Update Linux to v5.4.2
Change-Id: Idf6911045d9d382da2cfe01b1edff026404ac8fd
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index b69d3b1..1fbd778 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -1,13 +1,10 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
*
* Author:
* David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
*
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
- *
* See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
*/
@@ -30,10 +27,12 @@
#include <linux/tpm.h>
#include <linux/tpm_command.h>
-#include "trusted.h"
+#include <keys/trusted.h>
static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)";
static const char hash_alg[] = "sha1";
+static struct tpm_chip *chip;
+static struct tpm_digest *digests;
struct sdesc {
struct shash_desc shash;
@@ -53,7 +52,6 @@
if (!sdesc)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
sdesc->shash.tfm = alg;
- sdesc->shash.flags = 0x0;
return sdesc;
}
@@ -121,9 +119,9 @@
/*
* calculate authorization info fields to send to TPM
*/
-static int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
+int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
unsigned int keylen, unsigned char *h1,
- unsigned char *h2, unsigned char h3, ...)
+ unsigned char *h2, unsigned int h3, ...)
{
unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
struct sdesc *sdesc;
@@ -133,13 +131,16 @@
int ret;
va_list argp;
+ if (!chip)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
}
- c = h3;
+ c = !!h3;
ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
@@ -168,11 +169,12 @@
kzfree(sdesc);
return ret;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(TSS_authhmac);
/*
* verify the AUTH1_COMMAND (Seal) result from TPM
*/
-static int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
+int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
const uint32_t command,
const unsigned char *ononce,
const unsigned char *key,
@@ -193,6 +195,9 @@
va_list argp;
int ret;
+ if (!chip)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
bufsize = LOAD32(buffer, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
tag = LOAD16(buffer, 0);
ordinal = command;
@@ -249,6 +254,7 @@
kzfree(sdesc);
return ret;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(TSS_checkhmac1);
/*
* verify the AUTH2_COMMAND (unseal) result from TPM
@@ -355,18 +361,22 @@
* For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our
* own TPM command packets using the drivers send function.
*/
-static int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
+int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
{
int rc;
+ if (!chip)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
- rc = tpm_send(NULL, cmd, buflen);
+ rc = tpm_send(chip, cmd, buflen);
dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
if (rc > 0)
/* Can't return positive return codes values to keyctl */
rc = -EPERM;
return rc;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(trusted_tpm_send);
/*
* Lock a trusted key, by extending a selected PCR.
@@ -376,15 +386,10 @@
*/
static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum)
{
- unsigned char hash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
- int ret;
-
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
- ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
- if (ret != SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
- return ret;
- return tpm_pcr_extend(NULL, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0;
+
+ return tpm_pcr_extend(chip, pcrnum, digests) ? -EINVAL : 0;
}
/*
@@ -397,7 +402,7 @@
unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
int ret;
- ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ ret = tpm_get_random(chip, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
return ret;
@@ -425,10 +430,13 @@
/*
* Create an object independent authorisation protocol (oiap) session
*/
-static int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce)
+int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce)
{
int ret;
+ if (!chip)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
INIT_BUF(tb);
store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
store32(tb, TPM_OIAP_SIZE);
@@ -442,6 +450,7 @@
TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
return 0;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(oiap);
struct tpm_digests {
unsigned char encauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
@@ -492,7 +501,7 @@
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
- ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ ret = tpm_get_random(chip, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
goto out;
ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL);
@@ -602,7 +611,7 @@
ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
keyhndl = htonl(SRKHANDLE);
- ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ ret = tpm_get_random(chip, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) {
pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret);
return ret;
@@ -707,7 +716,7 @@
}
enum {
- Opt_err = -1,
+ Opt_err,
Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update,
Opt_keyhandle, Opt_keyauth, Opt_blobauth,
Opt_pcrinfo, Opt_pcrlock, Opt_migratable,
@@ -747,7 +756,7 @@
int i;
int tpm2;
- tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(NULL);
+ tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip);
if (tpm2 < 0)
return tpm2;
@@ -916,7 +925,7 @@
struct trusted_key_options *options;
int tpm2;
- tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(NULL);
+ tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip);
if (tpm2 < 0)
return NULL;
@@ -966,7 +975,7 @@
size_t key_len;
int tpm2;
- tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(NULL);
+ tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip);
if (tpm2 < 0)
return tpm2;
@@ -1007,7 +1016,7 @@
switch (key_cmd) {
case Opt_load:
if (tpm2)
- ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(NULL, payload, options);
+ ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(chip, payload, options);
else
ret = key_unseal(payload, options);
dump_payload(payload);
@@ -1017,13 +1026,13 @@
break;
case Opt_new:
key_len = payload->key_len;
- ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, payload->key, key_len);
+ ret = tpm_get_random(chip, payload->key, key_len);
if (ret != key_len) {
pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret);
goto out;
}
if (tpm2)
- ret = tpm_seal_trusted(NULL, payload, options);
+ ret = tpm_seal_trusted(chip, payload, options);
else
ret = key_seal(payload, options);
if (ret < 0)
@@ -1195,14 +1204,14 @@
{
int ret;
- hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(hmacalg)) {
pr_info("trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n",
hmac_alg);
return PTR_ERR(hmacalg);
}
- hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(hashalg)) {
pr_info("trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n",
hash_alg);
@@ -1217,23 +1226,59 @@
return ret;
}
+static int __init init_digests(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ digests = kcalloc(chip->nr_allocated_banks, sizeof(*digests),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!digests)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < chip->nr_allocated_banks; i++)
+ digests[i].alg_id = chip->allocated_banks[i].alg_id;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int __init init_trusted(void)
{
int ret;
+ /* encrypted_keys.ko depends on successful load of this module even if
+ * TPM is not used.
+ */
+ chip = tpm_default_chip();
+ if (!chip)
+ return 0;
+
+ ret = init_digests();
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err_put;
ret = trusted_shash_alloc();
if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
+ goto err_free;
ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
if (ret < 0)
- trusted_shash_release();
+ goto err_release;
+ return 0;
+err_release:
+ trusted_shash_release();
+err_free:
+ kfree(digests);
+err_put:
+ put_device(&chip->dev);
return ret;
}
static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void)
{
- trusted_shash_release();
- unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+ if (chip) {
+ put_device(&chip->dev);
+ kfree(digests);
+ trusted_shash_release();
+ unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+ }
}
late_initcall(init_trusted);