Update Linux to v5.10.109
Sourced from [1]
[1] https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/linux-5.10.109.tar.xz
Change-Id: I19bca9fc6762d4e63bcf3e4cba88bbe560d9c76c
Signed-off-by: Olivier Deprez <olivier.deprez@arm.com>
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
index 4d75bc6..b93d6cd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#include <xen/xen.h>
#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
+#include <asm/sev-es.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
#include <asm/kdebug.h>
@@ -45,55 +46,6 @@
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ex_handler_fault);
/*
- * Handler for UD0 exception following a failed test against the
- * result of a refcount inc/dec/add/sub.
- */
-__visible bool ex_handler_refcount(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
- struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
- unsigned long error_code,
- unsigned long fault_addr)
-{
- /* First unconditionally saturate the refcount. */
- *(int *)regs->cx = INT_MIN / 2;
-
- /*
- * Strictly speaking, this reports the fixup destination, not
- * the fault location, and not the actually overflowing
- * instruction, which is the instruction before the "js", but
- * since that instruction could be a variety of lengths, just
- * report the location after the overflow, which should be close
- * enough for finding the overflow, as it's at least back in
- * the function, having returned from .text.unlikely.
- */
- regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup);
-
- /*
- * This function has been called because either a negative refcount
- * value was seen by any of the refcount functions, or a zero
- * refcount value was seen by refcount_dec().
- *
- * If we crossed from INT_MAX to INT_MIN, OF (Overflow Flag: result
- * wrapped around) will be set. Additionally, seeing the refcount
- * reach 0 will set ZF (Zero Flag: result was zero). In each of
- * these cases we want a report, since it's a boundary condition.
- * The SF case is not reported since it indicates post-boundary
- * manipulations below zero or above INT_MAX. And if none of the
- * flags are set, something has gone very wrong, so report it.
- */
- if (regs->flags & (X86_EFLAGS_OF | X86_EFLAGS_ZF)) {
- bool zero = regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_ZF;
-
- refcount_error_report(regs, zero ? "hit zero" : "overflow");
- } else if ((regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_SF) == 0) {
- /* Report if none of OF, ZF, nor SF are set. */
- refcount_error_report(regs, "unexpected saturation");
- }
-
- return true;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_refcount);
-
-/*
* Handler for when we fail to restore a task's FPU state. We should never get
* here because the FPU state of a task using the FPU (task->thread.fpu.state)
* should always be valid. However, past bugs have allowed userspace to set
@@ -129,17 +81,17 @@
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_uaccess);
-__visible bool ex_handler_ext(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
- struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
- unsigned long error_code,
- unsigned long fault_addr)
+__visible bool ex_handler_copy(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+ struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
+ unsigned long error_code,
+ unsigned long fault_addr)
{
- /* Special hack for uaccess_err */
- current->thread.uaccess_err = 1;
+ WARN_ONCE(trapnr == X86_TRAP_GP, "General protection fault in user access. Non-canonical address?");
regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup);
+ regs->ax = trapnr;
return true;
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_ext);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_copy);
__visible bool ex_handler_rdmsr_unsafe(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
@@ -186,17 +138,21 @@
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_clear_fs);
-__visible bool ex_has_fault_handler(unsigned long ip)
+enum handler_type ex_get_fault_handler_type(unsigned long ip)
{
const struct exception_table_entry *e;
ex_handler_t handler;
e = search_exception_tables(ip);
if (!e)
- return false;
+ return EX_HANDLER_NONE;
handler = ex_fixup_handler(e);
-
- return handler == ex_handler_fault;
+ if (handler == ex_handler_fault)
+ return EX_HANDLER_FAULT;
+ else if (handler == ex_handler_uaccess || handler == ex_handler_copy)
+ return EX_HANDLER_UACCESS;
+ else
+ return EX_HANDLER_OTHER;
}
int fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr, unsigned long error_code,
@@ -265,8 +221,19 @@
if (fixup_exception(regs, trapnr, regs->orig_ax, 0))
return;
- if (fixup_bug(regs, trapnr))
- return;
+ if (trapnr == X86_TRAP_UD) {
+ if (report_bug(regs->ip, regs) == BUG_TRAP_TYPE_WARN) {
+ /* Skip the ud2. */
+ regs->ip += LEN_UD2;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If this was a BUG and report_bug returns or if this
+ * was just a normal #UD, we want to continue onward and
+ * crash.
+ */
+ }
fail:
early_printk("PANIC: early exception 0x%02x IP %lx:%lx error %lx cr2 0x%lx\n",