diff --git a/docs/project/glossary.rst b/docs/project/glossary.rst
index ec79dbc..053d5a6 100644
--- a/docs/project/glossary.rst
+++ b/docs/project/glossary.rst
@@ -48,7 +48,8 @@
         Trusted Execution Environment. An SPE implemented using TrustZone.
 
     TrustZone
-        Hardware assisted isolation technology built into arm CPUs. See `TrustZone for Cortex-A`_.
+        Arm :sup:`®` TrustZone :sup:`®` ia a hardware assisted isolation technology built into arm CPUs. See `TrustZone
+        for Cortex-A`_.
 
     SPE
         See :term:`Secure Processing Environment`.
@@ -70,7 +71,7 @@
         A Secure Partition which executes a software image in and isolated physical address space.
 
     Logical SP
-        A Secure Partition which executes a software image isolated buy without physical address space isolation.
+        A Secure Partition which executes a software image isolated without physical address space isolation.
 
     SPM
         See :term:`Secure Partition Manager`.
@@ -80,10 +81,16 @@
         is built from two sub-components the :term:`Secure Partition Manager Dispatcher` and the
         :term:`Secure Partition Manager Core`.
 
+    SPMD
+        See :term:`Secure Partition Manager Dispatcher`.
+
     Secure Partition Manager Dispatcher
         The SPM component responsible for SPMC initialization boot-time, and forwarding FF-A calls run-time between SPs
         and between SPs and the SPMC.
 
+    SPMC
+        See :term:`Secure Partition Manager Core`.
+
     Secure Partition Manager Core
         A component responsible for SP initialization and isolation at boot-time, inter partition isolation at run-time,
         inter-partition communication at run-time.
diff --git a/docs/security/index.rst b/docs/security/index.rst
index aaa1a30..f698f9f 100644
--- a/docs/security/index.rst
+++ b/docs/security/index.rst
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 
     security-model
     threat-models/generic-threat-model
+    threat-assessment/index
 
 The security model outlines the foundational security principles of the project. Refer to this section for an overview
 of key concepts and the high-level security architecture.
diff --git a/docs/security/threat-assessment/index.rst b/docs/security/threat-assessment/index.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7114e1a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/security/threat-assessment/index.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+Threat Assessment
+=================
+
+This section captures the threat assessment of the Secure Partitions in the project.
+
+.. toctree::
+    :maxdepth: 1
+    :caption: Secure Partitions
+
+    psa-storage-threat-assessment
+
+
+--------------
+
+*Copyright (c) 2025, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.*
+
+SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
diff --git a/docs/security/threat-assessment/psa-storage-threat-assessment.rst b/docs/security/threat-assessment/psa-storage-threat-assessment.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..21d563e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/security/threat-assessment/psa-storage-threat-assessment.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+PSA Storage SPs
+===============
+
+This document uses the term `PSA Storage` to refer to PSA Protected Storage SP and PSA Internal Trusted Storage SP.
+From Trusted Services perspective, there are only subtle differences between the two. The two services implement a
+slightly different API, and ITS must not use the PSA Crypto SP for cryptographic operations to avoid circular
+dependency. From security perspective the two SPs are the same.
+
+
+Scope of evaluation
+-------------------
+
+This assessment makes the following assumptions:
+
+    - The PSA Storage service is deployed to a dedicated S-EL0 SP, and its execution context is isolated from other
+      services, using |TRUSTZONE|.
+    - The SP may own the storage HW or it may rely on another service for non-volatile storage (e.g. the Block Storage
+      SP).
+    - No shared storage device will be used. In such a scenario, the shared device will be assigned to another SP which
+      provides a service level API. A good example is the Block Storage SP.
+    - The SP will use the Logging SP, or the FF-A logging API provided by the SPMC.
+
+Assessment Results
+------------------
+
+This section specializes the threats identified in the Generic Threat Model for the storage service where needed.
+Threats not listed here are mitigated as described in the :doc:`/security/threat-models/generic-threat-model`.
+
+    - :ref:`GEN05 <generic_threat_5>` "External devices connected to the system storing sensitive data."
+
+      This threat is in scope if the platform uses an external device as the non-volatile storage for the service. The
+      service must protect data in transit at DF9 and DF11.
+
+    - :ref:`GEN06 <generic_threat_6>` "State of external devices connected to the system might be modified by an attacker."
+
+      This threat is in scope when the platform relies on an external device for non-volatile storage used by the
+      service. To mitigate the risk, the service must implement platform-specific measures to protect the data.
+
+    - :ref:`GEN07 <generic_threat_7>` "Invalid or conflicting access to shared hardware."
+
+      This threat is out of scope due to the scope of evaluation.
+
+    - :ref:`GEN08 <generic_threat_8>` "Unauthenticated access to hardware."
+
+      This threat is out of scope as shared usage of hardware is excluded by the scope of evaluation.
+
+    - :ref:`GEN09 <generic_threat_9>` "Unauthenticated access to sensitive data."
+
+      The PSA Storage SP isolates clients at FF-A level and each FF-A endpoint is isolated to its own namespace.
+
+      If the selected storage backed relies on another service like the Block Storage SP, the backend service must
+      implement access control and client isolation too.
+
+    - :ref:`GEN10 <generic_threat_10>` "Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTTOU) attack through shared memory."
+
+      PSA Storage code will not read the input data multiple times and thus this threat is mitigated.
+
+
+
+--------------
+
+*Copyright (c) 2025, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.*
+
+SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause