Update Linux to v5.4.148
Sourced from [1]
[1] https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/linux-5.4.148.tar.gz
Change-Id: Ib3d26c5ba9b022e2e03533005c4fed4d7c30b61b
Signed-off-by: Olivier Deprez <olivier.deprez@arm.com>
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 838476d..748f3ee 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
select SECURITYFS
select CRYPTO
select CRYPTO_HMAC
- select CRYPTO_MD5
select CRYPTO_SHA1
select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
select TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM && !UML
@@ -227,7 +226,7 @@
config IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
bool "ima_appraise boot parameter"
- depends on IMA_APPRAISE && !IMA_ARCH_POLICY
+ depends on IMA_APPRAISE
default y
help
This option enables the different "ima_appraise=" modes
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 3689081..5fae6cf 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -30,13 +30,13 @@
enum ima_show_type { IMA_SHOW_BINARY, IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN,
IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT, IMA_SHOW_ASCII };
-enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 };
+enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8, TPM_PCR10 = 10 };
/* digest size for IMA, fits SHA1 or MD5 */
#define IMA_DIGEST_SIZE SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE
#define IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX 255
-#define IMA_HASH_BITS 9
+#define IMA_HASH_BITS 10
#define IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE (1 << IMA_HASH_BITS)
#define IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN 16
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
extern int ima_hash_algo;
extern int ima_appraise;
extern struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip;
+extern const char boot_aggregate_name[];
/* IMA event related data */
struct ima_event_data {
@@ -140,7 +141,7 @@
int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data,
struct ima_template_desc *desc, int num_fields,
struct ima_digest_data *hash);
-int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(struct ima_digest_data *hash);
+int ima_calc_boot_aggregate(struct ima_digest_data *hash);
void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
const char *op, const char *cause);
@@ -175,9 +176,10 @@
};
extern struct ima_h_table ima_htable;
-static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
+static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
{
- return hash_long(*digest, IMA_HASH_BITS);
+ /* there is no point in taking a hash of part of a digest */
+ return (digest[0] | digest[1] << 8) % IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE;
}
#define __ima_hooks(hook) \
@@ -360,6 +362,7 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
#define security_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init
+#define security_filter_rule_free security_audit_rule_free
#define security_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match
#else
@@ -370,6 +373,10 @@
return -EINVAL;
}
+static inline void security_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+{
+}
+
static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
void *lsmrule)
{
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 136ae4e..23b04c6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -18,6 +18,12 @@
static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
+ if (arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
+ pr_info("Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=%s boot parameter option",
+ str);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0)
ima_appraise = 0;
else if (strncmp(str, "log", 3) == 0)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 73044fc..e15f8d3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@
loff_t i_size;
int rc;
struct file *f = file;
- bool new_file_instance = false, modified_flags = false;
+ bool new_file_instance = false;
/*
* For consistency, fail file's opened with the O_DIRECT flag on
@@ -429,18 +429,10 @@
O_TRUNC | O_CREAT | O_NOCTTY | O_EXCL);
flags |= O_RDONLY;
f = dentry_open(&file->f_path, flags, file->f_cred);
- if (IS_ERR(f)) {
- /*
- * Cannot open the file again, lets modify f_flags
- * of original and continue
- */
- pr_info_ratelimited("Unable to reopen file for reading.\n");
- f = file;
- f->f_flags |= FMODE_READ;
- modified_flags = true;
- } else {
- new_file_instance = true;
- }
+ if (IS_ERR(f))
+ return PTR_ERR(f);
+
+ new_file_instance = true;
}
i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(f));
@@ -455,8 +447,6 @@
out:
if (new_file_instance)
fput(f);
- else if (modified_flags)
- f->f_flags &= ~FMODE_READ;
return rc;
}
@@ -645,7 +635,7 @@
return calc_buffer_shash(buf, len, hash);
}
-static void __init ima_pcrread(u32 idx, struct tpm_digest *d)
+static void ima_pcrread(u32 idx, struct tpm_digest *d)
{
if (!ima_tpm_chip)
return;
@@ -655,44 +645,94 @@
}
/*
- * Calculate the boot aggregate hash
+ * The boot_aggregate is a cumulative hash over TPM registers 0 - 7. With
+ * TPM 1.2 the boot_aggregate was based on reading the SHA1 PCRs, but with
+ * TPM 2.0 hash agility, TPM chips could support multiple TPM PCR banks,
+ * allowing firmware to configure and enable different banks.
+ *
+ * Knowing which TPM bank is read to calculate the boot_aggregate digest
+ * needs to be conveyed to a verifier. For this reason, use the same
+ * hash algorithm for reading the TPM PCRs as for calculating the boot
+ * aggregate digest as stored in the measurement list.
*/
-static int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm(char *digest,
- struct crypto_shash *tfm)
+static int ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm(char *digest, u16 alg_id,
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm)
{
- struct tpm_digest d = { .alg_id = TPM_ALG_SHA1, .digest = {0} };
+ struct tpm_digest d = { .alg_id = alg_id, .digest = {0} };
int rc;
u32 i;
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, tfm);
shash->tfm = tfm;
+ pr_devel("calculating the boot-aggregate based on TPM bank: %04x\n",
+ d.alg_id);
+
rc = crypto_shash_init(shash);
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
- /* cumulative sha1 over tpm registers 0-7 */
+ /* cumulative digest over TPM registers 0-7 */
for (i = TPM_PCR0; i < TPM_PCR8; i++) {
ima_pcrread(i, &d);
/* now accumulate with current aggregate */
- rc = crypto_shash_update(shash, d.digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ rc = crypto_shash_update(shash, d.digest,
+ crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm));
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Extend cumulative digest over TPM registers 8-9, which contain
+ * measurement for the kernel command line (reg. 8) and image (reg. 9)
+ * in a typical PCR allocation. Registers 8-9 are only included in
+ * non-SHA1 boot_aggregate digests to avoid ambiguity.
+ */
+ if (alg_id != TPM_ALG_SHA1) {
+ for (i = TPM_PCR8; i < TPM_PCR10; i++) {
+ ima_pcrread(i, &d);
+ rc = crypto_shash_update(shash, d.digest,
+ crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm));
+ }
}
if (!rc)
crypto_shash_final(shash, digest);
return rc;
}
-int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+int ima_calc_boot_aggregate(struct ima_digest_data *hash)
{
struct crypto_shash *tfm;
- int rc;
+ u16 crypto_id, alg_id;
+ int rc, i, bank_idx = -1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ima_tpm_chip->nr_allocated_banks; i++) {
+ crypto_id = ima_tpm_chip->allocated_banks[i].crypto_id;
+ if (crypto_id == hash->algo) {
+ bank_idx = i;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (crypto_id == HASH_ALGO_SHA256)
+ bank_idx = i;
+
+ if (bank_idx == -1 && crypto_id == HASH_ALGO_SHA1)
+ bank_idx = i;
+ }
+
+ if (bank_idx == -1) {
+ pr_err("No suitable TPM algorithm for boot aggregate\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ hash->algo = ima_tpm_chip->allocated_banks[bank_idx].crypto_id;
tfm = ima_alloc_tfm(hash->algo);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
return PTR_ERR(tfm);
hash->length = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
- rc = ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm(hash->digest, tfm);
+ alg_id = ima_tpm_chip->allocated_banks[bank_idx].alg_id;
+ rc = ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm(hash->digest, alg_id, tfm);
ima_free_tfm(tfm);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 2000e8d..68571c4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -340,8 +340,7 @@
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL,
"policy_update", "signed policy required",
1, 0);
- if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
- result = -EACCES;
+ result = -EACCES;
} else {
result = ima_parse_add_rule(data);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 5d55ade..a941770 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -21,13 +21,13 @@
#include "ima.h"
/* name for boot aggregate entry */
-static const char boot_aggregate_name[] = "boot_aggregate";
+const char boot_aggregate_name[] = "boot_aggregate";
struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip;
/* Add the boot aggregate to the IMA measurement list and extend
* the PCR register.
*
- * Calculate the boot aggregate, a SHA1 over tpm registers 0-7,
+ * Calculate the boot aggregate, a hash over tpm registers 0-7,
* assuming a TPM chip exists, and zeroes if the TPM chip does not
* exist. Add the boot aggregate measurement to the measurement
* list and extend the PCR register.
@@ -51,15 +51,27 @@
int violation = 0;
struct {
struct ima_digest_data hdr;
- char digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ char digest[TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
} hash;
memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
iint->ima_hash = &hash.hdr;
- iint->ima_hash->algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
- iint->ima_hash->length = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ iint->ima_hash->algo = ima_hash_algo;
+ iint->ima_hash->length = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
+ /*
+ * With TPM 2.0 hash agility, TPM chips could support multiple TPM
+ * PCR banks, allowing firmware to configure and enable different
+ * banks. The SHA1 bank is not necessarily enabled.
+ *
+ * Use the same hash algorithm for reading the TPM PCRs as for
+ * calculating the boot aggregate digest. Preference is given to
+ * the configured IMA default hash algorithm. Otherwise, use the
+ * TCG required banks - SHA256 for TPM 2.0, SHA1 for TPM 1.2.
+ * Ultimately select SHA1 also for TPM 2.0 if the SHA256 PCR bank
+ * is not found.
+ */
if (ima_tpm_chip) {
result = ima_calc_boot_aggregate(&hash.hdr);
if (result < 0) {
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
index 9e94eca..955e4b4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@
ret = kexec_add_buffer(&kbuf);
if (ret) {
pr_err("Error passing over kexec measurement buffer.\n");
+ vfree(kexec_buffer);
return;
}
@@ -129,6 +130,8 @@
return;
}
+ image->ima_buffer = kexec_buffer;
+
pr_debug("kexec measurement buffer for the loaded kernel at 0x%lx.\n",
kbuf.mem);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 60027c6..a768f37 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -712,6 +712,9 @@
error = ima_init();
}
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
error = register_blocking_lsm_notifier(&ima_lsm_policy_notifier);
if (error)
pr_warn("Couldn't register LSM notifier, error %d\n", error);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c
index 36cadad..95cc315 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
/*
* Allocate the IMA blacklist keyring
*/
-__init int ima_mok_init(void)
+static __init int ima_mok_init(void)
{
struct key_restriction *restriction;
@@ -38,13 +38,12 @@
(KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH,
- KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
+ KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP,
restriction, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(ima_blacklist_keyring))
panic("Can't allocate IMA blacklist keyring.");
-
- set_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &ima_blacklist_keyring->flags);
return 0;
}
device_initcall(ima_mok_init);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 5380aca..e725d41 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@
static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules);
static LIST_HEAD(ima_temp_rules);
-static struct list_head *ima_rules;
+static struct list_head *ima_rules = &ima_default_rules;
static int ima_policy __initdata;
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
- kfree(entry->lsm[i].rule);
+ security_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
}
kfree(entry);
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@
static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
{
struct ima_rule_entry *nentry;
- int i, result;
+ int i;
nentry = kmalloc(sizeof(*nentry), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!nentry)
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@
memset(nentry->lsm, 0, FIELD_SIZEOF(struct ima_rule_entry, lsm));
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
- if (!entry->lsm[i].rule)
+ if (!entry->lsm[i].args_p)
continue;
nentry->lsm[i].type = entry->lsm[i].type;
@@ -286,13 +286,13 @@
if (!nentry->lsm[i].args_p)
goto out_err;
- result = security_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type,
- Audit_equal,
- nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
- &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
- if (result == -EINVAL)
- pr_warn("ima: rule for LSM \'%d\' is undefined\n",
- entry->lsm[i].type);
+ security_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type,
+ Audit_equal,
+ nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
+ &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
+ if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)
+ pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
+ (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
}
return nentry;
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@
list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, e, &ima_policy_rules, list) {
needs_update = 0;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
- if (entry->lsm[i].rule) {
+ if (entry->lsm[i].args_p) {
needs_update = 1;
break;
}
@@ -339,8 +339,7 @@
result = ima_lsm_update_rule(entry);
if (result) {
- pr_err("ima: lsm rule update error %d\n",
- result);
+ pr_err("lsm rule update error %d\n", result);
return;
}
}
@@ -357,7 +356,7 @@
}
/**
- * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
+ * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the policy rule.
* @rule: a pointer to a rule
* @inode: a pointer to an inode
* @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation
@@ -415,9 +414,12 @@
int rc = 0;
u32 osid;
- if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
- continue;
-
+ if (!rule->lsm[i].rule) {
+ if (!rule->lsm[i].args_p)
+ continue;
+ else
+ return false;
+ }
switch (i) {
case LSM_OBJ_USER:
case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
@@ -589,9 +591,12 @@
list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules);
}
if (entries[i].action == APPRAISE) {
- temp_ima_appraise |= ima_appraise_flag(entries[i].func);
- if (entries[i].func == POLICY_CHECK)
- temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
+ if (entries != build_appraise_rules)
+ temp_ima_appraise |=
+ ima_appraise_flag(entries[i].func);
+ else
+ build_ima_appraise |=
+ ima_appraise_flag(entries[i].func);
}
}
}
@@ -710,7 +715,6 @@
ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules),
IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
- ima_rules = &ima_default_rules;
ima_update_policy_flag();
}
@@ -822,8 +826,14 @@
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
&entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
- kfree(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
- return -EINVAL;
+ pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
+ (char *)entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
+
+ if (ima_rules == &ima_default_rules) {
+ kfree(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ } else
+ result = 0;
}
return result;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
index 32ae05d..1be146e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
@@ -288,6 +288,24 @@
goto out;
}
+ if ((const char *)event_data->filename == boot_aggregate_name) {
+ if (ima_tpm_chip) {
+ hash.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+ result = ima_calc_boot_aggregate(&hash.hdr);
+
+ /* algo can change depending on available PCR banks */
+ if (!result && hash.hdr.algo != HASH_ALGO_SHA1)
+ result = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (result < 0)
+ memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
+ }
+
+ cur_digest = hash.hdr.digest;
+ cur_digestsize = hash_digest_size[HASH_ALGO_SHA1];
+ goto out;
+ }
+
if (!event_data->file) /* missing info to re-calculate the digest */
return -EINVAL;