diff --git a/docs/overview/example-usage.rst b/docs/overview/example-usage.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..68422ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/overview/example-usage.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+Solving Common Security Problems
+================================
+
+The following are examples of how trusted services can solve common device security problems.
+
+
+Protecting IoT device identity
+------------------------------
+
+During the provisioning process, an IoT device is assigned a secure identity that consists of a public/private
+key pair and a CA signed certificate that includes the public key.  The device is also provisioned with the
+public key corresponding to the cloud service that it will operate with.  The provisioned material is used
+whenever a device connects to the cloud during the authentication process.  To prevent the possibility
+of device cloning or unauthorized transfer to a different cloud service, all provisioned material must be
+held in secure storage and access to the private key must be prevented.  To achieve this, the certificate
+verification and nonce signing performed during the TLS handshake is performed by the Crypto trusted service
+that performs the operations without exposing the private key.
+
+
+Protecting Software Updates
+---------------------------
+
+To ensure that software updates applied to a device originate from a legitimate source, update packages are
+signed.  A signed package will include a signature block that includes a hash of the package contents within
+the signed data.  During the update process, a device will verify the signature using a provisioned public key
+that corresponds to the signing key used by the update originator.  By holding the public key in secure storage
+and performing the signature verification using the Crypto service, unauthorized modification of the update
+source is prevented.
+
+
+Secure Logging
+--------------
+
+A managed IoT device will often be configured by an installation engineer who has physical access to the
+device.  To allow a cloud operator to audit configuration changes, it is necessary to keep a log of
+configuration steps performed by the installation engineer.  To avoid the possibility of fraudulent
+modification of the audit log, a device signs log data using a device unique key-pair.  The public key
+corresponding to the signing private key may be retrieved by the cloud operator to allow the log to
+be verified.  To protect the signing key, the Crypto service is used for signing log records.
+
+--------------------
+
+*Copyright (c) 2020-2022, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.*
+
+SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
diff --git a/docs/overview/index.rst b/docs/overview/index.rst
index 4706034..485abae 100644
--- a/docs/overview/index.rst
+++ b/docs/overview/index.rst
@@ -1,15 +1,40 @@
-About trusted services
-======================
+Introduction
+============
+
+The term 'trusted service' is used as a general name for a class of application that runs in an isolated
+processing environment. Other applications rely on trusted services to perform security related operations in
+a way that avoids exposing secret data beyond the isolation boundary of the environment. The word 'trusted'
+does not imply anything inherently trustworthy about a service application but rather that other applications
+put trust in the service. Meeting those trust obligations relies on a range of hardware and firmware
+implemented security measures.
+
+The Arm A-profile architecture, in combination with standard firmware, provides a range of isolated
+processing environments that offer hardware-backed protection against various classes of attack. Because
+of their strong security properties, these environments are suitable for running applications that have
+access to valuable assets such as keys or sensitive user data. The goal of the Trusted Services project is
+to provide a framework in which security related services may be developed, tested and easily deployed to
+run in any of the supported environments. A core set of trusted services are implemented to provide basic
+device security functions such as cryptography and secure storage.
+
+Example isolated processing environments are:
+
+    - **Secure partitions** - secure world VMs managed by a secure partition manager
+    - **Trusted applications** - application environments managed by a TEE
+    - **Integrated microcontroller** - a secondary MCU used as a secure enclave
+
+For more background on the type of problems solved by trusted services and how the project aims to
+make solutions more accessible, see:
 
 .. toctree::
     :maxdepth: 1
-    :caption: Contents:
 
-    introduction
+    example-usage
     goals
 
+
+
 --------------
 
-*Copyright (c) 2020-2021, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.*
+*Copyright (c) 2020-2022, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.*
 
 SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
diff --git a/docs/overview/introduction.rst b/docs/overview/introduction.rst
deleted file mode 100644
index 674e0b5..0000000
--- a/docs/overview/introduction.rst
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
-What are trusted services?
-==========================
-
-The term 'trusted service' is used as a general name for a class of application that runs in an isolated
-processing environment.  Other applications rely on trusted services to perform security related operations in
-a way that avoids exposing secret data beyond the isolation boundary of the environment.  The word 'trusted'
-does not imply anything inherently trustworthy about a service application but rather that other applications
-put trust in the service.  Meeting those trust obligations relies on a range of hardware and firmware
-implemented security measures.
-
-The Arm architecture, in combination with standard firmware, provides a range of isolated processing environments
-that offer hardware-backed protection against various classes of attack.  Because of their strong security
-properties, these environments are suitable for running applications that have access to valuable assets
-such as keys or sensitive user data.  The goal of the Trusted Services project is to provide a framework in
-which security related services may be developed, tested and easily deployed to run in any of the supported
-environments.  A core set of trusted services are implemented to provide basic device security functions such
-as cryptography and secure storage.
-
-Example isolated processing environments are:
-
-    - **Secure partitions** - secure world VMs managed by a secure partition manager
-    - **Trusted applications** - application environments managed by a TEE
-    - **Integrated microcontroller** - a secondary MCU used as a secure enclave
-
-Typical problems solved by trusted services
--------------------------------------------
-
-The following are examples of how trusted services can solve common device security problems.
-
-
-Protecting IoT device identity
-''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
-
-During the provisioning process, an IoT device is assigned a secure identity that consists of a public/private
-key pair and a CA signed certificate that includes the public key.  The device is also provisioned with the
-public key corresponding to the cloud service that it will operate with.  The provisioned material is used
-whenever a device connects to the cloud during the authentication process.  To prevent the possibility
-of device cloning or unauthorized transfer to a different cloud service, all provisioned material must be
-held in secure storage and access to the private key must be prevented.  To achieve this, the certificate
-verification and nonce signing performed during the TLS handshake is performed by the Crypto trusted service
-that performs the operations without exposing the private key.
-
-
-Protecting Software Updates
-'''''''''''''''''''''''''''
-
-To ensure that software updates applied to a device originate from a legitimate source, update packages are
-signed.  A signed package will include a signature block that includes a hash of the package contents within
-the signed data.  During the update process, a device will verify the signature using a provisioned public key
-that corresponds to the signing key used by the update originator.  By holding the public key in secure storage
-and performing the signature verification using the Crypto service, unauthorized modification of the update
-source is prevented.
-
-
-Secure Logging
-''''''''''''''
-
-A managed IoT device will often be configured by an installation engineer who has physical access to the
-device.  To allow a cloud operator to audit configuration changes, it is necessary to keep a log of
-configuration steps performed by the installation engineer.  To avoid the possibility of fraudulent
-modification of the audit log, a device signs log data using a device unique key-pair.  The public key
-corresponding to the signing private key may be retrieved by the cloud operator to allow the log to
-be verified.  To protect the signing key, the Crypto service is used for signing log records.
-
---------------------
-
-*Copyright (c) 2020-2021, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.*
-
-SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause