT80_compat
+#endif
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_xen_unknown_trap
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_xen_hypervisor_callback
+
+ __INIT
+SYM_CODE_START(xen_early_idt_handler_array)
+ i = 0
+ .rept NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS
+ pop %rcx
+ pop %r11
+ jmp early_idt_handler_array + i*EARLY_IDT_HANDLER_SIZE
+ i = i + 1
+ .fill xen_early_idt_handler_array + i*XEN_EARLY_IDT_HANDLER_SIZE - ., 1, 0xcc
+ .endr
+SYM_CODE_END(xen_early_idt_handler_array)
+ __FINIT
+
+hypercall_iret = hypercall_page + __HYPERVISOR_iret * 32
+/*
+ * Xen64 iret frame:
+ *
+ * ss
+ * rsp
+ * rflags
+ * cs
+ * rip <-- standard iret frame
+ *
+ * flags
+ *
+ * rcx }
+ * r11 }<-- pushed by hypercall page
+ * rsp->rax }
+ */
+SYM_CODE_START(xen_iret)
+ pushq $0
+ jmp hypercall_iret
+SYM_CODE_END(xen_iret)
+
+SYM_CODE_START(xen_sysret64)
+ /*
+ * We're already on the usermode stack at this point, but
+ * still with the kernel gs, so we can easily switch back.
+ *
+ * tss.sp2 is scratch space.
+ */
+ movq %rsp, PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp2)
+ movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp
+
+ pushq $__USER_DS
+ pushq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp2)
+ pushq %r11
+ pushq $__USER_CS
+ pushq %rcx
+
+ pushq $VGCF_in_syscall
+ jmp hypercall_iret
+SYM_CODE_END(xen_sysret64)
+
+/*
+ * XEN pv doesn't use trampoline stack, PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp0) is
+ * also the kernel stack. Reusing swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode()
+ * in XEN pv would cause %rsp to move up to the top of the kernel stack and
+ * leave the IRET frame below %rsp, which is dangerous to be corrupted if #NMI
+ * interrupts. And swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode() pushing the IRET
+ * frame at the same address is useless.
+ */
+SYM_CODE_START(xenpv_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode)
+ UNWIND_HINT_REGS
+ POP_REGS
+
+ /* stackleak_erase() can work safely on the kernel stack. */
+ STACKLEAK_ERASE_NOCLOBBER
+
+ addq $8, %rsp /* skip regs->orig_ax */
+ jmp xen_iret
+SYM_CODE_END(xenpv_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode)
+
+/*
+ * Xen handles syscall callbacks much like ordinary exceptions, which
+ * means we have:
+ * - kernel gs
+ * - kernel rsp
+ * - an iret-like stack frame on the stack (including rcx and r11):
+ * ss
+ * rsp
+ * rflags
+ * cs
+ * rip
+ * r11
+ * rsp->rcx
+ */
+
+/* Normal 64-bit system call target */
+SYM_FUNC_START(xen_syscall_target)
+ popq %rcx
+ popq %r11
+
+ /*
+ * Neither Xen nor the kernel really knows what the old SS and
+ * CS were. The kernel expects __USER_DS and __USER_CS, so
+ * report those values even though Xen will guess its own values.
+ */
+ movq $__USER_DS, 4*8(%rsp)
+ movq $__USER_CS, 1*8(%rsp)
+
+ jmp entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
+SYM_FUNC_END(xen_syscall_target)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
+
+/* 32-bit compat syscall target */
+SYM_FUNC_START(xen_syscall32_target)
+ popq %rcx
+ popq %r11
+
+ /*
+ * Neither Xen nor the kernel really knows what the old SS and
+ * CS were. The kernel expects __USER32_DS and __USER32_CS, so
+ * report those values even though Xen will guess its own values.
+ */
+ movq $__USER32_DS, 4*8(%rsp)
+ movq $__USER32_CS, 1*8(%rsp)
+
+ jmp entry_SYSCALL_compat_after_hwframe
+SYM_FUNC_END(xen_syscall32_target)
+
+/* 32-bit compat sysenter target */
+SYM_FUNC_START(xen_sysenter_target)
+ /*
+ * NB: Xen is polite and clears TF from EFLAGS for us. This means
+ * that we don't need to guard against single step exceptions here.
+ */
+ popq %rcx
+ popq %r11
+
+ /*
+ * Neither Xen nor the kernel really knows what the old SS and
+ * CS were. The kernel expects __USER32_DS and __USER32_CS, so
+ * report those values even though Xen will guess its own values.
+ */
+ movq $__USER32_DS, 4*8(%rsp)
+ movq $__USER32_CS, 1*8(%rsp)
+
+ jmp entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe
+SYM_FUNC_END(xen_sysenter_target)
+
+#else /* !CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION */
+
+SYM_FUNC_START_ALIAS(xen_syscall32_target)
+SYM_FUNC_START(xen_sysenter_target)
+ lea 16(%rsp), %rsp /* strip %rcx, %r11 */
+ mov $-ENOSYS, %rax
+ pushq $0
+ jmp hypercall_iret
+SYM_FUNC_END(xen_sysenter_target)
+SYM_FUNC_END_ALIAS(xen_syscall32_target)
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION */