Squashed commit upgrading to mbedtls-2.22.0
Squash merging branch import/mbedtls-2.22.0
5cab03377186 ("mk/clang.mk: define libgcc$(sm)")
3607a5386a72 ("core: mbedtls: enable MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT")
896c8845bbda ("mbedtls: remove file md_wrap.c from build")
400b2af54fa0 ("libmbedtls: mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(): optimize mempool usage")
777827c7af3d ("libmbedtls: mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(): reduce stack usage")
549e4600678e ("libmbedtls: preserve mempool usage on reinit")
02d636083fe2 ("libmbedtls: mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod() initialize W")
d2ac2b3c92bf ("libmbedtls: fix no CRT issue")
f550879d5be2 ("libmbedtls: add interfaces in mbedtls for context memory operation")
219173d807ce ("libmedtls: mpi_miller_rabin: increase count limit")
7930b0b6b5e4 ("libmbedtls: add mbedtls_mpi_init_mempool()")
78af9fdc120f ("libmbedtls: make mbedtls_mpi_mont*() available")
8f7357271cc2 ("libmbedtls: refine mbedtls license header")
c5993878881f ("mbedtls: configure mbedtls to reach for config")
6f9c587783af ("mbedtls: remove default include/mbedtls/config.h")
3d3bd3b12752 ("Import mbedtls-2.22.0")
Signed-off-by: Jerome Forissier <jerome@forissier.org>
Acked-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
diff --git a/lib/libmbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c b/lib/libmbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c
index 9b633b7..e2bdfd5 100644
--- a/lib/libmbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/lib/libmbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -43,202 +43,119 @@
#define mbedtls_free free
#endif
-#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h"
+#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/version.h"
#include <string.h>
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
+#include "psa/crypto.h"
+#endif
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
#endif
-static void ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl );
-
-/* Length of the "epoch" field in the record header */
-static inline size_t ssl_ep_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- return( 2 );
-#else
- ((void) ssl);
-#endif
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Start a timer.
- * Passing millisecs = 0 cancels a running timer.
- */
-static void ssl_set_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint32_t millisecs )
-{
- if( ssl->f_set_timer == NULL )
- return;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "set_timer to %d ms", (int) millisecs ) );
- ssl->f_set_timer( ssl->p_timer, millisecs / 4, millisecs );
-}
-
-/*
- * Return -1 is timer is expired, 0 if it isn't.
- */
-static int ssl_check_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- if( ssl->f_get_timer == NULL )
- return( 0 );
-
- if( ssl->f_get_timer( ssl->p_timer ) == 2 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "timer expired" ) );
- return( -1 );
- }
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-static void ssl_update_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform );
-static void ssl_update_in_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform );
-
-#define SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH 0
-#define SSL_FORCE_FLUSH 1
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
-/* Forward declarations for functions related to message buffering. */
-static void ssl_buffering_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-static void ssl_buffering_free_slot( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- uint8_t slot );
-static void ssl_free_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-static int ssl_load_buffered_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-static int ssl_load_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-static int ssl_buffer_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-static int ssl_buffer_future_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-static int ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+/* Top-level Connection ID API */
-static size_t ssl_get_current_mtu( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-static size_t ssl_get_maximum_datagram_size( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
+int mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ size_t len,
+ int ignore_other_cid )
{
- size_t mtu = ssl_get_current_mtu( ssl );
+ if( len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
- if( mtu != 0 && mtu < MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN )
- return( mtu );
-
- return( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN );
-}
-
-static int ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
-{
- size_t const bytes_written = ssl->out_left;
- size_t const mtu = ssl_get_maximum_datagram_size( ssl );
-
- /* Double-check that the write-index hasn't gone
- * past what we can transmit in a single datagram. */
- if( bytes_written > mtu )
+ if( ignore_other_cid != MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_FAIL &&
+ ignore_other_cid != MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE )
{
- /* Should never happen... */
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
- return( (int) ( mtu - bytes_written ) );
+ conf->ignore_unexpected_cid = ignore_other_cid;
+ conf->cid_len = len;
+ return( 0 );
}
-static int ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
+int mbedtls_ssl_set_cid( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ int enable,
+ unsigned char const *own_cid,
+ size_t own_cid_len )
{
- int ret;
- size_t remaining, expansion;
- size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
+ if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
- const size_t mfl = mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( ssl );
-
- if( max_len > mfl )
- max_len = mfl;
-
- /* By the standard (RFC 6066 Sect. 4), the MFL extension
- * only limits the maximum record payload size, so in theory
- * we would be allowed to pack multiple records of payload size
- * MFL into a single datagram. However, this would mean that there's
- * no way to explicitly communicate MTU restrictions to the peer.
- *
- * The following reduction of max_len makes sure that we never
- * write datagrams larger than MFL + Record Expansion Overhead.
- */
- if( max_len <= ssl->out_left )
+ ssl->negotiate_cid = enable;
+ if( enable == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Disable use of CID extension." ) );
return( 0 );
+ }
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Enable use of CID extension." ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Own CID", own_cid, own_cid_len );
- max_len -= ssl->out_left;
-#endif
-
- ret = ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram( ssl );
- if( ret < 0 )
- return( ret );
- remaining = (size_t) ret;
-
- ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( ssl );
- if( ret < 0 )
- return( ret );
- expansion = (size_t) ret;
-
- if( remaining <= expansion )
- return( 0 );
-
- remaining -= expansion;
- if( remaining >= max_len )
- remaining = max_len;
-
- return( (int) remaining );
-}
-
-/*
- * Double the retransmit timeout value, within the allowed range,
- * returning -1 if the maximum value has already been reached.
- */
-static int ssl_double_retransmit_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- uint32_t new_timeout;
-
- if( ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout >= ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max )
- return( -1 );
-
- /* Implement the final paragraph of RFC 6347 section 4.1.1.1
- * in the following way: after the initial transmission and a first
- * retransmission, back off to a temporary estimated MTU of 508 bytes.
- * This value is guaranteed to be deliverable (if not guaranteed to be
- * delivered) of any compliant IPv4 (and IPv6) network, and should work
- * on most non-IP stacks too. */
- if( ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout != ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min )
+ if( own_cid_len != ssl->conf->cid_len )
{
- ssl->handshake->mtu = 508;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "mtu autoreduction to %d bytes", ssl->handshake->mtu ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "CID length %u does not match CID length %u in config",
+ (unsigned) own_cid_len,
+ (unsigned) ssl->conf->cid_len ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
- new_timeout = 2 * ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout;
-
- /* Avoid arithmetic overflow and range overflow */
- if( new_timeout < ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ||
- new_timeout > ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max )
- {
- new_timeout = ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max;
- }
-
- ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout = new_timeout;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "update timeout value to %d millisecs",
- ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ) );
+ memcpy( ssl->own_cid, own_cid, own_cid_len );
+ /* Truncation is not an issue here because
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX at most 255. */
+ ssl->own_cid_len = (uint8_t) own_cid_len;
return( 0 );
}
-static void ssl_reset_retransmit_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+int mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ int *enabled,
+ unsigned char peer_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ],
+ size_t *peer_cid_len )
{
- ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout = ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "update timeout value to %d millisecs",
- ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ) );
+ *enabled = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED;
+
+ if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ||
+ ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
+ {
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ }
+
+ /* We report MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED in case the CID extensions
+ * were used, but client and server requested the empty CID.
+ * This is indistinguishable from not using the CID extension
+ * in the first place. */
+ if( ssl->transform_in->in_cid_len == 0 &&
+ ssl->transform_in->out_cid_len == 0 )
+ {
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+
+ if( peer_cid_len != NULL )
+ {
+ *peer_cid_len = ssl->transform_in->out_cid_len;
+ if( peer_cid != NULL )
+ {
+ memcpy( peer_cid, ssl->transform_in->out_cid,
+ ssl->transform_in->out_cid_len );
+ }
+ }
+
+ *enabled = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED;
+
+ return( 0 );
}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
@@ -270,16 +187,18 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
-static int ssl_session_copy( mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, const mbedtls_ssl_session *src )
+int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( mbedtls_ssl_session *dst,
+ const mbedtls_ssl_session *src )
{
mbedtls_ssl_session_free( dst );
memcpy( dst, src, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
if( src->peer_cert != NULL )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
dst->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt) );
if( dst->peer_cert == NULL )
@@ -295,6 +214,21 @@
return( ret );
}
}
+#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+ if( src->peer_cert_digest != NULL )
+ {
+ dst->peer_cert_digest =
+ mbedtls_calloc( 1, src->peer_cert_digest_len );
+ if( dst->peer_cert_digest == NULL )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
+
+ memcpy( dst->peer_cert_digest, src->peer_cert_digest,
+ src->peer_cert_digest_len );
+ dst->peer_cert_digest_type = src->peer_cert_digest_type;
+ dst->peer_cert_digest_len = src->peer_cert_digest_len;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
@@ -310,22 +244,29 @@
return( 0 );
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL)
-int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- const unsigned char *key_enc, const unsigned char *key_dec,
- size_t keylen,
- const unsigned char *iv_enc, const unsigned char *iv_dec,
- size_t ivlen,
- const unsigned char *mac_enc, const unsigned char *mac_dec,
- size_t maclen ) = NULL;
-int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int direction) = NULL;
-int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) = NULL;
-int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) = NULL;
-int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) = NULL;
-int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) = NULL;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
+static int resize_buffer( unsigned char **buffer, size_t len_new, size_t *len_old )
+{
+ unsigned char* resized_buffer = mbedtls_calloc( 1, len_new );
+ if( resized_buffer == NULL )
+ return -1;
+
+ /* We want to copy len_new bytes when downsizing the buffer, and
+ * len_old bytes when upsizing, so we choose the smaller of two sizes,
+ * to fit one buffer into another. Size checks, ensuring that no data is
+ * lost, are done outside of this function. */
+ memcpy( resized_buffer, *buffer,
+ ( len_new < *len_old ) ? len_new : *len_old );
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( *buffer, *len_old );
+ mbedtls_free( *buffer );
+
+ *buffer = resized_buffer;
+ *len_old = len_new;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH */
/*
* Key material generation
@@ -400,16 +341,22 @@
size_t nb, hs;
size_t i, j, k;
const unsigned char *S1, *S2;
- unsigned char tmp[128];
+ unsigned char *tmp;
+ size_t tmp_len = 0;
unsigned char h_i[20];
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx );
- if( sizeof( tmp ) < 20 + strlen( label ) + rlen )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ tmp_len = 20 + strlen( label ) + rlen;
+ tmp = mbedtls_calloc( 1, tmp_len );
+ if( tmp == NULL )
+ {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ goto exit;
+ }
hs = ( slen + 1 ) / 2;
S1 = secret;
@@ -424,10 +371,15 @@
* First compute P_md5(secret,label+random)[0..dlen]
*/
if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 ) ) == NULL )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto exit;
+ }
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 )
- return( ret );
+ {
+ goto exit;
+ }
mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &md_ctx, S1, hs );
mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, tmp + 20, nb );
@@ -455,10 +407,15 @@
* XOR out with P_sha1(secret,label+random)[0..dlen]
*/
if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ) ) == NULL )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto exit;
+ }
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 )
- return( ret );
+ {
+ goto exit;
+ }
mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &md_ctx, S2, hs );
mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, tmp + 20, nb );
@@ -480,16 +437,148 @@
dstbuf[i + j] = (unsigned char)( dstbuf[i + j] ^ h_i[j] );
}
+exit:
mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx );
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) );
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, tmp_len );
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( h_i, sizeof( h_i ) );
- return( 0 );
+ mbedtls_free( tmp );
+ return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+
+static psa_status_t setup_psa_key_derivation( psa_key_derivation_operation_t* derivation,
+ psa_key_handle_t slot,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const unsigned char* seed, size_t seed_length,
+ const unsigned char* label, size_t label_length,
+ size_t capacity )
+{
+ psa_status_t status;
+
+ status = psa_key_derivation_setup( derivation, alg );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( status );
+
+ if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( alg ) || PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( alg ) )
+ {
+ status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( derivation,
+ PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED,
+ seed, seed_length );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( status );
+
+ if( slot == 0 )
+ {
+ status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(
+ derivation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET,
+ NULL, 0 );
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ status = psa_key_derivation_input_key(
+ derivation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET,
+ slot );
+ }
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( status );
+
+ status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( derivation,
+ PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL,
+ label, label_length );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( status );
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+ }
+
+ status = psa_key_derivation_set_capacity( derivation, capacity );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( status );
+
+ return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+}
+
+static int tls_prf_generic( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
+ const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen,
+ const char *label,
+ const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen,
+ unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen )
+{
+ psa_status_t status;
+ psa_algorithm_t alg;
+ psa_key_handle_t master_slot = 0;
+ psa_key_derivation_operation_t derivation =
+ PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT;
+
+ if( md_type == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 )
+ alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384);
+ else
+ alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256);
+
+ /* Normally a "secret" should be long enough to be impossible to
+ * find by brute force, and in particular should not be empty. But
+ * this PRF is also used to derive an IV, in particular in EAP-TLS,
+ * and for this use case it makes sense to have a 0-length "secret".
+ * Since the key API doesn't allow importing a key of length 0,
+ * keep master_slot=0, which setup_psa_key_derivation() understands
+ * to mean a 0-length "secret" input. */
+ if( slen != 0 )
+ {
+ psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init();
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE );
+ psa_set_key_algorithm( &key_attributes, alg );
+ psa_set_key_type( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE );
+
+ status = psa_import_key( &key_attributes, secret, slen, &master_slot );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
+ }
+
+ status = setup_psa_key_derivation( &derivation,
+ master_slot, alg,
+ random, rlen,
+ (unsigned char const *) label,
+ (size_t) strlen( label ),
+ dlen );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation );
+ psa_destroy_key( master_slot );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
+ }
+
+ status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( &derivation, dstbuf, dlen );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation );
+ psa_destroy_key( master_slot );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
+ }
+
+ status = psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ psa_destroy_key( master_slot );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
+ }
+
+ if( master_slot != 0 )
+ status = psa_destroy_key( master_slot );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
static int tls_prf_generic( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen,
const char *label,
@@ -498,11 +587,12 @@
{
size_t nb;
size_t i, j, k, md_len;
- unsigned char tmp[128];
+ unsigned char *tmp;
+ size_t tmp_len = 0;
unsigned char h_i[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx );
@@ -511,8 +601,13 @@
md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
- if( sizeof( tmp ) < md_len + strlen( label ) + rlen )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ tmp_len = md_len + strlen( label ) + rlen;
+ tmp = mbedtls_calloc( 1, tmp_len );
+ if( tmp == NULL )
+ {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ goto exit;
+ }
nb = strlen( label );
memcpy( tmp + md_len, label, nb );
@@ -523,7 +618,7 @@
* Compute P_<hash>(secret, label + random)[0..dlen]
*/
if ( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 )
- return( ret );
+ goto exit;
mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &md_ctx, secret, slen );
mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, tmp + md_len, nb );
@@ -545,14 +640,17 @@
dstbuf[i + j] = h_i[j];
}
+exit:
mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx );
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) );
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, tmp_len );
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( h_i, sizeof( h_i ) );
- return( 0 );
-}
+ mbedtls_free( tmp );
+ return( ret );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
static int tls_prf_sha256( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen,
const char *label,
@@ -584,33 +682,182 @@
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
-static void ssl_calc_verify_ssl( mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char * );
+static void ssl_calc_verify_ssl( const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t * );
static void ssl_calc_finished_ssl( mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
-static void ssl_calc_verify_tls( mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char * );
+static void ssl_calc_verify_tls( const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t * );
static void ssl_calc_finished_tls( mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
static void ssl_update_checksum_sha256( mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t );
-static void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256( mbedtls_ssl_context *,unsigned char * );
+static void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256( const mbedtls_ssl_context *,unsigned char *, size_t * );
static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256( mbedtls_ssl_context *,unsigned char *, int );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
static void ssl_update_checksum_sha384( mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t );
-static void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384( mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char * );
+static void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384( const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t * );
static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384( mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int );
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
-int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+static int ssl_use_opaque_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
+{
+ if( ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL )
+ {
+ /* If we've used a callback to select the PSK,
+ * the static configuration is irrelevant. */
+ if( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque != 0 )
+ return( 1 );
+
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+
+ if( ssl->conf->psk_opaque != 0 )
+ return( 1 );
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO &&
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS)
+static mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_get_type( mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf )
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
+ if( tls_prf == ssl3_prf )
+ {
+ return( MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SSL3 );
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
+ if( tls_prf == tls1_prf )
+ {
+ return( MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_TLS1 );
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+ if( tls_prf == tls_prf_sha384 )
+ {
+ return( MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384 );
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+ if( tls_prf == tls_prf_sha256 )
+ {
+ return( MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256 );
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
+ return( MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf( const mbedtls_tls_prf_types prf,
+ const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen,
+ const char *label,
+ const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen,
+ unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen )
+{
+ mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf = NULL;
+
+ switch( prf )
+ {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SSL3:
+ tls_prf = ssl3_prf;
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_TLS1:
+ tls_prf = tls1_prf;
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384:
+ tls_prf = tls_prf_sha384;
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256:
+ tls_prf = tls_prf_sha256;
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
+ default:
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
+ }
+
+ return( tls_prf( secret, slen, label, random, rlen, dstbuf, dlen ) );
+}
+
+/* Type for the TLS PRF */
+typedef int ssl_tls_prf_t(const unsigned char *, size_t, const char *,
+ const unsigned char *, size_t,
+ unsigned char *, size_t);
+
+/*
+ * Populate a transform structure with session keys and all the other
+ * necessary information.
+ *
+ * Parameters:
+ * - [in/out]: transform: structure to populate
+ * [in] must be just initialised with mbedtls_ssl_transform_init()
+ * [out] fully populated, ready for use by mbedtls_ssl_{en,de}crypt_buf()
+ * - [in] ciphersuite
+ * - [in] master
+ * - [in] encrypt_then_mac
+ * - [in] trunc_hmac
+ * - [in] compression
+ * - [in] tls_prf: pointer to PRF to use for key derivation
+ * - [in] randbytes: buffer holding ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random
+ * - [in] minor_ver: SSL/TLS minor version
+ * - [in] endpoint: client or server
+ * - [in] ssl: optionally used for:
+ * - MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL: whole context (non-const)
+ * - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS: ssl->conf->{f,p}_export_keys
+ * - MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C: ssl->conf->{f,p}_dbg
+ */
+static int ssl_populate_transform( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
+ int ciphersuite,
+ const unsigned char master[48],
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
+ int encrypt_then_mac,
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
+ int trunc_hmac,
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
+ int compression,
+#endif
+ ssl_tls_prf_t tls_prf,
+ const unsigned char randbytes[64],
+ int minor_ver,
+ unsigned endpoint,
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL)
+ const
+#endif
+ mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = 0;
- unsigned char tmp[64];
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ int psa_fallthrough;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
unsigned char keyblk[256];
unsigned char *key1;
unsigned char *key2;
@@ -618,173 +865,82 @@
unsigned char *mac_dec;
size_t mac_key_len;
size_t iv_copy_len;
+ unsigned keylen;
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
- mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate;
- mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform = ssl->transform_negotiate;
- mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
+ ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for those cases */
+ (void) ssl;
+#endif
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> derive keys" ) );
+ /*
+ * Some data just needs copying into the structure
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
+ transform->encrypt_then_mac = encrypt_then_mac;
+#endif
+ transform->minor_ver = minor_ver;
- cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( transform->ciphersuite_info->cipher );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION)
+ memcpy( transform->randbytes, randbytes, sizeof( transform->randbytes ) );
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Get various info structures
+ */
+ ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( ciphersuite );
+ if( ciphersuite_info == NULL )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ciphersuite info for %d not found",
+ ciphersuite ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ }
+
+ cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( ciphersuite_info->cipher );
if( cipher_info == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "cipher info for %d not found",
- transform->ciphersuite_info->cipher ) );
+ ciphersuite_info->cipher ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
- md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( transform->ciphersuite_info->mac );
+ md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( ciphersuite_info->mac );
if( md_info == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "mbedtls_md info for %d not found",
- transform->ciphersuite_info->mac ) );
+ ciphersuite_info->mac ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
- /*
- * Set appropriate PRF function and other SSL / TLS / TLS1.2 functions
- */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
- if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+ /* Copy own and peer's CID if the use of the CID
+ * extension has been negotiated. */
+ if( ssl->handshake->cid_in_use == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED )
{
- handshake->tls_prf = ssl3_prf;
- handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_ssl;
- handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_ssl;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" ) );
+
+ transform->in_cid_len = ssl->own_cid_len;
+ memcpy( transform->in_cid, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Incoming CID", transform->in_cid,
+ transform->in_cid_len );
+
+ transform->out_cid_len = ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len;
+ memcpy( transform->out_cid, ssl->handshake->peer_cid,
+ ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Outgoing CID", transform->out_cid,
+ transform->out_cid_len );
}
- else
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
- if( ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
- {
- handshake->tls_prf = tls1_prf;
- handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls;
- handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls;
- }
- else
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
- if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 &&
- transform->ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 )
- {
- handshake->tls_prf = tls_prf_sha384;
- handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384;
- handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384;
- }
- else
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
- if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
- {
- handshake->tls_prf = tls_prf_sha256;
- handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256;
- handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256;
- }
- else
-#endif
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
/*
- * SSLv3:
- * master =
- * MD5( premaster + SHA1( 'A' + premaster + randbytes ) ) +
- * MD5( premaster + SHA1( 'BB' + premaster + randbytes ) ) +
- * MD5( premaster + SHA1( 'CCC' + premaster + randbytes ) )
- *
- * TLSv1+:
- * master = PRF( premaster, "master secret", randbytes )[0..47]
+ * Compute key block using the PRF
*/
- if( handshake->resume == 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "premaster secret", handshake->premaster,
- handshake->pmslen );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
- if( ssl->handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED )
- {
- unsigned char session_hash[48];
- size_t hash_len;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "using extended master secret" ) );
-
- ssl->handshake->calc_verify( ssl, session_hash );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
- if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
- if( ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info->mac ==
- MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 )
- {
- hash_len = 48;
- }
- else
-#endif
- hash_len = 32;
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
- hash_len = 36;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "session hash", session_hash, hash_len );
-
- ret = handshake->tls_prf( handshake->premaster, handshake->pmslen,
- "extended master secret",
- session_hash, hash_len,
- session->master, 48 );
- if( ret != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "prf", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
-
- }
- else
-#endif
- ret = handshake->tls_prf( handshake->premaster, handshake->pmslen,
- "master secret",
- handshake->randbytes, 64,
- session->master, 48 );
- if( ret != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "prf", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
-
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( handshake->premaster,
- sizeof(handshake->premaster) );
- }
- else
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "no premaster (session resumed)" ) );
-
- /*
- * Swap the client and server random values.
- */
- memcpy( tmp, handshake->randbytes, 64 );
- memcpy( handshake->randbytes, tmp + 32, 32 );
- memcpy( handshake->randbytes + 32, tmp, 32 );
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) );
-
- /*
- * SSLv3:
- * key block =
- * MD5( master + SHA1( 'A' + master + randbytes ) ) +
- * MD5( master + SHA1( 'BB' + master + randbytes ) ) +
- * MD5( master + SHA1( 'CCC' + master + randbytes ) ) +
- * MD5( master + SHA1( 'DDDD' + master + randbytes ) ) +
- * ...
- *
- * TLSv1:
- * key block = PRF( master, "key expansion", randbytes )
- */
- ret = handshake->tls_prf( session->master, 48, "key expansion",
- handshake->randbytes, 64, keyblk, 256 );
+ ret = tls_prf( master, 48, "key expansion", randbytes, 64, keyblk, 256 );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "prf", ret );
@@ -792,28 +948,30 @@
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite = %s",
- mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( session->ciphersuite ) ) );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "master secret", session->master, 48 );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "random bytes", handshake->randbytes, 64 );
+ mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( ciphersuite ) ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "master secret", master, 48 );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "random bytes", randbytes, 64 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "key block", keyblk, 256 );
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( handshake->randbytes,
- sizeof( handshake->randbytes ) );
-
/*
* Determine the appropriate key, IV and MAC length.
*/
- transform->keylen = cipher_info->key_bitlen / 8;
+ keylen = cipher_info->key_bitlen / 8;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM ||
cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM ||
cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY )
{
- size_t taglen, explicit_ivlen;
+ size_t explicit_ivlen;
transform->maclen = 0;
mac_key_len = 0;
+ transform->taglen =
+ ciphersuite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG ? 8 : 16;
/* All modes haves 96-bit IVs;
* GCM and CCM has 4 implicit and 8 explicit bytes
@@ -825,23 +983,22 @@
else
transform->fixed_ivlen = 4;
- /* All modes have 128-bit tags, except CCM_8 (ciphersuite flag) */
- taglen = transform->ciphersuite_info->flags &
- MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG ? 8 : 16;
-
-
/* Minimum length of encrypted record */
explicit_ivlen = transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen;
- transform->minlen = explicit_ivlen + taglen;
+ transform->minlen = explicit_ivlen + transform->taglen;
}
else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
+ if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM ||
+ cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC )
{
/* Initialize HMAC contexts */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &transform->md_ctx_enc, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &transform->md_ctx_dec, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_setup", ret );
- return( ret );
+ goto end;
}
/* Get MAC length */
@@ -854,7 +1011,7 @@
* (rfc 6066 page 13 or rfc 2104 section 4),
* so we only need to adjust the length here.
*/
- if( session->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED )
+ if( trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED )
{
transform->maclen = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_LEN;
@@ -882,7 +1039,7 @@
* 2. IV except for SSL3 and TLS 1.0
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
- if( session->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED )
+ if( encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED )
{
transform->minlen = transform->maclen
+ cipher_info->block_size;
@@ -896,14 +1053,14 @@
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1)
- if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ||
- ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 )
+ if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ||
+ minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 )
; /* No need to adjust minlen */
else
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
- if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ||
- ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
+ if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ||
+ minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
transform->minlen += transform->ivlen;
}
@@ -911,23 +1068,32 @@
#endif
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto end;
}
}
}
+ else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ }
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "keylen: %d, minlen: %d, ivlen: %d, maclen: %d",
- transform->keylen, transform->minlen, transform->ivlen,
- transform->maclen ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "keylen: %u, minlen: %u, ivlen: %u, maclen: %u",
+ (unsigned) keylen,
+ (unsigned) transform->minlen,
+ (unsigned) transform->ivlen,
+ (unsigned) transform->maclen ) );
/*
* Finally setup the cipher contexts, IVs and MAC secrets.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
- if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT )
+ if( endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT )
{
key1 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2;
- key2 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2 + transform->keylen;
+ key2 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2 + keylen;
mac_enc = keyblk;
mac_dec = keyblk + mac_key_len;
@@ -937,16 +1103,16 @@
*/
iv_copy_len = ( transform->fixed_ivlen ) ?
transform->fixed_ivlen : transform->ivlen;
- memcpy( transform->iv_enc, key2 + transform->keylen, iv_copy_len );
- memcpy( transform->iv_dec, key2 + transform->keylen + iv_copy_len,
+ memcpy( transform->iv_enc, key2 + keylen, iv_copy_len );
+ memcpy( transform->iv_dec, key2 + keylen + iv_copy_len,
iv_copy_len );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
- if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER )
+ if( endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER )
{
- key1 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2 + transform->keylen;
+ key1 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2 + keylen;
key2 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2;
mac_enc = keyblk + mac_key_len;
@@ -957,24 +1123,27 @@
*/
iv_copy_len = ( transform->fixed_ivlen ) ?
transform->fixed_ivlen : transform->ivlen;
- memcpy( transform->iv_dec, key1 + transform->keylen, iv_copy_len );
- memcpy( transform->iv_enc, key1 + transform->keylen + iv_copy_len,
+ memcpy( transform->iv_dec, key1 + keylen, iv_copy_len );
+ memcpy( transform->iv_enc, key1 + keylen + iv_copy_len,
iv_copy_len );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto end;
}
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
- if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
+ if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
{
- if( mac_key_len > sizeof transform->mac_enc )
+ if( mac_key_len > sizeof( transform->mac_enc ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto end;
}
memcpy( transform->mac_enc, mac_enc, mac_key_len );
@@ -984,7 +1153,7 @@
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
- if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 )
+ if( minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 )
{
/* For HMAC-based ciphersuites, initialize the HMAC transforms.
For AEAD-based ciphersuites, there is nothing to do here. */
@@ -998,8 +1167,10 @@
#endif
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto end;
}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL)
if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init != NULL )
@@ -1008,40 +1179,128 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init()" ) );
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init( ssl, key1, key2, transform->keylen,
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init( ssl, key1, key2, keylen,
transform->iv_enc, transform->iv_dec,
iv_copy_len,
mac_enc, mac_dec,
mac_key_len ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init", ret );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
+ goto end;
}
}
+#else
+ ((void) mac_dec);
+ ((void) mac_enc);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS)
if( ssl->conf->f_export_keys != NULL )
{
ssl->conf->f_export_keys( ssl->conf->p_export_keys,
- session->master, keyblk,
- mac_key_len, transform->keylen,
+ master, keyblk,
+ mac_key_len, keylen,
iv_copy_len );
}
+
+ if( ssl->conf->f_export_keys_ext != NULL )
+ {
+ ssl->conf->f_export_keys_ext( ssl->conf->p_export_keys,
+ master, keyblk,
+ mac_key_len, keylen,
+ iv_copy_len,
+ randbytes + 32,
+ randbytes,
+ tls_prf_get_type( tls_prf ) );
+ }
#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+
+ /* Only use PSA-based ciphers for TLS-1.2.
+ * That's relevant at least for TLS-1.0, where
+ * we assume that mbedtls_cipher_crypt() updates
+ * the structure field for the IV, which the PSA-based
+ * implementation currently doesn't. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+ if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
+ {
+ ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc,
+ cipher_info, transform->taglen );
+ if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa", ret );
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if( ret == 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Successfully setup PSA-based encryption cipher context" ) );
+ psa_fallthrough = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Failed to setup PSA-based cipher context for record encryption - fall through to default setup." ) );
+ psa_fallthrough = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ psa_fallthrough = 1;
+#else
+ psa_fallthrough = 1;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
+
+ if( psa_fallthrough == 1 )
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc,
cipher_info ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret );
- return( ret );
+ goto end;
}
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ /* Only use PSA-based ciphers for TLS-1.2.
+ * That's relevant at least for TLS-1.0, where
+ * we assume that mbedtls_cipher_crypt() updates
+ * the structure field for the IV, which the PSA-based
+ * implementation currently doesn't. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+ if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
+ {
+ ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec,
+ cipher_info, transform->taglen );
+ if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa", ret );
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if( ret == 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Successfully setup PSA-based decryption cipher context" ) );
+ psa_fallthrough = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Failed to setup PSA-based cipher context for record decryption - fall through to default setup." ) );
+ psa_fallthrough = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ psa_fallthrough = 1;
+#else
+ psa_fallthrough = 1;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
+
+ if( psa_fallthrough == 1 )
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec,
cipher_info ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret );
- return( ret );
+ goto end;
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, key1,
@@ -1049,7 +1308,7 @@
MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret );
- return( ret );
+ goto end;
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, key2,
@@ -1057,7 +1316,7 @@
MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret );
- return( ret );
+ goto end;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
@@ -1067,37 +1326,23 @@
MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode", ret );
- return( ret );
+ goto end;
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec,
MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode", ret );
- return( ret );
+ goto end;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( keyblk, sizeof( keyblk ) );
+ /* Initialize Zlib contexts */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
- // Initialize compression
- //
- if( session->compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE )
+ if( compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE )
{
- if( ssl->compress_buf == NULL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Allocating compression buffer" ) );
- ssl->compress_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_BUFFER_LEN );
- if( ssl->compress_buf == NULL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed",
- MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_BUFFER_LEN ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
- }
- }
-
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Initializing zlib states" ) );
memset( &transform->ctx_deflate, 0, sizeof( transform->ctx_deflate ) );
@@ -1108,18 +1353,318 @@
inflateInit( &transform->ctx_inflate ) != Z_OK )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Failed to initialize compression" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED );
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED;
+ goto end;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */
+end:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( keyblk, sizeof( keyblk ) );
+ return( ret );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set appropriate PRF function and other SSL / TLS 1.0/1.1 / TLS1.2 functions
+ *
+ * Inputs:
+ * - SSL/TLS minor version
+ * - hash associated with the ciphersuite (only used by TLS 1.2)
+ *
+ * Outputs:
+ * - the tls_prf, calc_verify and calc_finished members of handshake structure
+ */
+static int ssl_set_handshake_prfs( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake,
+ int minor_ver,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t hash )
+{
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+ (void) hash;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
+ if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
+ {
+ handshake->tls_prf = ssl3_prf;
+ handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_ssl;
+ handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_ssl;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
+ if( minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
+ {
+ handshake->tls_prf = tls1_prf;
+ handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls;
+ handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+ if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 &&
+ hash == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 )
+ {
+ handshake->tls_prf = tls_prf_sha384;
+ handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384;
+ handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+ if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
+ {
+ handshake->tls_prf = tls_prf_sha256;
+ handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256;
+ handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
+ {
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ }
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute master secret if needed
+ *
+ * Parameters:
+ * [in/out] handshake
+ * [in] resume, premaster, extended_ms, calc_verify, tls_prf
+ * (PSA-PSK) ciphersuite_info, psk_opaque
+ * [out] premaster (cleared)
+ * [out] master
+ * [in] ssl: optionally used for debugging, EMS and PSA-PSK
+ * debug: conf->f_dbg, conf->p_dbg
+ * EMS: passed to calc_verify (debug + (SSL3) session_negotiate)
+ * PSA-PSA: minor_ver, conf
+ */
+static int ssl_compute_master( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake,
+ unsigned char *master,
+ const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ /* cf. RFC 5246, Section 8.1:
+ * "The master secret is always exactly 48 bytes in length." */
+ size_t const master_secret_len = 48;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
+ unsigned char session_hash[48];
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
+
+ /* The label for the KDF used for key expansion.
+ * This is either "master secret" or "extended master secret"
+ * depending on whether the Extended Master Secret extension
+ * is used. */
+ char const *lbl = "master secret";
+
+ /* The salt for the KDF used for key expansion.
+ * - If the Extended Master Secret extension is not used,
+ * this is ClientHello.Random + ServerHello.Random
+ * (see Sect. 8.1 in RFC 5246).
+ * - If the Extended Master Secret extension is used,
+ * this is the transcript of the handshake so far.
+ * (see Sect. 4 in RFC 7627). */
+ unsigned char const *salt = handshake->randbytes;
+ size_t salt_len = 64;
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) && \
+ !(defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED))
+ ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for those cases */
+ (void) ssl;
+#endif
+
+ if( handshake->resume != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "no premaster (session resumed)" ) );
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
+ if( handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED )
+ {
+ lbl = "extended master secret";
+ salt = session_hash;
+ handshake->calc_verify( ssl, session_hash, &salt_len );
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "session hash for extended master secret",
+ session_hash, salt_len );
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)
+ if( handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK &&
+ ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 &&
+ ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 )
+ {
+ /* Perform PSK-to-MS expansion in a single step. */
+ psa_status_t status;
+ psa_algorithm_t alg;
+ psa_key_handle_t psk;
+ psa_key_derivation_operation_t derivation =
+ PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT;
+ mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg = handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "perform PSA-based PSK-to-MS expansion" ) );
+
+ psk = ssl->conf->psk_opaque;
+ if( handshake->psk_opaque != 0 )
+ psk = handshake->psk_opaque;
+
+ if( hash_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 )
+ alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384);
+ else
+ alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256);
+
+ status = setup_psa_key_derivation( &derivation, psk, alg,
+ salt, salt_len,
+ (unsigned char const *) lbl,
+ (size_t) strlen( lbl ),
+ master_secret_len );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
+ }
+
+ status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( &derivation,
+ master,
+ master_secret_len );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
+ }
+
+ status = psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ {
+ ret = handshake->tls_prf( handshake->premaster, handshake->pmslen,
+ lbl, salt, salt_len,
+ master,
+ master_secret_len );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "prf", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "premaster secret",
+ handshake->premaster,
+ handshake->pmslen );
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( handshake->premaster,
+ sizeof(handshake->premaster) );
+ }
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * const ciphersuite_info =
+ ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> derive keys" ) );
+
+ /* Set PRF, calc_verify and calc_finished function pointers */
+ ret = ssl_set_handshake_prfs( ssl->handshake,
+ ssl->minor_ver,
+ ciphersuite_info->mac );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_set_handshake_prfs", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ /* Compute master secret if needed */
+ ret = ssl_compute_master( ssl->handshake,
+ ssl->session_negotiate->master,
+ ssl );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_compute_master", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ /* Swap the client and server random values:
+ * - MS derivation wanted client+server (RFC 5246 8.1)
+ * - key derivation wants server+client (RFC 5246 6.3) */
+ {
+ unsigned char tmp[64];
+ memcpy( tmp, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64 );
+ memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes, tmp + 32, 32 );
+ memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, tmp, 32 );
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) );
+ }
+
+ /* Populate transform structure */
+ ret = ssl_populate_transform( ssl->transform_negotiate,
+ ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite,
+ ssl->session_negotiate->master,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
+ ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac,
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
+ ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac,
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
+ ssl->session_negotiate->compression,
+#endif
+ ssl->handshake->tls_prf,
+ ssl->handshake->randbytes,
+ ssl->minor_ver,
+ ssl->conf->endpoint,
+ ssl );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_populate_transform", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ /* We no longer need Server/ClientHello.random values */
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->handshake->randbytes,
+ sizeof( ssl->handshake->randbytes ) );
+
+ /* Allocate compression buffer */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
+ if( ssl->session_negotiate->compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE &&
+ ssl->compress_buf == NULL )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Allocating compression buffer" ) );
+ ssl->compress_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_BUFFER_LEN );
+ if( ssl->compress_buf == NULL )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_BUFFER_LEN ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= derive keys" ) );
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
-void ssl_calc_verify_ssl( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char hash[36] )
+void ssl_calc_verify_ssl( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char hash[36],
+ size_t *hlen )
{
mbedtls_md5_context md5;
mbedtls_sha1_context sha1;
@@ -1157,7 +1702,9 @@
mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, hash + 16, 20 );
mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &sha1, hash + 16 );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calculated verify result", hash, 36 );
+ *hlen = 36;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calculated verify result", hash, *hlen );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc verify" ) );
mbedtls_md5_free( &md5 );
@@ -1168,7 +1715,9 @@
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
-void ssl_calc_verify_tls( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char hash[36] )
+void ssl_calc_verify_tls( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char hash[36],
+ size_t *hlen )
{
mbedtls_md5_context md5;
mbedtls_sha1_context sha1;
@@ -1181,10 +1730,12 @@
mbedtls_md5_clone( &md5, &ssl->handshake->fin_md5 );
mbedtls_sha1_clone( &sha1, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1 );
- mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &md5, hash );
+ mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &md5, hash );
mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &sha1, hash + 16 );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calculated verify result", hash, 36 );
+ *hlen = 36;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calculated verify result", hash, *hlen );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc verify" ) );
mbedtls_md5_free( &md5 );
@@ -1196,8 +1747,34 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
-void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char hash[32] )
+void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char hash[32],
+ size_t *hlen )
{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ size_t hash_size;
+ psa_status_t status;
+ psa_hash_operation_t sha256_psa = psa_hash_operation_init();
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> PSA calc verify sha256" ) );
+ status = psa_hash_clone( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, &sha256_psa );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash clone failed" ) );
+ return;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_finish( &sha256_psa, hash, 32, &hash_size );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash finish failed" ) );
+ return;
+ }
+
+ *hlen = 32;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "PSA calculated verify result", hash, *hlen );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= PSA calc verify" ) );
+#else
mbedtls_sha256_context sha256;
mbedtls_sha256_init( &sha256 );
@@ -1207,18 +1784,46 @@
mbedtls_sha256_clone( &sha256, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256 );
mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( &sha256, hash );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calculated verify result", hash, 32 );
+ *hlen = 32;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calculated verify result", hash, *hlen );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc verify" ) );
mbedtls_sha256_free( &sha256 );
-
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
return;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
-void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char hash[48] )
+void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char hash[48],
+ size_t *hlen )
{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ size_t hash_size;
+ psa_status_t status;
+ psa_hash_operation_t sha384_psa = psa_hash_operation_init();
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> PSA calc verify sha384" ) );
+ status = psa_hash_clone( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, &sha384_psa );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash clone failed" ) );
+ return;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_finish( &sha384_psa, hash, 48, &hash_size );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash finish failed" ) );
+ return;
+ }
+
+ *hlen = 48;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "PSA calculated verify result", hash, *hlen );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= PSA calc verify" ) );
+#else
mbedtls_sha512_context sha512;
mbedtls_sha512_init( &sha512 );
@@ -1228,17 +1833,19 @@
mbedtls_sha512_clone( &sha512, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512 );
mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( &sha512, hash );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calculated verify result", hash, 48 );
+ *hlen = 48;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calculated verify result", hash, *hlen );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc verify" ) );
mbedtls_sha512_free( &sha512 );
-
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
return;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_ex )
{
unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->premaster;
@@ -1296,7 +1903,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len;
/* Write length only when we know the actual value */
@@ -1318,7 +1925,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t zlen;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &zlen,
@@ -1360,1133 +1967,13 @@
return( 0 );
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
-/*
- * SSLv3.0 MAC functions
- */
-#define SSL_MAC_MAX_BYTES 20 /* MD-5 or SHA-1 */
-static void ssl_mac( mbedtls_md_context_t *md_ctx,
- const unsigned char *secret,
- const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
- const unsigned char *ctr, int type,
- unsigned char out[SSL_MAC_MAX_BYTES] )
-{
- unsigned char header[11];
- unsigned char padding[48];
- int padlen;
- int md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_ctx->md_info );
- int md_type = mbedtls_md_get_type( md_ctx->md_info );
-
- /* Only MD5 and SHA-1 supported */
- if( md_type == MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 )
- padlen = 48;
- else
- padlen = 40;
-
- memcpy( header, ctr, 8 );
- header[ 8] = (unsigned char) type;
- header[ 9] = (unsigned char)( len >> 8 );
- header[10] = (unsigned char)( len );
-
- memset( padding, 0x36, padlen );
- mbedtls_md_starts( md_ctx );
- mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, secret, md_size );
- mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, padding, padlen );
- mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, header, 11 );
- mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, buf, len );
- mbedtls_md_finish( md_ctx, out );
-
- memset( padding, 0x5C, padlen );
- mbedtls_md_starts( md_ctx );
- mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, secret, md_size );
- mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, padding, padlen );
- mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, out, md_size );
- mbedtls_md_finish( md_ctx, out );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) || \
- ( defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \
- ( defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)) )
-#define SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC
-#endif
-
-/* The function below is only used in the Lucky 13 counter-measure in
- * ssl_decrypt_buf(). These are the defines that guard the call site. */
-#if defined(SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) && \
- ( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) )
-/* This function makes sure every byte in the memory region is accessed
- * (in ascending addresses order) */
-static void ssl_read_memory( unsigned char *p, size_t len )
-{
- unsigned char acc = 0;
- volatile unsigned char force;
-
- for( ; len != 0; p++, len-- )
- acc ^= *p;
-
- force = acc;
- (void) force;
-}
-#endif /* SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC && ( TLS1 || TLS1_1 || TLS1_2 ) */
-
-/*
- * Encryption/decryption functions
- */
-static int ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode;
- int auth_done = 0;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> encrypt buf" ) );
-
- if( ssl->session_out == NULL || ssl->transform_out == NULL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
-
- mode = mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &ssl->transform_out->cipher_ctx_enc );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "before encrypt: output payload",
- ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen );
-
- /*
- * Add MAC before if needed
- */
-#if defined(SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
- if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM ||
- ( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
- && ssl->session_out->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED
-#endif
- ) )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
- if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
- {
- unsigned char mac[SSL_MAC_MAX_BYTES];
-
- ssl_mac( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc,
- ssl->transform_out->mac_enc,
- ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen,
- ssl->out_ctr, ssl->out_msgtype,
- mac );
-
- memcpy( ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, mac, ssl->transform_out->maclen );
- }
- else
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
- if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 )
- {
- unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
-
- mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, ssl->out_ctr, 8 );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, ssl->out_hdr, 3 );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, ssl->out_len, 2 );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc,
- ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, mac );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc );
-
- memcpy( ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, mac, ssl->transform_out->maclen );
- }
- else
-#endif
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "computed mac",
- ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen,
- ssl->transform_out->maclen );
-
- ssl->out_msglen += ssl->transform_out->maclen;
- auth_done++;
- }
-#endif /* AEAD not the only option */
-
- /*
- * Encrypt
- */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER)
- if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM )
- {
- int ret;
- size_t olen = 0;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %d, "
- "including %d bytes of padding",
- ssl->out_msglen, 0 ) );
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &ssl->transform_out->cipher_ctx_enc,
- ssl->transform_out->iv_enc,
- ssl->transform_out->ivlen,
- ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen,
- ssl->out_msg, &olen ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
-
- if( ssl->out_msglen != olen )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C || MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
- if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM ||
- mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM ||
- mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY )
- {
- int ret;
- size_t enc_msglen, olen;
- unsigned char *enc_msg;
- unsigned char add_data[13];
- unsigned char iv[12];
- mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform = ssl->transform_out;
- unsigned char taglen = transform->ciphersuite_info->flags &
- MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG ? 8 : 16;
- size_t explicit_ivlen = transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen;
-
- /*
- * Prepare additional authenticated data
- */
- memcpy( add_data, ssl->out_ctr, 8 );
- add_data[8] = ssl->out_msgtype;
- mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver,
- ssl->conf->transport, add_data + 9 );
- add_data[11] = ( ssl->out_msglen >> 8 ) & 0xFF;
- add_data[12] = ssl->out_msglen & 0xFF;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "additional data for AEAD", add_data, 13 );
-
- /*
- * Generate IV
- */
- if( transform->ivlen == 12 && transform->fixed_ivlen == 4 )
- {
- /* GCM and CCM: fixed || explicit (=seqnum) */
- memcpy( iv, transform->iv_enc, transform->fixed_ivlen );
- memcpy( iv + transform->fixed_ivlen, ssl->out_ctr, 8 );
- memcpy( ssl->out_iv, ssl->out_ctr, 8 );
-
- }
- else if( transform->ivlen == 12 && transform->fixed_ivlen == 12 )
- {
- /* ChachaPoly: fixed XOR sequence number */
- unsigned char i;
-
- memcpy( iv, transform->iv_enc, transform->fixed_ivlen );
-
- for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ )
- iv[i+4] ^= ssl->out_ctr[i];
- }
- else
- {
- /* Reminder if we ever add an AEAD mode with a different size */
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used (internal)",
- iv, transform->ivlen );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used (transmitted)",
- ssl->out_iv, explicit_ivlen );
-
- /*
- * Fix message length with added IV
- */
- enc_msg = ssl->out_msg;
- enc_msglen = ssl->out_msglen;
- ssl->out_msglen += explicit_ivlen;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %d, "
- "including 0 bytes of padding",
- ssl->out_msglen ) );
-
- /*
- * Encrypt and authenticate
- */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc,
- iv, transform->ivlen,
- add_data, 13,
- enc_msg, enc_msglen,
- enc_msg, &olen,
- enc_msg + enc_msglen, taglen ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
-
- if( olen != enc_msglen )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
-
- ssl->out_msglen += taglen;
- auth_done++;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "after encrypt: tag", enc_msg + enc_msglen, taglen );
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \
- ( defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) )
- if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC )
- {
- int ret;
- unsigned char *enc_msg;
- size_t enc_msglen, padlen, olen = 0, i;
-
- padlen = ssl->transform_out->ivlen - ( ssl->out_msglen + 1 ) %
- ssl->transform_out->ivlen;
- if( padlen == ssl->transform_out->ivlen )
- padlen = 0;
-
- for( i = 0; i <= padlen; i++ )
- ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen + i] = (unsigned char) padlen;
-
- ssl->out_msglen += padlen + 1;
-
- enc_msglen = ssl->out_msglen;
- enc_msg = ssl->out_msg;
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
- /*
- * Prepend per-record IV for block cipher in TLS v1.1 and up as per
- * Method 1 (6.2.3.2. in RFC4346 and RFC5246)
- */
- if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
- {
- /*
- * Generate IV
- */
- ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, ssl->transform_out->iv_enc,
- ssl->transform_out->ivlen );
- if( ret != 0 )
- return( ret );
-
- memcpy( ssl->out_iv, ssl->transform_out->iv_enc,
- ssl->transform_out->ivlen );
-
- /*
- * Fix pointer positions and message length with added IV
- */
- enc_msg = ssl->out_msg;
- enc_msglen = ssl->out_msglen;
- ssl->out_msglen += ssl->transform_out->ivlen;
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %d, "
- "including %d bytes of IV and %d bytes of padding",
- ssl->out_msglen, ssl->transform_out->ivlen,
- padlen + 1 ) );
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &ssl->transform_out->cipher_ctx_enc,
- ssl->transform_out->iv_enc,
- ssl->transform_out->ivlen,
- enc_msg, enc_msglen,
- enc_msg, &olen ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
-
- if( enc_msglen != olen )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1)
- if( ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
- {
- /*
- * Save IV in SSL3 and TLS1
- */
- memcpy( ssl->transform_out->iv_enc,
- ssl->transform_out->cipher_ctx_enc.iv,
- ssl->transform_out->ivlen );
- }
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
- if( auth_done == 0 )
- {
- unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
-
- /*
- * MAC(MAC_write_key, seq_num +
- * TLSCipherText.type +
- * TLSCipherText.version +
- * length_of( (IV +) ENC(...) ) +
- * IV + // except for TLS 1.0
- * ENC(content + padding + padding_length));
- */
- unsigned char pseudo_hdr[13];
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "using encrypt then mac" ) );
-
- memcpy( pseudo_hdr + 0, ssl->out_ctr, 8 );
- memcpy( pseudo_hdr + 8, ssl->out_hdr, 3 );
- pseudo_hdr[11] = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->out_msglen >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
- pseudo_hdr[12] = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->out_msglen ) & 0xFF );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "MAC'd meta-data", pseudo_hdr, 13 );
-
- mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, pseudo_hdr, 13 );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc,
- ssl->out_iv, ssl->out_msglen );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, mac );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc );
-
- memcpy( ssl->out_iv + ssl->out_msglen, mac,
- ssl->transform_out->maclen );
-
- ssl->out_msglen += ssl->transform_out->maclen;
- auth_done++;
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC &&
- ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C || MBEDTLS_ARIA_C ) */
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
-
- /* Make extra sure authentication was performed, exactly once */
- if( auth_done != 1 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= encrypt buf" ) );
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode;
- int auth_done = 0;
-#if defined(SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
- size_t padlen = 0, correct = 1;
-#endif
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> decrypt buf" ) );
-
- if( ssl->session_in == NULL || ssl->transform_in == NULL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
-
- mode = mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &ssl->transform_in->cipher_ctx_dec );
-
- if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->transform_in->minlen )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "in_msglen (%d) < minlen (%d)",
- ssl->in_msglen, ssl->transform_in->minlen ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
- }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER)
- if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM )
- {
- int ret;
- size_t olen = 0;
-
- padlen = 0;
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &ssl->transform_in->cipher_ctx_dec,
- ssl->transform_in->iv_dec,
- ssl->transform_in->ivlen,
- ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen,
- ssl->in_msg, &olen ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
-
- if( ssl->in_msglen != olen )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C || MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
- if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM ||
- mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM ||
- mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY )
- {
- int ret;
- size_t dec_msglen, olen;
- unsigned char *dec_msg;
- unsigned char *dec_msg_result;
- unsigned char add_data[13];
- unsigned char iv[12];
- mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform = ssl->transform_in;
- unsigned char taglen = transform->ciphersuite_info->flags &
- MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG ? 8 : 16;
- size_t explicit_iv_len = transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen;
-
- /*
- * Compute and update sizes
- */
- if( ssl->in_msglen < explicit_iv_len + taglen )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%d) < explicit_iv_len (%d) "
- "+ taglen (%d)", ssl->in_msglen,
- explicit_iv_len, taglen ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
- }
- dec_msglen = ssl->in_msglen - explicit_iv_len - taglen;
-
- dec_msg = ssl->in_msg;
- dec_msg_result = ssl->in_msg;
- ssl->in_msglen = dec_msglen;
-
- /*
- * Prepare additional authenticated data
- */
- memcpy( add_data, ssl->in_ctr, 8 );
- add_data[8] = ssl->in_msgtype;
- mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver,
- ssl->conf->transport, add_data + 9 );
- add_data[11] = ( ssl->in_msglen >> 8 ) & 0xFF;
- add_data[12] = ssl->in_msglen & 0xFF;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "additional data for AEAD", add_data, 13 );
-
- /*
- * Prepare IV
- */
- if( transform->ivlen == 12 && transform->fixed_ivlen == 4 )
- {
- /* GCM and CCM: fixed || explicit (transmitted) */
- memcpy( iv, transform->iv_dec, transform->fixed_ivlen );
- memcpy( iv + transform->fixed_ivlen, ssl->in_iv, 8 );
-
- }
- else if( transform->ivlen == 12 && transform->fixed_ivlen == 12 )
- {
- /* ChachaPoly: fixed XOR sequence number */
- unsigned char i;
-
- memcpy( iv, transform->iv_dec, transform->fixed_ivlen );
-
- for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ )
- iv[i+4] ^= ssl->in_ctr[i];
- }
- else
- {
- /* Reminder if we ever add an AEAD mode with a different size */
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used", iv, transform->ivlen );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "TAG used", dec_msg + dec_msglen, taglen );
-
- /*
- * Decrypt and authenticate
- */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &ssl->transform_in->cipher_ctx_dec,
- iv, transform->ivlen,
- add_data, 13,
- dec_msg, dec_msglen,
- dec_msg_result, &olen,
- dec_msg + dec_msglen, taglen ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt", ret );
-
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
-
- return( ret );
- }
- auth_done++;
-
- if( olen != dec_msglen )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \
- ( defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) )
- if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC )
- {
- /*
- * Decrypt and check the padding
- */
- int ret;
- unsigned char *dec_msg;
- unsigned char *dec_msg_result;
- size_t dec_msglen;
- size_t minlen = 0;
- size_t olen = 0;
-
- /*
- * Check immediate ciphertext sanity
- */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
- if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
- minlen += ssl->transform_in->ivlen;
-#endif
-
- if( ssl->in_msglen < minlen + ssl->transform_in->ivlen ||
- ssl->in_msglen < minlen + ssl->transform_in->maclen + 1 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%d) < max( ivlen(%d), maclen (%d) "
- "+ 1 ) ( + expl IV )", ssl->in_msglen,
- ssl->transform_in->ivlen,
- ssl->transform_in->maclen ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
- }
-
- dec_msglen = ssl->in_msglen;
- dec_msg = ssl->in_msg;
- dec_msg_result = ssl->in_msg;
-
- /*
- * Authenticate before decrypt if enabled
- */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
- if( ssl->session_in->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED )
- {
- unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
- unsigned char pseudo_hdr[13];
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "using encrypt then mac" ) );
-
- dec_msglen -= ssl->transform_in->maclen;
- ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->transform_in->maclen;
-
- memcpy( pseudo_hdr + 0, ssl->in_ctr, 8 );
- memcpy( pseudo_hdr + 8, ssl->in_hdr, 3 );
- pseudo_hdr[11] = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_msglen >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
- pseudo_hdr[12] = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_msglen ) & 0xFF );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "MAC'd meta-data", pseudo_hdr, 13 );
-
- mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, pseudo_hdr, 13 );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec,
- ssl->in_iv, ssl->in_msglen );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, mac_expect );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", ssl->in_iv + ssl->in_msglen,
- ssl->transform_in->maclen );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "expected mac", mac_expect,
- ssl->transform_in->maclen );
-
- if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->in_iv + ssl->in_msglen, mac_expect,
- ssl->transform_in->maclen ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) );
-
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
- }
- auth_done++;
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
-
- /*
- * Check length sanity
- */
- if( ssl->in_msglen % ssl->transform_in->ivlen != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%d) %% ivlen (%d) != 0",
- ssl->in_msglen, ssl->transform_in->ivlen ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
- }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
- /*
- * Initialize for prepended IV for block cipher in TLS v1.1 and up
- */
- if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
- {
- unsigned char i;
- dec_msglen -= ssl->transform_in->ivlen;
- ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->transform_in->ivlen;
-
- for( i = 0; i < ssl->transform_in->ivlen; i++ )
- ssl->transform_in->iv_dec[i] = ssl->in_iv[i];
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &ssl->transform_in->cipher_ctx_dec,
- ssl->transform_in->iv_dec,
- ssl->transform_in->ivlen,
- dec_msg, dec_msglen,
- dec_msg_result, &olen ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
-
- if( dec_msglen != olen )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1)
- if( ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
- {
- /*
- * Save IV in SSL3 and TLS1
- */
- memcpy( ssl->transform_in->iv_dec,
- ssl->transform_in->cipher_ctx_dec.iv,
- ssl->transform_in->ivlen );
- }
-#endif
-
- padlen = 1 + ssl->in_msg[ssl->in_msglen - 1];
-
- if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->transform_in->maclen + padlen &&
- auth_done == 0 )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%d) < maclen (%d) + padlen (%d)",
- ssl->in_msglen, ssl->transform_in->maclen, padlen ) );
-#endif
- padlen = 0;
- correct = 0;
- }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
- if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
- {
- if( padlen > ssl->transform_in->ivlen )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad padding length: is %d, "
- "should be no more than %d",
- padlen, ssl->transform_in->ivlen ) );
-#endif
- correct = 0;
- }
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
- if( ssl->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
- {
- /*
- * TLSv1+: always check the padding up to the first failure
- * and fake check up to 256 bytes of padding
- */
- size_t pad_count = 0, real_count = 1;
- size_t padding_idx = ssl->in_msglen - padlen;
- size_t i;
-
- /*
- * Padding is guaranteed to be incorrect if:
- * 1. padlen > ssl->in_msglen
- *
- * 2. padding_idx > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN +
- * ssl->transform_in->maclen
- *
- * In both cases we reset padding_idx to a safe value (0) to
- * prevent out-of-buffer reads.
- */
- correct &= ( padlen <= ssl->in_msglen );
- correct &= ( padding_idx <= MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN +
- ssl->transform_in->maclen );
-
- padding_idx *= correct;
-
- for( i = 0; i < 256; i++ )
- {
- real_count &= ( i < padlen );
- pad_count += real_count *
- ( ssl->in_msg[padding_idx + i] == padlen - 1 );
- }
-
- correct &= ( pad_count == padlen ); /* Only 1 on correct padding */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
- if( padlen > 0 && correct == 0 )
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad padding byte detected" ) );
-#endif
- padlen &= correct * 0x1FF;
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
- MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
-
- ssl->in_msglen -= padlen;
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC &&
- ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C || MBEDTLS_ARIA_C ) */
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "raw buffer after decryption",
- ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen );
-#endif
-
- /*
- * Authenticate if not done yet.
- * Compute the MAC regardless of the padding result (RFC4346, CBCTIME).
- */
-#if defined(SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
- if( auth_done == 0 )
- {
- unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
-
- ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->transform_in->maclen;
-
- ssl->in_len[0] = (unsigned char)( ssl->in_msglen >> 8 );
- ssl->in_len[1] = (unsigned char)( ssl->in_msglen );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
- if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
- {
- ssl_mac( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec,
- ssl->transform_in->mac_dec,
- ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen,
- ssl->in_ctr, ssl->in_msgtype,
- mac_expect );
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
- if( ssl->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
- {
- /*
- * Process MAC and always update for padlen afterwards to make
- * total time independent of padlen.
- *
- * Known timing attacks:
- * - Lucky Thirteen (http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/TLStiming.pdf)
- *
- * To compensate for different timings for the MAC calculation
- * depending on how much padding was removed (which is determined
- * by padlen), process extra_run more blocks through the hash
- * function.
- *
- * The formula in the paper is
- * extra_run = ceil( (L1-55) / 64 ) - ceil( (L2-55) / 64 )
- * where L1 is the size of the header plus the decrypted message
- * plus CBC padding and L2 is the size of the header plus the
- * decrypted message. This is for an underlying hash function
- * with 64-byte blocks.
- * We use ( (Lx+8) / 64 ) to handle 'negative Lx' values
- * correctly. We round down instead of up, so -56 is the correct
- * value for our calculations instead of -55.
- *
- * Repeat the formula rather than defining a block_size variable.
- * This avoids requiring division by a variable at runtime
- * (which would be marginally less efficient and would require
- * linking an extra division function in some builds).
- */
- size_t j, extra_run = 0;
-
- /*
- * The next two sizes are the minimum and maximum values of
- * in_msglen over all padlen values.
- *
- * They're independent of padlen, since we previously did
- * in_msglen -= padlen.
- *
- * Note that max_len + maclen is never more than the buffer
- * length, as we previously did in_msglen -= maclen too.
- */
- const size_t max_len = ssl->in_msglen + padlen;
- const size_t min_len = ( max_len > 256 ) ? max_len - 256 : 0;
-
- switch( ssl->transform_in->ciphersuite_info->mac )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
- case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:
- case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:
- case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:
- /* 8 bytes of message size, 64-byte compression blocks */
- extra_run = ( 13 + ssl->in_msglen + padlen + 8 ) / 64 -
- ( 13 + ssl->in_msglen + 8 ) / 64;
- break;
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
- case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:
- /* 16 bytes of message size, 128-byte compression blocks */
- extra_run = ( 13 + ssl->in_msglen + padlen + 16 ) / 128 -
- ( 13 + ssl->in_msglen + 16 ) / 128;
- break;
-#endif
- default:
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
-
- extra_run &= correct * 0xFF;
-
- mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_ctr, 8 );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_hdr, 3 );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_len, 2 );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_msg,
- ssl->in_msglen );
- /* Make sure we access everything even when padlen > 0. This
- * makes the synchronisation requirements for just-in-time
- * Prime+Probe attacks much tighter and hopefully impractical. */
- ssl_read_memory( ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen, padlen );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, mac_expect );
-
- /* Call mbedtls_md_process at least once due to cache attacks
- * that observe whether md_process() was called of not */
- for( j = 0; j < extra_run + 1; j++ )
- mbedtls_md_process( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_msg );
-
- mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec );
-
- /* Make sure we access all the memory that could contain the MAC,
- * before we check it in the next code block. This makes the
- * synchronisation requirements for just-in-time Prime+Probe
- * attacks much tighter and hopefully impractical. */
- ssl_read_memory( ssl->in_msg + min_len,
- max_len - min_len + ssl->transform_in->maclen );
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
- MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "expected mac", mac_expect, ssl->transform_in->maclen );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen,
- ssl->transform_in->maclen );
-#endif
-
- if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen, mac_expect,
- ssl->transform_in->maclen ) != 0 )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) );
-#endif
- correct = 0;
- }
- auth_done++;
- }
-
- /*
- * Finally check the correct flag
- */
- if( correct == 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
-#endif /* SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */
-
- /* Make extra sure authentication was performed, exactly once */
- if( auth_done != 1 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
-
- if( ssl->in_msglen == 0 )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
- if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3
- && ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA )
- {
- /* TLS v1.2 explicitly disallows zero-length messages which are not application data */
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid zero-length message type: %d", ssl->in_msgtype ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
-
- ssl->nb_zero++;
-
- /*
- * Three or more empty messages may be a DoS attack
- * (excessive CPU consumption).
- */
- if( ssl->nb_zero > 3 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received four consecutive empty "
- "messages, possible DoS attack" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
- }
- }
- else
- ssl->nb_zero = 0;
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
- ; /* in_ctr read from peer, not maintained internally */
- }
- else
-#endif
- {
- unsigned char i;
- for( i = 8; i > ssl_ep_len( ssl ); i-- )
- if( ++ssl->in_ctr[i - 1] != 0 )
- break;
-
- /* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */
- if( i == ssl_ep_len( ssl ) )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "incoming message counter would wrap" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING );
- }
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= decrypt buf" ) );
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-#undef MAC_NONE
-#undef MAC_PLAINTEXT
-#undef MAC_CIPHERTEXT
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
-/*
- * Compression/decompression functions
- */
-static int ssl_compress_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- int ret;
- unsigned char *msg_post = ssl->out_msg;
- ptrdiff_t bytes_written = ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf;
- size_t len_pre = ssl->out_msglen;
- unsigned char *msg_pre = ssl->compress_buf;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> compress buf" ) );
-
- if( len_pre == 0 )
- return( 0 );
-
- memcpy( msg_pre, ssl->out_msg, len_pre );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before compression: msglen = %d, ",
- ssl->out_msglen ) );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "before compression: output payload",
- ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen );
-
- ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.next_in = msg_pre;
- ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.avail_in = len_pre;
- ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.next_out = msg_post;
- ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.avail_out = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN - bytes_written;
-
- ret = deflate( &ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate, Z_SYNC_FLUSH );
- if( ret != Z_OK )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "failed to perform compression (%d)", ret ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED );
- }
-
- ssl->out_msglen = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN -
- ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.avail_out - bytes_written;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "after compression: msglen = %d, ",
- ssl->out_msglen ) );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "after compression: output payload",
- ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= compress buf" ) );
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-static int ssl_decompress_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- int ret;
- unsigned char *msg_post = ssl->in_msg;
- ptrdiff_t header_bytes = ssl->in_msg - ssl->in_buf;
- size_t len_pre = ssl->in_msglen;
- unsigned char *msg_pre = ssl->compress_buf;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> decompress buf" ) );
-
- if( len_pre == 0 )
- return( 0 );
-
- memcpy( msg_pre, ssl->in_msg, len_pre );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before decompression: msglen = %d, ",
- ssl->in_msglen ) );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "before decompression: input payload",
- ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen );
-
- ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.next_in = msg_pre;
- ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.avail_in = len_pre;
- ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.next_out = msg_post;
- ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.avail_out = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN -
- header_bytes;
-
- ret = inflate( &ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate, Z_SYNC_FLUSH );
- if( ret != Z_OK )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "failed to perform decompression (%d)", ret ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED );
- }
-
- ssl->in_msglen = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN -
- ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.avail_out - header_bytes;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "after decompression: msglen = %d, ",
- ssl->in_msglen ) );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "after decompression: input payload",
- ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= decompress buf" ) );
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
static int ssl_write_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
-static int ssl_resend_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+int mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
/* If renegotiation is not enforced, retransmit until we would reach max
* timeout if we were using the usual handshake doubling scheme */
@@ -2513,2779 +2000,42 @@
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
-/*
- * Fill the input message buffer by appending data to it.
- * The amount of data already fetched is in ssl->in_left.
- *
- * If we return 0, is it guaranteed that (at least) nb_want bytes are
- * available (from this read and/or a previous one). Otherwise, an error code
- * is returned (possibly EOF or WANT_READ).
- *
- * With stream transport (TLS) on success ssl->in_left == nb_want, but
- * with datagram transport (DTLS) on success ssl->in_left >= nb_want,
- * since we always read a whole datagram at once.
- *
- * For DTLS, it is up to the caller to set ssl->next_record_offset when
- * they're done reading a record.
- */
-int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want )
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+static void ssl_clear_peer_cert( mbedtls_ssl_session *session )
{
- int ret;
- size_t len;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> fetch input" ) );
-
- if( ssl->f_recv == NULL && ssl->f_recv_timeout == NULL )
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+ if( session->peer_cert != NULL )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Bad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() "
- "or mbedtls_ssl_set_bio()" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( session->peer_cert );
+ mbedtls_free( session->peer_cert );
+ session->peer_cert = NULL;
}
-
- if( nb_want > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN - (size_t)( ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf ) )
+#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+ if( session->peer_cert_digest != NULL )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "requesting more data than fits" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ /* Zeroization is not necessary. */
+ mbedtls_free( session->peer_cert_digest );
+ session->peer_cert_digest = NULL;
+ session->peer_cert_digest_type = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
+ session->peer_cert_digest_len = 0;
}
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
- uint32_t timeout;
-
- /* Just to be sure */
- if( ssl->f_set_timer == NULL || ssl->f_get_timer == NULL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "You must use "
- "mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb() for DTLS" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
- }
-
- /*
- * The point is, we need to always read a full datagram at once, so we
- * sometimes read more then requested, and handle the additional data.
- * It could be the rest of the current record (while fetching the
- * header) and/or some other records in the same datagram.
- */
-
- /*
- * Move to the next record in the already read datagram if applicable
- */
- if( ssl->next_record_offset != 0 )
- {
- if( ssl->in_left < ssl->next_record_offset )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
-
- ssl->in_left -= ssl->next_record_offset;
-
- if( ssl->in_left != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "next record in same datagram, offset: %d",
- ssl->next_record_offset ) );
- memmove( ssl->in_hdr,
- ssl->in_hdr + ssl->next_record_offset,
- ssl->in_left );
- }
-
- ssl->next_record_offset = 0;
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %d, nb_want: %d",
- ssl->in_left, nb_want ) );
-
- /*
- * Done if we already have enough data.
- */
- if( nb_want <= ssl->in_left)
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= fetch input" ) );
- return( 0 );
- }
-
- /*
- * A record can't be split across datagrams. If we need to read but
- * are not at the beginning of a new record, the caller did something
- * wrong.
- */
- if( ssl->in_left != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
-
- /*
- * Don't even try to read if time's out already.
- * This avoids by-passing the timer when repeatedly receiving messages
- * that will end up being dropped.
- */
- if( ssl_check_timer( ssl ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "timer has expired" ) );
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT;
- }
- else
- {
- len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN - ( ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf );
-
- if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
- timeout = ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout;
- else
- timeout = ssl->conf->read_timeout;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "f_recv_timeout: %u ms", timeout ) );
-
- if( ssl->f_recv_timeout != NULL )
- ret = ssl->f_recv_timeout( ssl->p_bio, ssl->in_hdr, len,
- timeout );
- else
- ret = ssl->f_recv( ssl->p_bio, ssl->in_hdr, len );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_recv(_timeout)", ret );
-
- if( ret == 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF );
- }
-
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "timeout" ) );
- ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 );
-
- if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
- {
- if( ssl_double_retransmit_timeout( ssl ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake timeout" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT );
- }
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
-
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ );
- }
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
- else if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
- ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING )
- {
- if( ( ret = ssl_resend_hello_request( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_resend_hello_request", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
-
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ );
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
- }
-
- if( ret < 0 )
- return( ret );
-
- ssl->in_left = ret;
- }
- else
-#endif
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %d, nb_want: %d",
- ssl->in_left, nb_want ) );
-
- while( ssl->in_left < nb_want )
- {
- len = nb_want - ssl->in_left;
-
- if( ssl_check_timer( ssl ) != 0 )
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT;
- else
- {
- if( ssl->f_recv_timeout != NULL )
- {
- ret = ssl->f_recv_timeout( ssl->p_bio,
- ssl->in_hdr + ssl->in_left, len,
- ssl->conf->read_timeout );
- }
- else
- {
- ret = ssl->f_recv( ssl->p_bio,
- ssl->in_hdr + ssl->in_left, len );
- }
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %d, nb_want: %d",
- ssl->in_left, nb_want ) );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_recv(_timeout)", ret );
-
- if( ret == 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF );
-
- if( ret < 0 )
- return( ret );
-
- if ( (size_t)ret > len || ( INT_MAX > SIZE_MAX && ret > SIZE_MAX ) )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
- ( "f_recv returned %d bytes but only %lu were requested",
- ret, (unsigned long)len ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
-
- ssl->in_left += ret;
- }
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= fetch input" ) );
-
- return( 0 );
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
}
-
-/*
- * Flush any data not yet written
- */
-int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- int ret;
- unsigned char *buf;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> flush output" ) );
-
- if( ssl->f_send == NULL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Bad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() "
- "or mbedtls_ssl_set_bio()" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
- }
-
- /* Avoid incrementing counter if data is flushed */
- if( ssl->out_left == 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= flush output" ) );
- return( 0 );
- }
-
- while( ssl->out_left > 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "message length: %d, out_left: %d",
- mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) + ssl->out_msglen, ssl->out_left ) );
-
- buf = ssl->out_hdr - ssl->out_left;
- ret = ssl->f_send( ssl->p_bio, buf, ssl->out_left );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_send", ret );
-
- if( ret <= 0 )
- return( ret );
-
- if( (size_t)ret > ssl->out_left || ( INT_MAX > SIZE_MAX && ret > SIZE_MAX ) )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
- ( "f_send returned %d bytes but only %lu bytes were sent",
- ret, (unsigned long)ssl->out_left ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
-
- ssl->out_left -= ret;
- }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
- ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf;
- }
- else
-#endif
- {
- ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf + 8;
- }
- ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_out );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= flush output" ) );
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Functions to handle the DTLS retransmission state machine
- */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
-/*
- * Append current handshake message to current outgoing flight
- */
-static int ssl_flight_append( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *msg;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_flight_append" ) );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message appended to flight",
- ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen );
-
- /* Allocate space for current message */
- if( ( msg = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item ) ) ) == NULL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc %d bytes failed",
- sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item ) ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
- }
-
- if( ( msg->p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ssl->out_msglen ) ) == NULL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc %d bytes failed", ssl->out_msglen ) );
- mbedtls_free( msg );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
- }
-
- /* Copy current handshake message with headers */
- memcpy( msg->p, ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen );
- msg->len = ssl->out_msglen;
- msg->type = ssl->out_msgtype;
- msg->next = NULL;
-
- /* Append to the current flight */
- if( ssl->handshake->flight == NULL )
- ssl->handshake->flight = msg;
- else
- {
- mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur = ssl->handshake->flight;
- while( cur->next != NULL )
- cur = cur->next;
- cur->next = msg;
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_flight_append" ) );
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Free the current flight of handshake messages
- */
-static void ssl_flight_free( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight )
-{
- mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur = flight;
- mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *next;
-
- while( cur != NULL )
- {
- next = cur->next;
-
- mbedtls_free( cur->p );
- mbedtls_free( cur );
-
- cur = next;
- }
-}
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
-static void ssl_dtls_replay_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Swap transform_out and out_ctr with the alternative ones
- */
-static void ssl_swap_epochs( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- mbedtls_ssl_transform *tmp_transform;
- unsigned char tmp_out_ctr[8];
-
- if( ssl->transform_out == ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip swap epochs" ) );
- return;
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "swap epochs" ) );
-
- /* Swap transforms */
- tmp_transform = ssl->transform_out;
- ssl->transform_out = ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out;
- ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = tmp_transform;
-
- /* Swap epoch + sequence_number */
- memcpy( tmp_out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8 );
- memcpy( ssl->cur_out_ctr, ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, 8 );
- memcpy( ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, tmp_out_ctr, 8 );
-
- /* Adjust to the newly activated transform */
- ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_out );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL)
- if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate != NULL )
- {
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate", ret );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
- }
- }
-#endif
-}
-
-/*
- * Retransmit the current flight of messages.
- */
-int mbedtls_ssl_resend( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- int ret = 0;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> mbedtls_ssl_resend" ) );
-
- ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= mbedtls_ssl_resend" ) );
-
- return( ret );
-}
-
-/*
- * Transmit or retransmit the current flight of messages.
- *
- * Need to remember the current message in case flush_output returns
- * WANT_WRITE, causing us to exit this function and come back later.
- * This function must be called until state is no longer SENDING.
- */
-int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- int ret;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit" ) );
-
- if( ssl->handshake->retransmit_state != MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "initialise flight transmission" ) );
-
- ssl->handshake->cur_msg = ssl->handshake->flight;
- ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = ssl->handshake->flight->p + 12;
- ssl_swap_epochs( ssl );
-
- ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING;
- }
-
- while( ssl->handshake->cur_msg != NULL )
- {
- size_t max_frag_len;
- const mbedtls_ssl_flight_item * const cur = ssl->handshake->cur_msg;
-
- int const is_finished =
- ( cur->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
- cur->p[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED );
-
- uint8_t const force_flush = ssl->disable_datagram_packing == 1 ?
- SSL_FORCE_FLUSH : SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH;
-
- /* Swap epochs before sending Finished: we can't do it after
- * sending ChangeCipherSpec, in case write returns WANT_READ.
- * Must be done before copying, may change out_msg pointer */
- if( is_finished && ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p == ( cur->p + 12 ) )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "swap epochs to send finished message" ) );
- ssl_swap_epochs( ssl );
- }
-
- ret = ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( ssl );
- if( ret < 0 )
- return( ret );
- max_frag_len = (size_t) ret;
-
- /* CCS is copied as is, while HS messages may need fragmentation */
- if( cur->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC )
- {
- if( max_frag_len == 0 )
- {
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- return( ret );
-
- continue;
- }
-
- memcpy( ssl->out_msg, cur->p, cur->len );
- ssl->out_msglen = cur->len;
- ssl->out_msgtype = cur->type;
-
- /* Update position inside current message */
- ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p += cur->len;
- }
- else
- {
- const unsigned char * const p = ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p;
- const size_t hs_len = cur->len - 12;
- const size_t frag_off = p - ( cur->p + 12 );
- const size_t rem_len = hs_len - frag_off;
- size_t cur_hs_frag_len, max_hs_frag_len;
-
- if( ( max_frag_len < 12 ) || ( max_frag_len == 12 && hs_len != 0 ) )
- {
- if( is_finished )
- ssl_swap_epochs( ssl );
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- return( ret );
-
- continue;
- }
- max_hs_frag_len = max_frag_len - 12;
-
- cur_hs_frag_len = rem_len > max_hs_frag_len ?
- max_hs_frag_len : rem_len;
-
- if( frag_off == 0 && cur_hs_frag_len != hs_len )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "fragmenting handshake message (%u > %u)",
- (unsigned) cur_hs_frag_len,
- (unsigned) max_hs_frag_len ) );
- }
-
- /* Messages are stored with handshake headers as if not fragmented,
- * copy beginning of headers then fill fragmentation fields.
- * Handshake headers: type(1) len(3) seq(2) f_off(3) f_len(3) */
- memcpy( ssl->out_msg, cur->p, 6 );
-
- ssl->out_msg[6] = ( ( frag_off >> 16 ) & 0xff );
- ssl->out_msg[7] = ( ( frag_off >> 8 ) & 0xff );
- ssl->out_msg[8] = ( ( frag_off ) & 0xff );
-
- ssl->out_msg[ 9] = ( ( cur_hs_frag_len >> 16 ) & 0xff );
- ssl->out_msg[10] = ( ( cur_hs_frag_len >> 8 ) & 0xff );
- ssl->out_msg[11] = ( ( cur_hs_frag_len ) & 0xff );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "handshake header", ssl->out_msg, 12 );
-
- /* Copy the handshake message content and set records fields */
- memcpy( ssl->out_msg + 12, p, cur_hs_frag_len );
- ssl->out_msglen = cur_hs_frag_len + 12;
- ssl->out_msgtype = cur->type;
-
- /* Update position inside current message */
- ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p += cur_hs_frag_len;
- }
-
- /* If done with the current message move to the next one if any */
- if( ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p >= cur->p + cur->len )
- {
- if( cur->next != NULL )
- {
- ssl->handshake->cur_msg = cur->next;
- ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = cur->next->p + 12;
- }
- else
- {
- ssl->handshake->cur_msg = NULL;
- ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = NULL;
- }
- }
-
- /* Actually send the message out */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, force_flush ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
- }
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- return( ret );
-
- /* Update state and set timer */
- if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
- ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED;
- else
- {
- ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING;
- ssl_set_timer( ssl, ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout );
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit" ) );
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-/*
- * To be called when the last message of an incoming flight is received.
- */
-void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- /* We won't need to resend that one any more */
- ssl_flight_free( ssl->handshake->flight );
- ssl->handshake->flight = NULL;
- ssl->handshake->cur_msg = NULL;
-
- /* The next incoming flight will start with this msg_seq */
- ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq = ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq;
-
- /* We don't want to remember CCS's across flight boundaries. */
- ssl->handshake->buffering.seen_ccs = 0;
-
- /* Clear future message buffering structure. */
- ssl_buffering_free( ssl );
-
- /* Cancel timer */
- ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 );
-
- if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
- ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED )
- {
- ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED;
- }
- else
- ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING;
-}
-
-/*
- * To be called when the last message of an outgoing flight is send.
- */
-void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- ssl_reset_retransmit_timeout( ssl );
- ssl_set_timer( ssl, ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout );
-
- if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
- ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED )
- {
- ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED;
- }
- else
- ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING;
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
-
-/*
- * Handshake layer functions
- */
-
-/*
- * Write (DTLS: or queue) current handshake (including CCS) message.
- *
- * - fill in handshake headers
- * - update handshake checksum
- * - DTLS: save message for resending
- * - then pass to the record layer
- *
- * DTLS: except for HelloRequest, messages are only queued, and will only be
- * actually sent when calling flight_transmit() or resend().
- *
- * Inputs:
- * - ssl->out_msglen: 4 + actual handshake message len
- * (4 is the size of handshake headers for TLS)
- * - ssl->out_msg[0]: the handshake type (ClientHello, ServerHello, etc)
- * - ssl->out_msg + 4: the handshake message body
- *
- * Outputs, ie state before passing to flight_append() or write_record():
- * - ssl->out_msglen: the length of the record contents
- * (including handshake headers but excluding record headers)
- * - ssl->out_msg: the record contents (handshake headers + content)
- */
-int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- int ret;
- const size_t hs_len = ssl->out_msglen - 4;
- const unsigned char hs_type = ssl->out_msg[0];
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write handshake message" ) );
-
- /*
- * Sanity checks
- */
- if( ssl->out_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
- ssl->out_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC )
- {
- /* In SSLv3, the client might send a NoCertificate alert. */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
- if( ! ( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 &&
- ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT &&
- ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) )
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
- }
-
- /* Whenever we send anything different from a
- * HelloRequest we should be in a handshake - double check. */
- if( ! ( ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
- hs_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ) &&
- ssl->handshake == NULL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
- ssl->handshake != NULL &&
- ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
-#endif
-
- /* Double-check that we did not exceed the bounds
- * of the outgoing record buffer.
- * This should never fail as the various message
- * writing functions must obey the bounds of the
- * outgoing record buffer, but better be safe.
- *
- * Note: We deliberately do not check for the MTU or MFL here.
- */
- if( ssl->out_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Record too large: "
- "size %u, maximum %u",
- (unsigned) ssl->out_msglen,
- (unsigned) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
-
- /*
- * Fill handshake headers
- */
- if( ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
- {
- ssl->out_msg[1] = (unsigned char)( hs_len >> 16 );
- ssl->out_msg[2] = (unsigned char)( hs_len >> 8 );
- ssl->out_msg[3] = (unsigned char)( hs_len );
-
- /*
- * DTLS has additional fields in the Handshake layer,
- * between the length field and the actual payload:
- * uint16 message_seq;
- * uint24 fragment_offset;
- * uint24 fragment_length;
- */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
- /* Make room for the additional DTLS fields */
- if( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen < 8 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DTLS handshake message too large: "
- "size %u, maximum %u",
- (unsigned) ( hs_len ),
- (unsigned) ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 12 ) ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
- }
-
- memmove( ssl->out_msg + 12, ssl->out_msg + 4, hs_len );
- ssl->out_msglen += 8;
-
- /* Write message_seq and update it, except for HelloRequest */
- if( hs_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST )
- {
- ssl->out_msg[4] = ( ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq >> 8 ) & 0xFF;
- ssl->out_msg[5] = ( ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq ) & 0xFF;
- ++( ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq );
- }
- else
- {
- ssl->out_msg[4] = 0;
- ssl->out_msg[5] = 0;
- }
-
- /* Handshake hashes are computed without fragmentation,
- * so set frag_offset = 0 and frag_len = hs_len for now */
- memset( ssl->out_msg + 6, 0x00, 3 );
- memcpy( ssl->out_msg + 9, ssl->out_msg + 1, 3 );
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
-
- /* Update running hashes of handshake messages seen */
- if( hs_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST )
- ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen );
- }
-
- /* Either send now, or just save to be sent (and resent) later */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
- ! ( ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
- hs_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ) )
- {
- if( ( ret = ssl_flight_append( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_flight_append", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
- }
- else
-#endif
- {
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_record", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write handshake message" ) );
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Record layer functions
- */
-
-/*
- * Write current record.
- *
- * Uses:
- * - ssl->out_msgtype: type of the message (AppData, Handshake, Alert, CCS)
- * - ssl->out_msglen: length of the record content (excl headers)
- * - ssl->out_msg: record content
- */
-int mbedtls_ssl_write_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush )
-{
- int ret, done = 0;
- size_t len = ssl->out_msglen;
- uint8_t flush = force_flush;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write record" ) );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
- if( ssl->transform_out != NULL &&
- ssl->session_out->compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE )
- {
- if( ( ret = ssl_compress_buf( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_compress_buf", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
-
- len = ssl->out_msglen;
- }
-#endif /*MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL)
- if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write != NULL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write()" ) );
-
- ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write( ssl );
- if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write", ret );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
- }
-
- if( ret == 0 )
- done = 1;
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */
- if( !done )
- {
- unsigned i;
- size_t protected_record_size;
-
- ssl->out_hdr[0] = (unsigned char) ssl->out_msgtype;
- mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver,
- ssl->conf->transport, ssl->out_hdr + 1 );
-
- memcpy( ssl->out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8 );
- ssl->out_len[0] = (unsigned char)( len >> 8 );
- ssl->out_len[1] = (unsigned char)( len );
-
- if( ssl->transform_out != NULL )
- {
- if( ( ret = ssl_encrypt_buf( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_encrypt_buf", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
-
- len = ssl->out_msglen;
- ssl->out_len[0] = (unsigned char)( len >> 8 );
- ssl->out_len[1] = (unsigned char)( len );
- }
-
- protected_record_size = len + mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- /* In case of DTLS, double-check that we don't exceed
- * the remaining space in the datagram. */
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
- ret = ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram( ssl );
- if( ret < 0 )
- return( ret );
-
- if( protected_record_size > (size_t) ret )
- {
- /* Should never happen */
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "output record: msgtype = %d, "
- "version = [%d:%d], msglen = %d",
- ssl->out_hdr[0], ssl->out_hdr[1],
- ssl->out_hdr[2], len ) );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "output record sent to network",
- ssl->out_hdr, protected_record_size );
-
- ssl->out_left += protected_record_size;
- ssl->out_hdr += protected_record_size;
- ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_out );
-
- for( i = 8; i > ssl_ep_len( ssl ); i-- )
- if( ++ssl->cur_out_ctr[i - 1] != 0 )
- break;
-
- /* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */
- if( i == ssl_ep_len( ssl ) )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "outgoing message counter would wrap" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING );
- }
- }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
- flush == SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH )
- {
- size_t remaining;
- ret = ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( ssl );
- if( ret < 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram",
- ret );
- return( ret );
- }
-
- remaining = (size_t) ret;
- if( remaining == 0 )
- {
- flush = SSL_FORCE_FLUSH;
- }
- else
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Still %u bytes available in current datagram", (unsigned) remaining ) );
- }
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
-
- if( ( flush == SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) &&
- ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flush_output", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write record" ) );
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
-
-static int ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->in_hslen ||
- memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 6, "\0\0\0", 3 ) != 0 ||
- memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 9, ssl->in_msg + 1, 3 ) != 0 )
- {
- return( 1 );
- }
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_frag_len( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
-{
- return( ( ssl->in_msg[9] << 16 ) |
- ( ssl->in_msg[10] << 8 ) |
- ssl->in_msg[11] );
-}
-
-static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_frag_off( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
-{
- return( ( ssl->in_msg[6] << 16 ) |
- ( ssl->in_msg[7] << 8 ) |
- ssl->in_msg[8] );
-}
-
-static int ssl_check_hs_header( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
-{
- uint32_t msg_len, frag_off, frag_len;
-
- msg_len = ssl_get_hs_total_len( ssl );
- frag_off = ssl_get_hs_frag_off( ssl );
- frag_len = ssl_get_hs_frag_len( ssl );
-
- if( frag_off > msg_len )
- return( -1 );
-
- if( frag_len > msg_len - frag_off )
- return( -1 );
-
- if( frag_len + 12 > ssl->in_msglen )
- return( -1 );
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Mark bits in bitmask (used for DTLS HS reassembly)
- */
-static void ssl_bitmask_set( unsigned char *mask, size_t offset, size_t len )
-{
- unsigned int start_bits, end_bits;
-
- start_bits = 8 - ( offset % 8 );
- if( start_bits != 8 )
- {
- size_t first_byte_idx = offset / 8;
-
- /* Special case */
- if( len <= start_bits )
- {
- for( ; len != 0; len-- )
- mask[first_byte_idx] |= 1 << ( start_bits - len );
-
- /* Avoid potential issues with offset or len becoming invalid */
- return;
- }
-
- offset += start_bits; /* Now offset % 8 == 0 */
- len -= start_bits;
-
- for( ; start_bits != 0; start_bits-- )
- mask[first_byte_idx] |= 1 << ( start_bits - 1 );
- }
-
- end_bits = len % 8;
- if( end_bits != 0 )
- {
- size_t last_byte_idx = ( offset + len ) / 8;
-
- len -= end_bits; /* Now len % 8 == 0 */
-
- for( ; end_bits != 0; end_bits-- )
- mask[last_byte_idx] |= 1 << ( 8 - end_bits );
- }
-
- memset( mask + offset / 8, 0xFF, len / 8 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Check that bitmask is full
- */
-static int ssl_bitmask_check( unsigned char *mask, size_t len )
-{
- size_t i;
-
- for( i = 0; i < len / 8; i++ )
- if( mask[i] != 0xFF )
- return( -1 );
-
- for( i = 0; i < len % 8; i++ )
- if( ( mask[len / 8] & ( 1 << ( 7 - i ) ) ) == 0 )
- return( -1 );
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-/* msg_len does not include the handshake header */
-static size_t ssl_get_reassembly_buffer_size( size_t msg_len,
- unsigned add_bitmap )
-{
- size_t alloc_len;
-
- alloc_len = 12; /* Handshake header */
- alloc_len += msg_len; /* Content buffer */
-
- if( add_bitmap )
- alloc_len += msg_len / 8 + ( msg_len % 8 != 0 ); /* Bitmap */
-
- return( alloc_len );
-}
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
-
-static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
-{
- return( ( ssl->in_msg[1] << 16 ) |
- ( ssl->in_msg[2] << 8 ) |
- ssl->in_msg[3] );
-}
-
-int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- if( ssl->in_msglen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake message too short: %d",
- ssl->in_msglen ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
- }
-
- ssl->in_hslen = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + ssl_get_hs_total_len( ssl );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "handshake message: msglen ="
- " %d, type = %d, hslen = %d",
- ssl->in_msglen, ssl->in_msg[0], ssl->in_hslen ) );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
- int ret;
- unsigned int recv_msg_seq = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[5];
-
- if( ssl_check_hs_header( ssl ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid handshake header" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
- }
-
- if( ssl->handshake != NULL &&
- ( ( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER &&
- recv_msg_seq != ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) ||
- ( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER &&
- ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ) ) )
- {
- if( recv_msg_seq > ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received future handshake message of sequence number %u (next %u)",
- recv_msg_seq,
- ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE );
- }
-
- /* Retransmit only on last message from previous flight, to avoid
- * too many retransmissions.
- * Besides, No sane server ever retransmits HelloVerifyRequest */
- if( recv_msg_seq == ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq - 1 &&
- ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received message from last flight, "
- "message_seq = %d, start_of_flight = %d",
- recv_msg_seq,
- ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq ) );
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
- }
- else
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "dropping out-of-sequence message: "
- "message_seq = %d, expected = %d",
- recv_msg_seq,
- ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) );
- }
-
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING );
- }
- /* Wait until message completion to increment in_msg_seq */
-
- /* Message reassembly is handled alongside buffering of future
- * messages; the commonality is that both handshake fragments and
- * future messages cannot be forwarded immediately to the
- * handshake logic layer. */
- if( ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( ssl ) == 1 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE );
- }
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
- /* With TLS we don't handle fragmentation (for now) */
- if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->in_hslen )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "TLS handshake fragmentation not supported" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
- }
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake;
-
- if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && hs != NULL )
- {
- ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_hslen );
- }
-
- /* Handshake message is complete, increment counter */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
- ssl->handshake != NULL )
- {
- unsigned offset;
- mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer *hs_buf;
-
- /* Increment handshake sequence number */
- hs->in_msg_seq++;
-
- /*
- * Clear up handshake buffering and reassembly structure.
- */
-
- /* Free first entry */
- ssl_buffering_free_slot( ssl, 0 );
-
- /* Shift all other entries */
- for( offset = 0, hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[0];
- offset + 1 < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS;
- offset++, hs_buf++ )
- {
- *hs_buf = *(hs_buf + 1);
- }
-
- /* Create a fresh last entry */
- memset( hs_buf, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer ) );
- }
-#endif
-}
-
-/*
- * DTLS anti-replay: RFC 6347 4.1.2.6
- *
- * in_window is a field of bits numbered from 0 (lsb) to 63 (msb).
- * Bit n is set iff record number in_window_top - n has been seen.
- *
- * Usually, in_window_top is the last record number seen and the lsb of
- * in_window is set. The only exception is the initial state (record number 0
- * not seen yet).
- */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
-static void ssl_dtls_replay_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- ssl->in_window_top = 0;
- ssl->in_window = 0;
-}
-
-static inline uint64_t ssl_load_six_bytes( unsigned char *buf )
-{
- return( ( (uint64_t) buf[0] << 40 ) |
- ( (uint64_t) buf[1] << 32 ) |
- ( (uint64_t) buf[2] << 24 ) |
- ( (uint64_t) buf[3] << 16 ) |
- ( (uint64_t) buf[4] << 8 ) |
- ( (uint64_t) buf[5] ) );
-}
-
-/*
- * Return 0 if sequence number is acceptable, -1 otherwise
- */
-int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- uint64_t rec_seqnum = ssl_load_six_bytes( ssl->in_ctr + 2 );
- uint64_t bit;
-
- if( ssl->conf->anti_replay == MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED )
- return( 0 );
-
- if( rec_seqnum > ssl->in_window_top )
- return( 0 );
-
- bit = ssl->in_window_top - rec_seqnum;
-
- if( bit >= 64 )
- return( -1 );
-
- if( ( ssl->in_window & ( (uint64_t) 1 << bit ) ) != 0 )
- return( -1 );
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Update replay window on new validated record
- */
-void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- uint64_t rec_seqnum = ssl_load_six_bytes( ssl->in_ctr + 2 );
-
- if( ssl->conf->anti_replay == MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED )
- return;
-
- if( rec_seqnum > ssl->in_window_top )
- {
- /* Update window_top and the contents of the window */
- uint64_t shift = rec_seqnum - ssl->in_window_top;
-
- if( shift >= 64 )
- ssl->in_window = 1;
- else
- {
- ssl->in_window <<= shift;
- ssl->in_window |= 1;
- }
-
- ssl->in_window_top = rec_seqnum;
- }
- else
- {
- /* Mark that number as seen in the current window */
- uint64_t bit = ssl->in_window_top - rec_seqnum;
-
- if( bit < 64 ) /* Always true, but be extra sure */
- ssl->in_window |= (uint64_t) 1 << bit;
- }
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
-/* Forward declaration */
-static int ssl_session_reset_int( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial );
-
-/*
- * Without any SSL context, check if a datagram looks like a ClientHello with
- * a valid cookie, and if it doesn't, generate a HelloVerifyRequest message.
- * Both input and output include full DTLS headers.
- *
- * - if cookie is valid, return 0
- * - if ClientHello looks superficially valid but cookie is not,
- * fill obuf and set olen, then
- * return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED
- * - otherwise return a specific error code
- */
-static int ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie(
- mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t *f_cookie_write,
- mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t *f_cookie_check,
- void *p_cookie,
- const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len,
- unsigned char *obuf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen )
-{
- size_t sid_len, cookie_len;
- unsigned char *p;
-
- if( f_cookie_write == NULL || f_cookie_check == NULL )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
-
- /*
- * Structure of ClientHello with record and handshake headers,
- * and expected values. We don't need to check a lot, more checks will be
- * done when actually parsing the ClientHello - skipping those checks
- * avoids code duplication and does not make cookie forging any easier.
- *
- * 0-0 ContentType type; copied, must be handshake
- * 1-2 ProtocolVersion version; copied
- * 3-4 uint16 epoch; copied, must be 0
- * 5-10 uint48 sequence_number; copied
- * 11-12 uint16 length; (ignored)
- *
- * 13-13 HandshakeType msg_type; (ignored)
- * 14-16 uint24 length; (ignored)
- * 17-18 uint16 message_seq; copied
- * 19-21 uint24 fragment_offset; copied, must be 0
- * 22-24 uint24 fragment_length; (ignored)
- *
- * 25-26 ProtocolVersion client_version; (ignored)
- * 27-58 Random random; (ignored)
- * 59-xx SessionID session_id; 1 byte len + sid_len content
- * 60+ opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; 1 byte len + content
- * ...
- *
- * Minimum length is 61 bytes.
- */
- if( in_len < 61 ||
- in[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ||
- in[3] != 0 || in[4] != 0 ||
- in[19] != 0 || in[20] != 0 || in[21] != 0 )
- {
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
- }
-
- sid_len = in[59];
- if( sid_len > in_len - 61 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
-
- cookie_len = in[60 + sid_len];
- if( cookie_len > in_len - 60 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
-
- if( f_cookie_check( p_cookie, in + sid_len + 61, cookie_len,
- cli_id, cli_id_len ) == 0 )
- {
- /* Valid cookie */
- return( 0 );
- }
-
- /*
- * If we get here, we've got an invalid cookie, let's prepare HVR.
- *
- * 0-0 ContentType type; copied
- * 1-2 ProtocolVersion version; copied
- * 3-4 uint16 epoch; copied
- * 5-10 uint48 sequence_number; copied
- * 11-12 uint16 length; olen - 13
- *
- * 13-13 HandshakeType msg_type; hello_verify_request
- * 14-16 uint24 length; olen - 25
- * 17-18 uint16 message_seq; copied
- * 19-21 uint24 fragment_offset; copied
- * 22-24 uint24 fragment_length; olen - 25
- *
- * 25-26 ProtocolVersion server_version; 0xfe 0xff
- * 27-27 opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; cookie_len = olen - 27, cookie
- *
- * Minimum length is 28.
- */
- if( buf_len < 28 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
-
- /* Copy most fields and adapt others */
- memcpy( obuf, in, 25 );
- obuf[13] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
- obuf[25] = 0xfe;
- obuf[26] = 0xff;
-
- /* Generate and write actual cookie */
- p = obuf + 28;
- if( f_cookie_write( p_cookie,
- &p, obuf + buf_len, cli_id, cli_id_len ) != 0 )
- {
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
-
- *olen = p - obuf;
-
- /* Go back and fill length fields */
- obuf[27] = (unsigned char)( *olen - 28 );
-
- obuf[14] = obuf[22] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 25 ) >> 16 );
- obuf[15] = obuf[23] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 25 ) >> 8 );
- obuf[16] = obuf[24] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 25 ) );
-
- obuf[11] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 13 ) >> 8 );
- obuf[12] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 13 ) );
-
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED );
-}
-
-/*
- * Handle possible client reconnect with the same UDP quadruplet
- * (RFC 6347 Section 4.2.8).
- *
- * Called by ssl_parse_record_header() in case we receive an epoch 0 record
- * that looks like a ClientHello.
- *
- * - if the input looks like a ClientHello without cookies,
- * send back HelloVerifyRequest, then
- * return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED
- * - if the input looks like a ClientHello with a valid cookie,
- * reset the session of the current context, and
- * return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT
- * - if anything goes wrong, return a specific error code
- *
- * mbedtls_ssl_read_record() will ignore the record if anything else than
- * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT or 0 is returned, although this function
- * cannot not return 0.
- */
-static int ssl_handle_possible_reconnect( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- int ret;
- size_t len;
-
- ret = ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie(
- ssl->conf->f_cookie_write,
- ssl->conf->f_cookie_check,
- ssl->conf->p_cookie,
- ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len,
- ssl->in_buf, ssl->in_left,
- ssl->out_buf, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, &len );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie", ret );
-
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED )
- {
- /* Don't check write errors as we can't do anything here.
- * If the error is permanent we'll catch it later,
- * if it's not, then hopefully it'll work next time. */
- (void) ssl->f_send( ssl->p_bio, ssl->out_buf, len );
-
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED );
- }
-
- if( ret == 0 )
- {
- /* Got a valid cookie, partially reset context */
- if( ( ret = ssl_session_reset_int( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "reset", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
-
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT );
- }
-
- return( ret );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
-
-/*
- * ContentType type;
- * ProtocolVersion version;
- * uint16 epoch; // DTLS only
- * uint48 sequence_number; // DTLS only
- * uint16 length;
- *
- * Return 0 if header looks sane (and, for DTLS, the record is expected)
- * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD if the header looks bad,
- * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD (DTLS only) if sane but unexpected.
- *
- * With DTLS, mbedtls_ssl_read_record() will:
- * 1. proceed with the record if this function returns 0
- * 2. drop only the current record if this function returns UNEXPECTED_RECORD
- * 3. return CLIENT_RECONNECT if this function return that value
- * 4. drop the whole datagram if this function returns anything else.
- * Point 2 is needed when the peer is resending, and we have already received
- * the first record from a datagram but are still waiting for the others.
- */
-static int ssl_parse_record_header( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- int major_ver, minor_ver;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "input record header", ssl->in_hdr, mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) );
-
- ssl->in_msgtype = ssl->in_hdr[0];
- ssl->in_msglen = ( ssl->in_len[0] << 8 ) | ssl->in_len[1];
- mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &major_ver, &minor_ver, ssl->conf->transport, ssl->in_hdr + 1 );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "input record: msgtype = %d, "
- "version = [%d:%d], msglen = %d",
- ssl->in_msgtype,
- major_ver, minor_ver, ssl->in_msglen ) );
-
- /* Check record type */
- if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
- ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT &&
- ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC &&
- ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "unknown record type" ) );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- /* Silently ignore invalid DTLS records as recommended by RFC 6347
- * Section 4.1.2.7 */
- if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
-
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
- }
-
- /* Check version */
- if( major_ver != ssl->major_ver )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "major version mismatch" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
- }
-
- if( minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "minor version mismatch" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
- }
-
- /* Check length against the size of our buffer */
- if( ssl->in_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN
- - (size_t)( ssl->in_msg - ssl->in_buf ) )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
- }
-
- /*
- * DTLS-related tests.
- * Check epoch before checking length constraint because
- * the latter varies with the epoch. E.g., if a ChangeCipherSpec
- * message gets duplicated before the corresponding Finished message,
- * the second ChangeCipherSpec should be discarded because it belongs
- * to an old epoch, but not because its length is shorter than
- * the minimum record length for packets using the new record transform.
- * Note that these two kinds of failures are handled differently,
- * as an unexpected record is silently skipped but an invalid
- * record leads to the entire datagram being dropped.
- */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
- unsigned int rec_epoch = ( ssl->in_ctr[0] << 8 ) | ssl->in_ctr[1];
-
- /* Check epoch (and sequence number) with DTLS */
- if( rec_epoch != ssl->in_epoch )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "record from another epoch: "
- "expected %d, received %d",
- ssl->in_epoch, rec_epoch ) );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
- /*
- * Check for an epoch 0 ClientHello. We can't use in_msg here to
- * access the first byte of record content (handshake type), as we
- * have an active transform (possibly iv_len != 0), so use the
- * fact that the record header len is 13 instead.
- */
- if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
- ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER &&
- rec_epoch == 0 &&
- ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
- ssl->in_left > 13 &&
- ssl->in_buf[13] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "possible client reconnect "
- "from the same port" ) );
- return( ssl_handle_possible_reconnect( ssl ) );
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
- {
- /* Consider buffering the record. */
- if( rec_epoch == (unsigned int) ssl->in_epoch + 1 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Consider record for buffering" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE );
- }
-
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD );
- }
- }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
- /* Replay detection only works for the current epoch */
- if( rec_epoch == ssl->in_epoch &&
- mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( ssl ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "replayed record" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD );
- }
-#endif
-
- /* Drop unexpected ApplicationData records,
- * except at the beginning of renegotiations */
- if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA &&
- ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
- && ! ( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
- ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO )
-#endif
- )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "dropping unexpected ApplicationData" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD );
- }
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
-
-
- /* Check length against bounds of the current transform and version */
- if( ssl->transform_in == NULL )
- {
- if( ssl->in_msglen < 1 ||
- ssl->in_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
- }
- }
- else
- {
- if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->transform_in->minlen )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
- }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
- if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 &&
- ssl->in_msglen > ssl->transform_in->minlen + MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
- }
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
- /*
- * TLS encrypted messages can have up to 256 bytes of padding
- */
- if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 &&
- ssl->in_msglen > ssl->transform_in->minlen +
- MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN + 256 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
- }
-#endif
- }
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-/*
- * If applicable, decrypt (and decompress) record content
- */
-static int ssl_prepare_record_content( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- int ret, done = 0;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "input record from network",
- ssl->in_hdr, mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) + ssl->in_msglen );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL)
- if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read != NULL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read()" ) );
-
- ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read( ssl );
- if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read", ret );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
- }
-
- if( ret == 0 )
- done = 1;
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */
- if( !done && ssl->transform_in != NULL )
- {
- if( ( ret = ssl_decrypt_buf( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_decrypt_buf", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "input payload after decrypt",
- ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen );
-
- if( ssl->in_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
- }
- }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
- if( ssl->transform_in != NULL &&
- ssl->session_in->compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE )
- {
- if( ( ret = ssl_decompress_buf( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_decompress_buf", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
- mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( ssl );
- }
-#endif
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-static void ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-
-/*
- * Read a record.
- *
- * Silently ignore non-fatal alert (and for DTLS, invalid records as well,
- * RFC 6347 4.1.2.7) and continue reading until a valid record is found.
- *
- */
-
-/* Helper functions for mbedtls_ssl_read_record(). */
-static int ssl_consume_current_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-static int ssl_get_next_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-static int ssl_record_is_in_progress( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-
-int mbedtls_ssl_read_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- unsigned update_hs_digest )
-{
- int ret;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> read record" ) );
-
- if( ssl->keep_current_message == 0 )
- {
- do {
-
- ret = ssl_consume_current_message( ssl );
- if( ret != 0 )
- return( ret );
-
- if( ssl_record_is_in_progress( ssl ) == 0 )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- int have_buffered = 0;
-
- /* We only check for buffered messages if the
- * current datagram is fully consumed. */
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
- ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( ssl ) == 0 )
- {
- if( ssl_load_buffered_message( ssl ) == 0 )
- have_buffered = 1;
- }
-
- if( have_buffered == 0 )
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
- {
- ret = ssl_get_next_record( ssl );
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING )
- continue;
-
- if( ret != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_get_next_record" ), ret );
- return( ret );
- }
- }
- }
-
- ret = mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( ssl );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE )
- {
- /* Buffer future message */
- ret = ssl_buffer_message( ssl );
- if( ret != 0 )
- return( ret );
-
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
-
- } while( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL == ret ||
- MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING == ret );
-
- if( 0 != ret )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type" ), ret );
- return( ret );
- }
-
- if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
- update_hs_digest == 1 )
- {
- mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( ssl );
- }
- }
- else
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "reuse previously read message" ) );
- ssl->keep_current_message = 0;
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= read record" ) );
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
-static int ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- if( ssl->in_left > ssl->next_record_offset )
- return( 1 );
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-static int ssl_load_buffered_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake;
- mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer * hs_buf;
- int ret = 0;
-
- if( hs == NULL )
- return( -1 );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_load_buffered_messsage" ) );
-
- if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ||
- ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC )
- {
- /* Check if we have seen a ChangeCipherSpec before.
- * If yes, synthesize a CCS record. */
- if( !hs->buffering.seen_ccs )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "CCS not seen in the current flight" ) );
- ret = -1;
- goto exit;
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Injecting buffered CCS message" ) );
- ssl->in_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
- ssl->in_msglen = 1;
- ssl->in_msg[0] = 1;
-
- /* As long as they are equal, the exact value doesn't matter. */
- ssl->in_left = 0;
- ssl->next_record_offset = 0;
-
- hs->buffering.seen_ccs = 0;
- goto exit;
- }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
- /* Debug only */
- {
- unsigned offset;
- for( offset = 1; offset < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS; offset++ )
- {
- hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[offset];
- if( hs_buf->is_valid == 1 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Future message with sequence number %u %s buffered.",
- hs->in_msg_seq + offset,
- hs_buf->is_complete ? "fully" : "partially" ) );
- }
- }
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
-
- /* Check if we have buffered and/or fully reassembled the
- * next handshake message. */
- hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[0];
- if( ( hs_buf->is_valid == 1 ) && ( hs_buf->is_complete == 1 ) )
- {
- /* Synthesize a record containing the buffered HS message. */
- size_t msg_len = ( hs_buf->data[1] << 16 ) |
- ( hs_buf->data[2] << 8 ) |
- hs_buf->data[3];
-
- /* Double-check that we haven't accidentally buffered
- * a message that doesn't fit into the input buffer. */
- if( msg_len + 12 > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Next handshake message has been buffered - load" ) );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Buffered handshake message (incl. header)",
- hs_buf->data, msg_len + 12 );
-
- ssl->in_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
- ssl->in_hslen = msg_len + 12;
- ssl->in_msglen = msg_len + 12;
- memcpy( ssl->in_msg, hs_buf->data, ssl->in_hslen );
-
- ret = 0;
- goto exit;
- }
- else
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Next handshake message %u not or only partially bufffered",
- hs->in_msg_seq ) );
- }
-
- ret = -1;
-
-exit:
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_load_buffered_message" ) );
- return( ret );
-}
-
-static int ssl_buffer_make_space( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- size_t desired )
-{
- int offset;
- mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Attempt to free buffered messages to have %u bytes available",
- (unsigned) desired ) );
-
- /* Get rid of future records epoch first, if such exist. */
- ssl_free_buffered_record( ssl );
-
- /* Check if we have enough space available now. */
- if( desired <= ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING -
- hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Enough space available after freeing future epoch record" ) );
- return( 0 );
- }
-
- /* We don't have enough space to buffer the next expected handshake
- * message. Remove buffers used for future messages to gain space,
- * starting with the most distant one. */
- for( offset = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS - 1;
- offset >= 0; offset-- )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Free buffering slot %d to make space for reassembly of next handshake message",
- offset ) );
-
- ssl_buffering_free_slot( ssl, (uint8_t) offset );
-
- /* Check if we have enough space available now. */
- if( desired <= ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING -
- hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Enough space available after freeing buffered HS messages" ) );
- return( 0 );
- }
- }
-
- return( -1 );
-}
-
-static int ssl_buffer_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- int ret = 0;
- mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake;
-
- if( hs == NULL )
- return( 0 );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_buffer_message" ) );
-
- switch( ssl->in_msgtype )
- {
- case MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Remember CCS message" ) );
-
- hs->buffering.seen_ccs = 1;
- break;
-
- case MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE:
- {
- unsigned recv_msg_seq_offset;
- unsigned recv_msg_seq = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[5];
- mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer *hs_buf;
- size_t msg_len = ssl->in_hslen - 12;
-
- /* We should never receive an old handshake
- * message - double-check nonetheless. */
- if( recv_msg_seq < ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
-
- recv_msg_seq_offset = recv_msg_seq - ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq;
- if( recv_msg_seq_offset >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS )
- {
- /* Silently ignore -- message too far in the future */
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2,
- ( "Ignore future HS message with sequence number %u, "
- "buffering window %u - %u",
- recv_msg_seq, ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq,
- ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS - 1 ) );
-
- goto exit;
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering HS message with sequence number %u, offset %u ",
- recv_msg_seq, recv_msg_seq_offset ) );
-
- hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[ recv_msg_seq_offset ];
-
- /* Check if the buffering for this seq nr has already commenced. */
- if( !hs_buf->is_valid )
- {
- size_t reassembly_buf_sz;
-
- hs_buf->is_fragmented =
- ( ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( ssl ) == 1 );
-
- /* We copy the message back into the input buffer
- * after reassembly, so check that it's not too large.
- * This is an implementation-specific limitation
- * and not one from the standard, hence it is not
- * checked in ssl_check_hs_header(). */
- if( msg_len + 12 > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN )
- {
- /* Ignore message */
- goto exit;
- }
-
- /* Check if we have enough space to buffer the message. */
- if( hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered >
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
-
- reassembly_buf_sz = ssl_get_reassembly_buffer_size( msg_len,
- hs_buf->is_fragmented );
-
- if( reassembly_buf_sz > ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING -
- hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) )
- {
- if( recv_msg_seq_offset > 0 )
- {
- /* If we can't buffer a future message because
- * of space limitations -- ignore. */
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future message of size %u would exceed the compile-time limit %u (already %u bytes buffered) -- ignore\n",
- (unsigned) msg_len, MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING,
- (unsigned) hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) );
- goto exit;
- }
- else
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future message of size %u would exceed the compile-time limit %u (already %u bytes buffered) -- attempt to make space by freeing buffered future messages\n",
- (unsigned) msg_len, MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING,
- (unsigned) hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) );
- }
-
- if( ssl_buffer_make_space( ssl, reassembly_buf_sz ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Reassembly of next message of size %u (%u with bitmap) would exceed the compile-time limit %u (already %u bytes buffered) -- fail\n",
- (unsigned) msg_len,
- (unsigned) reassembly_buf_sz,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING,
- (unsigned) hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) );
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
- goto exit;
- }
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "initialize reassembly, total length = %d",
- msg_len ) );
-
- hs_buf->data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, reassembly_buf_sz );
- if( hs_buf->data == NULL )
- {
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
- goto exit;
- }
- hs_buf->data_len = reassembly_buf_sz;
-
- /* Prepare final header: copy msg_type, length and message_seq,
- * then add standardised fragment_offset and fragment_length */
- memcpy( hs_buf->data, ssl->in_msg, 6 );
- memset( hs_buf->data + 6, 0, 3 );
- memcpy( hs_buf->data + 9, hs_buf->data + 1, 3 );
-
- hs_buf->is_valid = 1;
-
- hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered += reassembly_buf_sz;
- }
- else
- {
- /* Make sure msg_type and length are consistent */
- if( memcmp( hs_buf->data, ssl->in_msg, 4 ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Fragment header mismatch - ignore" ) );
- /* Ignore */
- goto exit;
- }
- }
-
- if( !hs_buf->is_complete )
- {
- size_t frag_len, frag_off;
- unsigned char * const msg = hs_buf->data + 12;
-
- /*
- * Check and copy current fragment
- */
-
- /* Validation of header fields already done in
- * mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(). */
- frag_off = ssl_get_hs_frag_off( ssl );
- frag_len = ssl_get_hs_frag_len( ssl );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "adding fragment, offset = %d, length = %d",
- frag_off, frag_len ) );
- memcpy( msg + frag_off, ssl->in_msg + 12, frag_len );
-
- if( hs_buf->is_fragmented )
- {
- unsigned char * const bitmask = msg + msg_len;
- ssl_bitmask_set( bitmask, frag_off, frag_len );
- hs_buf->is_complete = ( ssl_bitmask_check( bitmask,
- msg_len ) == 0 );
- }
- else
- {
- hs_buf->is_complete = 1;
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "message %scomplete",
- hs_buf->is_complete ? "" : "not yet " ) );
- }
-
- break;
- }
-
- default:
- /* We don't buffer other types of messages. */
- break;
- }
-
-exit:
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_buffer_message" ) );
- return( ret );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
-
-static int ssl_consume_current_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- /*
- * Consume last content-layer message and potentially
- * update in_msglen which keeps track of the contents'
- * consumption state.
- *
- * (1) Handshake messages:
- * Remove last handshake message, move content
- * and adapt in_msglen.
- *
- * (2) Alert messages:
- * Consume whole record content, in_msglen = 0.
- *
- * (3) Change cipher spec:
- * Consume whole record content, in_msglen = 0.
- *
- * (4) Application data:
- * Don't do anything - the record layer provides
- * the application data as a stream transport
- * and consumes through mbedtls_ssl_read only.
- *
- */
-
- /* Case (1): Handshake messages */
- if( ssl->in_hslen != 0 )
- {
- /* Hard assertion to be sure that no application data
- * is in flight, as corrupting ssl->in_msglen during
- * ssl->in_offt != NULL is fatal. */
- if( ssl->in_offt != NULL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
-
- /*
- * Get next Handshake message in the current record
- */
-
- /* Notes:
- * (1) in_hslen is not necessarily the size of the
- * current handshake content: If DTLS handshake
- * fragmentation is used, that's the fragment
- * size instead. Using the total handshake message
- * size here is faulty and should be changed at
- * some point.
- * (2) While it doesn't seem to cause problems, one
- * has to be very careful not to assume that in_hslen
- * is always <= in_msglen in a sensible communication.
- * Again, it's wrong for DTLS handshake fragmentation.
- * The following check is therefore mandatory, and
- * should not be treated as a silently corrected assertion.
- * Additionally, ssl->in_hslen might be arbitrarily out of
- * bounds after handling a DTLS message with an unexpected
- * sequence number, see mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record.
- */
- if( ssl->in_hslen < ssl->in_msglen )
- {
- ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->in_hslen;
- memmove( ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen,
- ssl->in_msglen );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "remaining content in record",
- ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen );
- }
- else
- {
- ssl->in_msglen = 0;
- }
-
- ssl->in_hslen = 0;
- }
- /* Case (4): Application data */
- else if( ssl->in_offt != NULL )
- {
- return( 0 );
- }
- /* Everything else (CCS & Alerts) */
- else
- {
- ssl->in_msglen = 0;
- }
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-static int ssl_record_is_in_progress( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- if( ssl->in_msglen > 0 )
- return( 1 );
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
-
-static void ssl_free_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake;
- if( hs == NULL )
- return;
-
- if( hs->buffering.future_record.data != NULL )
- {
- hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered -=
- hs->buffering.future_record.len;
-
- mbedtls_free( hs->buffering.future_record.data );
- hs->buffering.future_record.data = NULL;
- }
-}
-
-static int ssl_load_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake;
- unsigned char * rec;
- size_t rec_len;
- unsigned rec_epoch;
-
- if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- return( 0 );
-
- if( hs == NULL )
- return( 0 );
-
- rec = hs->buffering.future_record.data;
- rec_len = hs->buffering.future_record.len;
- rec_epoch = hs->buffering.future_record.epoch;
-
- if( rec == NULL )
- return( 0 );
-
- /* Only consider loading future records if the
- * input buffer is empty. */
- if( ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( ssl ) == 1 )
- return( 0 );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_load_buffered_record" ) );
-
- if( rec_epoch != ssl->in_epoch )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffered record not from current epoch." ) );
- goto exit;
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Found buffered record from current epoch - load" ) );
-
- /* Double-check that the record is not too large */
- if( rec_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN -
- (size_t)( ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf ) )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
-
- memcpy( ssl->in_hdr, rec, rec_len );
- ssl->in_left = rec_len;
- ssl->next_record_offset = 0;
-
- ssl_free_buffered_record( ssl );
-
-exit:
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_load_buffered_record" ) );
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-static int ssl_buffer_future_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake;
- size_t const rec_hdr_len = 13;
- size_t const total_buf_sz = rec_hdr_len + ssl->in_msglen;
-
- /* Don't buffer future records outside handshakes. */
- if( hs == NULL )
- return( 0 );
-
- /* Only buffer handshake records (we are only interested
- * in Finished messages). */
- if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
- return( 0 );
-
- /* Don't buffer more than one future epoch record. */
- if( hs->buffering.future_record.data != NULL )
- return( 0 );
-
- /* Don't buffer record if there's not enough buffering space remaining. */
- if( total_buf_sz > ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING -
- hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future epoch record of size %u would exceed the compile-time limit %u (already %u bytes buffered) -- ignore\n",
- (unsigned) total_buf_sz, MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING,
- (unsigned) hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) );
- return( 0 );
- }
-
- /* Buffer record */
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffer record from epoch %u",
- ssl->in_epoch + 1 ) );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Buffered record", ssl->in_hdr,
- rec_hdr_len + ssl->in_msglen );
-
- /* ssl_parse_record_header() only considers records
- * of the next epoch as candidates for buffering. */
- hs->buffering.future_record.epoch = ssl->in_epoch + 1;
- hs->buffering.future_record.len = total_buf_sz;
-
- hs->buffering.future_record.data =
- mbedtls_calloc( 1, hs->buffering.future_record.len );
- if( hs->buffering.future_record.data == NULL )
- {
- /* If we run out of RAM trying to buffer a
- * record from the next epoch, just ignore. */
- return( 0 );
- }
-
- memcpy( hs->buffering.future_record.data, ssl->in_hdr, total_buf_sz );
-
- hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered += total_buf_sz;
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
-
-static int ssl_get_next_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- int ret;
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- /* We might have buffered a future record; if so,
- * and if the epoch matches now, load it.
- * On success, this call will set ssl->in_left to
- * the length of the buffered record, so that
- * the calls to ssl_fetch_input() below will
- * essentially be no-ops. */
- ret = ssl_load_buffered_record( ssl );
- if( ret != 0 )
- return( ret );
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
-
- if( ( ret = ssl_parse_record_header( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
- ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT )
- {
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE )
- {
- ret = ssl_buffer_future_record( ssl );
- if( ret != 0 )
- return( ret );
-
- /* Fall through to handling of unexpected records */
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD;
- }
-
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD )
- {
- /* Skip unexpected record (but not whole datagram) */
- ssl->next_record_offset = ssl->in_msglen
- + mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "discarding unexpected record "
- "(header)" ) );
- }
- else
- {
- /* Skip invalid record and the rest of the datagram */
- ssl->next_record_offset = 0;
- ssl->in_left = 0;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "discarding invalid record "
- "(header)" ) );
- }
-
- /* Get next record */
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING );
- }
-#endif
- return( ret );
- }
-
- /*
- * Read and optionally decrypt the message contents
- */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl,
- mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) + ssl->in_msglen ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
-
- /* Done reading this record, get ready for the next one */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
- ssl->next_record_offset = ssl->in_msglen + mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl );
- if( ssl->next_record_offset < ssl->in_left )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "more than one record within datagram" ) );
- }
- }
- else
-#endif
- ssl->in_left = 0;
-
- if( ( ret = ssl_prepare_record_content( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
- /* Silently discard invalid records */
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ||
- ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC )
- {
- /* Except when waiting for Finished as a bad mac here
- * probably means something went wrong in the handshake
- * (eg wrong psk used, mitm downgrade attempt, etc.) */
- if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED ||
- ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES)
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC )
- {
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC );
- }
-#endif
- return( ret );
- }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT)
- if( ssl->conf->badmac_limit != 0 &&
- ++ssl->badmac_seen >= ssl->conf->badmac_limit )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "too many records with bad MAC" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
- }
-#endif
-
- /* As above, invalid records cause
- * dismissal of the whole datagram. */
-
- ssl->next_record_offset = 0;
- ssl->in_left = 0;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "discarding invalid record (mac)" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING );
- }
-
- return( ret );
- }
- else
-#endif
- {
- /* Error out (and send alert) on invalid records */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES)
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC )
- {
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC );
- }
-#endif
- return( ret );
- }
- }
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- int ret;
-
- /*
- * Handle particular types of records
- */
- if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
- {
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- {
- return( ret );
- }
- }
-
- if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC )
- {
- if( ssl->in_msglen != 1 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid CCS message, len: %d",
- ssl->in_msglen ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
- }
-
- if( ssl->in_msg[0] != 1 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid CCS message, content: %02x",
- ssl->in_msg[0] ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
- }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
- ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC &&
- ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC )
- {
- if( ssl->handshake == NULL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "dropping ChangeCipherSpec outside handshake" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD );
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received out-of-order ChangeCipherSpec - remember" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE );
- }
-#endif
- }
-
- if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT )
- {
- if( ssl->in_msglen != 2 )
- {
- /* Note: Standard allows for more than one 2 byte alert
- to be packed in a single message, but Mbed TLS doesn't
- currently support this. */
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid alert message, len: %d",
- ssl->in_msglen ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "got an alert message, type: [%d:%d]",
- ssl->in_msg[0], ssl->in_msg[1] ) );
-
- /*
- * Ignore non-fatal alerts, except close_notify and no_renegotiation
- */
- if( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "is a fatal alert message (msg %d)",
- ssl->in_msg[1] ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE );
- }
-
- if( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING &&
- ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "is a close notify message" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY );
- }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED)
- if( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING &&
- ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "is a SSLv3 no renegotiation alert" ) );
- /* Will be handled when trying to parse ServerHello */
- return( 0 );
- }
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
- if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 &&
- ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
- ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING &&
- ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "is a SSLv3 no_cert" ) );
- /* Will be handled in mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate() */
- return( 0 );
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
-
- /* Silently ignore: fetch new message */
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL;
- }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
- ssl->handshake != NULL &&
- ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
- {
- ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( ssl );
- }
-#endif
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- int ret;
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ) ) != 0 )
- {
- return( ret );
- }
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-int mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- unsigned char level,
- unsigned char message )
-{
- int ret;
-
- if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> send alert message" ) );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "send alert level=%u message=%u", level, message ));
-
- ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT;
- ssl->out_msglen = 2;
- ssl->out_msg[0] = level;
- ssl->out_msg[1] = message;
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= send alert message" ) );
-
- return( 0 );
-}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
/*
* Handshake functions
*/
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) && \
- !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) && \
- !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \
- !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \
- !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) && \
- !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) && \
- !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
/* No certificate support -> dummy functions */
int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info;
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+ ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate" ) );
- if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
- ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
- ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ||
- ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
+ if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate" ) );
ssl->state++;
@@ -5298,14 +2048,12 @@
int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info;
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+ ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate" ) );
- if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
- ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
- ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ||
- ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
+ if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) );
ssl->state++;
@@ -5316,7 +2064,7 @@
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
-#else
+#else /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
/* Some certificate support -> implement write and parse */
int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
@@ -5324,14 +2072,12 @@
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
size_t i, n;
const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt;
- const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info;
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+ ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate" ) );
- if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
- ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
- ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ||
- ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
+ if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate" ) );
ssl->state++;
@@ -5435,63 +2181,68 @@
return( ret );
}
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *crt_buf,
+ size_t crt_buf_len )
+{
+ mbedtls_x509_crt const * const peer_crt = ssl->session->peer_cert;
+
+ if( peer_crt == NULL )
+ return( -1 );
+
+ if( peer_crt->raw.len != crt_buf_len )
+ return( -1 );
+
+ return( memcmp( peer_crt->raw.p, crt_buf, peer_crt->raw.len ) );
+}
+#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *crt_buf,
+ size_t crt_buf_len )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char const * const peer_cert_digest =
+ ssl->session->peer_cert_digest;
+ mbedtls_md_type_t const peer_cert_digest_type =
+ ssl->session->peer_cert_digest_type;
+ mbedtls_md_info_t const * const digest_info =
+ mbedtls_md_info_from_type( peer_cert_digest_type );
+ unsigned char tmp_digest[MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN];
+ size_t digest_len;
+
+ if( peer_cert_digest == NULL || digest_info == NULL )
+ return( -1 );
+
+ digest_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( digest_info );
+ if( digest_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN )
+ return( -1 );
+
+ ret = mbedtls_md( digest_info, crt_buf, crt_buf_len, tmp_digest );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return( -1 );
+
+ return( memcmp( tmp_digest, peer_cert_digest, digest_len ) );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
+
/*
* Once the certificate message is read, parse it into a cert chain and
* perform basic checks, but leave actual verification to the caller
*/
-static int ssl_parse_certificate_chain( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+static int ssl_parse_certificate_chain( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *chain )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+ int crt_cnt=0;
+#endif
size_t i, n;
uint8_t alert;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
- /*
- * Check if the client sent an empty certificate
- */
- if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
- ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
- {
- if( ssl->in_msglen == 2 &&
- ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT &&
- ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING &&
- ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "SSLv3 client has no certificate" ) );
-
- /* The client was asked for a certificate but didn't send
- one. The client should know what's going on, so we
- don't send an alert. */
- ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING;
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE );
- }
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
- if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
- ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
- {
- if( ssl->in_hslen == 3 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) &&
- ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
- ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE &&
- memcmp( ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ), "\0\0\0", 3 ) == 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "TLSv1 client has no certificate" ) );
-
- /* The client was asked for a certificate but didn't send
- one. The client should know what's going on, so we
- don't send an alert. */
- ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING;
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE );
- }
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
- MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
-
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) );
@@ -5525,43 +2276,32 @@
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE );
}
- /* In case we tried to reuse a session but it failed */
- if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert != NULL )
- {
- mbedtls_x509_crt_free( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
- mbedtls_free( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
- }
-
- if( ( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1,
- sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ) ) == NULL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed",
- sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ) );
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
- }
-
- mbedtls_x509_crt_init( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
-
+ /* Make &ssl->in_msg[i] point to the beginning of the CRT chain. */
i += 3;
+ /* Iterate through and parse the CRTs in the provided chain. */
while( i < ssl->in_hslen )
{
+ /* Check that there's room for the next CRT's length fields. */
if ( i + 3 > ssl->in_hslen ) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) );
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE );
}
+ /* In theory, the CRT can be up to 2**24 Bytes, but we don't support
+ * anything beyond 2**16 ~ 64K. */
if( ssl->in_msg[i] != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) );
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE );
}
+ /* Read length of the next CRT in the chain. */
n = ( (unsigned int) ssl->in_msg[i + 1] << 8 )
| (unsigned int) ssl->in_msg[i + 2];
i += 3;
@@ -5569,161 +2309,207 @@
if( n < 128 || i + n > ssl->in_hslen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) );
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE );
}
- ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
- ssl->in_msg + i, n );
+ /* Check if we're handling the first CRT in the chain. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+ if( crt_cnt++ == 0 &&
+ ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT &&
+ ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS )
+ {
+ /* During client-side renegotiation, check that the server's
+ * end-CRTs hasn't changed compared to the initial handshake,
+ * mitigating the triple handshake attack. On success, reuse
+ * the original end-CRT instead of parsing it again. */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Check that peer CRT hasn't changed during renegotiation" ) );
+ if( ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( ssl,
+ &ssl->in_msg[i],
+ n ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "new server cert during renegotiation" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE );
+ }
+
+ /* Now we can safely free the original chain. */
+ ssl_clear_peer_cert( ssl->session );
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
+
+ /* Parse the next certificate in the chain. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+ ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( chain, ssl->in_msg + i, n );
+#else
+ /* If we don't need to store the CRT chain permanently, parse
+ * it in-place from the input buffer instead of making a copy. */
+ ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy( chain, ssl->in_msg + i, n );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
switch( ret )
{
- case 0: /*ok*/
- case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND:
- /* Ignore certificate with an unknown algorithm: maybe a
- prior certificate was already trusted. */
- break;
+ case 0: /*ok*/
+ case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND:
+ /* Ignore certificate with an unknown algorithm: maybe a
+ prior certificate was already trusted. */
+ break;
- case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED:
- alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto crt_parse_der_failed;
+ case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED:
+ alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto crt_parse_der_failed;
- case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION:
- alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
- goto crt_parse_der_failed;
+ case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION:
+ alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
+ goto crt_parse_der_failed;
- default:
- alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT;
- crt_parse_der_failed:
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, alert );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, " mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der", ret );
- return( ret );
+ default:
+ alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT;
+ crt_parse_der_failed:
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, alert );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, " mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der", ret );
+ return( ret );
}
i += n;
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "peer certificate", ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
-
- /*
- * On client, make sure the server cert doesn't change during renego to
- * avoid "triple handshake" attack: https://secure-resumption.com/
- */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
- if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT &&
- ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS )
- {
- if( ssl->session->peer_cert == NULL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "new server cert during renegotiation" ) );
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE );
- }
-
- if( ssl->session->peer_cert->raw.len !=
- ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->raw.len ||
- memcmp( ssl->session->peer_cert->raw.p,
- ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->raw.p,
- ssl->session->peer_cert->raw.len ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server cert changed during renegotiation" ) );
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE );
- }
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
-
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "peer certificate", chain );
return( 0 );
}
-int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+static int ssl_srv_check_client_no_crt_notification( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
- const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * const ciphersuite_info =
- ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
- const int authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET
- ? ssl->handshake->sni_authmode
- : ssl->conf->authmode;
-#else
- const int authmode = ssl->conf->authmode;
-#endif
- void *rs_ctx = NULL;
+ if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT )
+ return( -1 );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate" ) );
-
- if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
- ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
- ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ||
- ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
+ /*
+ * Check if the client sent an empty certificate
+ */
+ if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) );
- ssl->state++;
- return( 0 );
- }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
- if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
- ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) );
- ssl->state++;
- return( 0 );
- }
-
- if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
- authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE )
- {
- ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) );
-
- ssl->state++;
- return( 0 );
- }
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
- if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled &&
- ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_crt_verify )
- {
- goto crt_verify;
- }
-#endif
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
- {
- /* mbedtls_ssl_read_record may have sent an alert already. We
- let it decide whether to alert. */
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
-
- if( ( ret = ssl_parse_certificate_chain( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE &&
- authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL )
+ if( ssl->in_msglen == 2 &&
+ ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT &&
+ ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING &&
+ ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT )
{
- ret = 0;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "SSLv3 client has no certificate" ) );
+ return( 0 );
}
-#endif
- ssl->state++;
- return( ret );
+ return( -1 );
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+ if( ssl->in_hslen == 3 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) &&
+ ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
+ ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE &&
+ memcmp( ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ), "\0\0\0", 3 ) == 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "TLSv1 client has no certificate" ) );
+ return( 0 );
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
- if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled)
- ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_crt_verify;
+ return( -1 );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
-crt_verify:
- if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled)
- rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx;
-#endif
+/* Check if a certificate message is expected.
+ * Return either
+ * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED, or
+ * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP
+ * indicating whether a Certificate message is expected or not.
+ */
+#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED 0
+#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP 1
+static int ssl_parse_certificate_coordinate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ int authmode )
+{
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+ ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
- if( authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE )
+ if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert( ciphersuite_info ) )
+ return( SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+ if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER )
+ {
+ if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
+ return( SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP );
+
+ if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE )
+ {
+ ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result =
+ MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY;
+ return( SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP );
+ }
+ }
+#else
+ ((void) authmode);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+
+ return( SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED );
+}
+
+static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ int authmode,
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
+ void *rs_ctx )
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+ ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
+ int have_ca_chain = 0;
+
+ int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *);
+ void *p_vrfy;
+
+ if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE )
+ return( 0 );
+
+ if( ssl->f_vrfy != NULL )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Use context-specific verification callback" ) );
+ f_vrfy = ssl->f_vrfy;
+ p_vrfy = ssl->p_vrfy;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Use configuration-specific verification callback" ) );
+ f_vrfy = ssl->conf->f_vrfy;
+ p_vrfy = ssl->conf->p_vrfy;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Main check: verify certificate
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
+ if( ssl->conf->f_ca_cb != NULL )
+ {
+ ((void) rs_ctx);
+ have_ca_chain = 1;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" ) );
+ ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb(
+ chain,
+ ssl->conf->f_ca_cb,
+ ssl->conf->p_ca_cb,
+ ssl->conf->cert_profile,
+ ssl->hostname,
+ &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result,
+ f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
{
mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain;
mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl;
@@ -5741,232 +2527,329 @@
ca_crl = ssl->conf->ca_crl;
}
- /*
- * Main check: verify certificate
- */
+ if( ca_chain != NULL )
+ have_ca_chain = 1;
+
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable(
- ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
- ca_chain, ca_crl,
- ssl->conf->cert_profile,
- ssl->hostname,
- &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result,
- ssl->conf->f_vrfy, ssl->conf->p_vrfy, rs_ctx );
+ chain,
+ ca_chain, ca_crl,
+ ssl->conf->cert_profile,
+ ssl->hostname,
+ &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result,
+ f_vrfy, p_vrfy, rs_ctx );
+ }
- if( ret != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "x509_verify_cert", ret );
- }
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "x509_verify_cert", ret );
+ }
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+ if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS );
#endif
- /*
- * Secondary checks: always done, but change 'ret' only if it was 0
- */
+ /*
+ * Secondary checks: always done, but change 'ret' only if it was 0
+ */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+ {
+ const mbedtls_pk_context *pk = &chain->pk;
+
+ /* If certificate uses an EC key, make sure the curve is OK */
+ if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) &&
+ mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( ssl, mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp.id ) != 0 )
{
- const mbedtls_pk_context *pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk;
+ ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
- /* If certificate uses an EC key, make sure the curve is OK */
- if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) &&
- mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( ssl, mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp.id ) != 0 )
- {
- ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate (EC key curve)" ) );
- if( ret == 0 )
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE;
- }
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
-
- if( mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
- ciphersuite_info,
- ! ssl->conf->endpoint,
- &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate (usage extensions)" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate (EC key curve)" ) );
if( ret == 0 )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE;
}
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
- /* mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile is supposed to report a
- * verification failure through MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED,
- * with details encoded in the verification flags. All other kinds
- * of error codes, including those from the user provided f_vrfy
- * functions, are treated as fatal and lead to a failure of
- * ssl_parse_certificate even if verification was optional. */
- if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL &&
- ( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED ||
- ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ) )
- {
- ret = 0;
- }
-
- if( ca_chain == NULL && authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no CA chain" ) );
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED;
- }
-
- if( ret != 0 )
- {
- uint8_t alert;
-
- /* The certificate may have been rejected for several reasons.
- Pick one and send the corresponding alert. Which alert to send
- may be a subject of debate in some cases. */
- if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER )
- alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED;
- else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH )
- alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT;
- else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE )
- alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
- else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE )
- alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
- else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE )
- alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
- else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK )
- alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
- else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY )
- alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
- else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED )
- alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED;
- else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED )
- alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED;
- else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED )
- alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA;
- else
- alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN;
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- alert );
- }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
- if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "! Certificate verification flags %x",
- ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ) );
- }
- else
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Certificate verification flags clear" ) );
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
+ if( mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( chain,
+ ciphersuite_info,
+ ! ssl->conf->endpoint,
+ &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate (usage extensions)" ) );
+ if( ret == 0 )
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE;
}
- ssl->state++;
+ /* mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile is supposed to report a
+ * verification failure through MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED,
+ * with details encoded in the verification flags. All other kinds
+ * of error codes, including those from the user provided f_vrfy
+ * functions, are treated as fatal and lead to a failure of
+ * ssl_parse_certificate even if verification was optional. */
+ if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL &&
+ ( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED ||
+ ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ) )
+ {
+ ret = 0;
+ }
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate" ) );
+ if( have_ca_chain == 0 && authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no CA chain" ) );
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED;
+ }
+
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ uint8_t alert;
+
+ /* The certificate may have been rejected for several reasons.
+ Pick one and send the corresponding alert. Which alert to send
+ may be a subject of debate in some cases. */
+ if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER )
+ alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH )
+ alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT;
+ else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE )
+ alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
+ else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE )
+ alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
+ else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE )
+ alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
+ else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK )
+ alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
+ else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY )
+ alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
+ else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED )
+ alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED;
+ else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED )
+ alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED;
+ else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED )
+ alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA;
+ else
+ alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN;
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ alert );
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
+ if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "! Certificate verification flags %x",
+ ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ) );
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Certificate verification flags clear" ) );
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
return( ret );
}
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED
- !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED
- !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED
- !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED
- !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED
- !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED
- !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
-int mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+static int ssl_remember_peer_crt_digest( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *start, size_t len )
{
- int ret;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write change cipher spec" ) );
-
- ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
- ssl->out_msglen = 1;
- ssl->out_msg[0] = 1;
-
- ssl->state++;
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 )
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ /* Remember digest of the peer's end-CRT. */
+ ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest =
+ mbedtls_calloc( 1, MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN );
+ if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest == NULL )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret );
- return( ret );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write change cipher spec" ) );
+ ret = mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type(
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE ),
+ start, len,
+ ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest );
+
+ ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest_type =
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE;
+ ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest_len =
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN;
+
+ return( ret );
+}
+
+static int ssl_remember_peer_pubkey( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *start, size_t len )
+{
+ unsigned char *end = start + len;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ /* Make a copy of the peer's raw public key. */
+ mbedtls_pk_init( &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey );
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( &start, end,
+ &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ /* We should have parsed the public key before. */
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ }
return( 0 );
}
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
-int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = 0;
+ int crt_expected;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+ const int authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET
+ ? ssl->handshake->sni_authmode
+ : ssl->conf->authmode;
+#else
+ const int authmode = ssl->conf->authmode;
+#endif
+ void *rs_ctx = NULL;
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *chain = NULL;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse change cipher spec" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate" ) );
+
+ crt_expected = ssl_parse_certificate_coordinate( ssl, authmode );
+ if( crt_expected == SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) );
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+ if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled &&
+ ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_crt_verify )
+ {
+ chain = ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert;
+ ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert = NULL;
+ goto crt_verify;
+ }
+#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
{
+ /* mbedtls_ssl_read_record may have sent an alert already. We
+ let it decide whether to alert. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
- return( ret );
+ goto exit;
}
- if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC )
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+ if( ssl_srv_check_client_no_crt_notification( ssl ) == 0 )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad change cipher spec message" ) );
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
+ ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING;
+
+ if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL )
+ ret = 0;
+ else
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE;
+
+ goto exit;
}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
- /* CCS records are only accepted if they have length 1 and content '1',
- * so we don't need to check this here. */
+ /* Clear existing peer CRT structure in case we tried to
+ * reuse a session but it failed, and allocate a new one. */
+ ssl_clear_peer_cert( ssl->session_negotiate );
- /*
- * Switch to our negotiated transform and session parameters for inbound
- * data.
- */
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "switching to new transform spec for inbound data" ) );
- ssl->transform_in = ssl->transform_negotiate;
- ssl->session_in = ssl->session_negotiate;
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
+ chain = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) );
+ if( chain == NULL )
{
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
- ssl_dtls_replay_reset( ssl );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed",
+ sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_init( chain );
+
+ ret = ssl_parse_certificate_chain( ssl, chain );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto exit;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+ if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled)
+ ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_crt_verify;
+
+crt_verify:
+ if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled)
+ rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx;
#endif
- /* Increment epoch */
- if( ++ssl->in_epoch == 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DTLS epoch would wrap" ) );
- /* This is highly unlikely to happen for legitimate reasons, so
- treat it as an attack and don't send an alert. */
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING );
- }
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
- memset( ssl->in_ctr, 0, 8 );
+ ret = ssl_parse_certificate_verify( ssl, authmode,
+ chain, rs_ctx );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto exit;
- ssl_update_in_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_negotiate );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL)
- if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate != NULL )
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
{
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_INBOUND ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate", ret );
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
- }
+ unsigned char *crt_start, *pk_start;
+ size_t crt_len, pk_len;
+
+ /* We parse the CRT chain without copying, so
+ * these pointers point into the input buffer,
+ * and are hence still valid after freeing the
+ * CRT chain. */
+
+ crt_start = chain->raw.p;
+ crt_len = chain->raw.len;
+
+ pk_start = chain->pk_raw.p;
+ pk_len = chain->pk_raw.len;
+
+ /* Free the CRT structures before computing
+ * digest and copying the peer's public key. */
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( chain );
+ mbedtls_free( chain );
+ chain = NULL;
+
+ ret = ssl_remember_peer_crt_digest( ssl, crt_start, crt_len );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto exit;
+
+ ret = ssl_remember_peer_pubkey( ssl, pk_start, pk_len );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto exit;
+ }
+#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+ /* Pass ownership to session structure. */
+ ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert = chain;
+ chain = NULL;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate" ) );
+
+exit:
+
+ if( ret == 0 )
+ ssl->state++;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+ if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS )
+ {
+ ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert = chain;
+ chain = NULL;
}
#endif
- ssl->state++;
+ if( chain != NULL )
+ {
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( chain );
+ mbedtls_free( chain );
+ }
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse change cipher spec" ) );
-
- return( 0 );
+ return( ret );
}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
void mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info )
@@ -6006,11 +2889,21 @@
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ psa_hash_abort( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa );
+ psa_hash_setup( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_256 );
+#else
mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, 0 );
#endif
+#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ psa_hash_abort( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa );
+ psa_hash_setup( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_384 );
+#else
mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512, 1 );
#endif
+#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
}
@@ -6024,11 +2917,19 @@
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ psa_hash_update( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, buf, len );
+#else
mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, buf, len );
#endif
+#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ psa_hash_update( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, buf, len );
+#else
mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512, buf, len );
#endif
+#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
}
@@ -6047,7 +2948,11 @@
static void ssl_update_checksum_sha256( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ psa_hash_update( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, buf, len );
+#else
mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, buf, len );
+#endif
}
#endif
@@ -6055,7 +2960,11 @@
static void ssl_update_checksum_sha384( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ psa_hash_update( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, buf, len );
+#else
mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512, buf, len );
+#endif
}
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
@@ -6211,13 +3120,44 @@
{
int len = 12;
const char *sender;
- mbedtls_sha256_context sha256;
unsigned char padbuf[32];
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ size_t hash_size;
+ psa_hash_operation_t sha256_psa = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
+ psa_status_t status;
+#else
+ mbedtls_sha256_context sha256;
+#endif
mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate;
if( !session )
session = ssl->session;
+ sender = ( from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT )
+ ? "client finished"
+ : "server finished";
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ sha256_psa = psa_hash_operation_init();
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc PSA finished tls sha256" ) );
+
+ status = psa_hash_clone( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, &sha256_psa );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash clone failed" ) );
+ return;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_finish( &sha256_psa, padbuf, sizeof( padbuf ), &hash_size );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash finish failed" ) );
+ return;
+ }
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "PSA calculated padbuf", padbuf, 32 );
+#else
+
mbedtls_sha256_init( &sha256 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc finished tls sha256" ) );
@@ -6235,19 +3175,15 @@
sha256.state, sizeof( sha256.state ) );
#endif
- sender = ( from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT )
- ? "client finished"
- : "server finished";
-
mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( &sha256, padbuf );
+ mbedtls_sha256_free( &sha256 );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
ssl->handshake->tls_prf( session->master, 48, sender,
padbuf, 32, buf, len );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calc finished result", buf, len );
- mbedtls_sha256_free( &sha256 );
-
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( padbuf, sizeof( padbuf ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc finished" ) );
@@ -6260,13 +3196,43 @@
{
int len = 12;
const char *sender;
- mbedtls_sha512_context sha512;
unsigned char padbuf[48];
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ size_t hash_size;
+ psa_hash_operation_t sha384_psa = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
+ psa_status_t status;
+#else
+ mbedtls_sha512_context sha512;
+#endif
mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate;
if( !session )
session = ssl->session;
+ sender = ( from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT )
+ ? "client finished"
+ : "server finished";
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ sha384_psa = psa_hash_operation_init();
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc PSA finished tls sha384" ) );
+
+ status = psa_hash_clone( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, &sha384_psa );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash clone failed" ) );
+ return;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_finish( &sha384_psa, padbuf, sizeof( padbuf ), &hash_size );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash finish failed" ) );
+ return;
+ }
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "PSA calculated padbuf", padbuf, 48 );
+#else
mbedtls_sha512_init( &sha512 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc finished tls sha384" ) );
@@ -6284,19 +3250,15 @@
sha512.state, sizeof( sha512.state ) );
#endif
- sender = ( from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT )
- ? "client finished"
- : "server finished";
-
mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( &sha512, padbuf );
+ mbedtls_sha512_free( &sha512 );
+#endif
ssl->handshake->tls_prf( session->master, 48, sender,
padbuf, 48, buf, len );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calc finished result", buf, len );
- mbedtls_sha512_free( &sha512 );
-
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( padbuf, sizeof( padbuf ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc finished" ) );
@@ -6304,7 +3266,7 @@
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
-static void ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "=> handshake wrapup: final free" ) );
@@ -6376,7 +3338,7 @@
ssl->handshake->flight != NULL )
{
/* Cancel handshake timer */
- ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 );
+ mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 );
/* Keep last flight around in case we need to resend it:
* we need the handshake and transform structures for that */
@@ -6384,7 +3346,7 @@
}
else
#endif
- ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( ssl );
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( ssl );
ssl->state++;
@@ -6397,7 +3359,7 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write finished" ) );
- ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_negotiate );
+ mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_negotiate );
ssl->handshake->calc_finished( ssl, ssl->out_msg + 4, ssl->conf->endpoint );
@@ -6517,7 +3479,7 @@
int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned int hash_len;
unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_HASH_LEN];
@@ -6607,19 +3569,29 @@
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ handshake->fin_sha256_psa = psa_hash_operation_init();
+ psa_hash_setup( &handshake->fin_sha256_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_256 );
+#else
mbedtls_sha256_init( &handshake->fin_sha256 );
mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( &handshake->fin_sha256, 0 );
#endif
+#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ handshake->fin_sha384_psa = psa_hash_operation_init();
+ psa_hash_setup( &handshake->fin_sha384_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_384 );
+#else
mbedtls_sha512_init( &handshake->fin_sha512 );
mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( &handshake->fin_sha512, 1 );
#endif
+#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_start;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
- defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED)
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_init( &handshake->hash_algs );
#endif
@@ -6637,24 +3609,31 @@
#endif
#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init( &handshake->ecrs_ctx );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
handshake->sni_authmode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET;
#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+ mbedtls_pk_init( &handshake->peer_pubkey );
+#endif
}
-static void ssl_transform_init( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform )
+void mbedtls_ssl_transform_init( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform )
{
memset( transform, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform) );
mbedtls_cipher_init( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc );
mbedtls_cipher_init( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
mbedtls_md_init( &transform->md_ctx_enc );
mbedtls_md_init( &transform->md_ctx_dec );
+#endif
}
void mbedtls_ssl_session_init( mbedtls_ssl_session *session )
@@ -6690,6 +3669,58 @@
{
ssl->handshake = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params) );
}
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
+ /* If the buffers are too small - reallocate */
+ {
+ int modified = 0;
+ size_t written_in = 0;
+ size_t written_out = 0;
+ if( ssl->in_buf != NULL )
+ {
+ written_in = ssl->in_msg - ssl->in_buf;
+ if( ssl->in_buf_len < MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN )
+ {
+ if( resize_buffer( &ssl->in_buf, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN,
+ &ssl->in_buf_len ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "input buffer resizing failed - out of memory" ) );
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Reallocating in_buf to %d", MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN ) );
+ modified = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if( ssl->out_buf != NULL )
+ {
+ written_out = ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf;
+ if( ssl->out_buf_len < MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN )
+ {
+ if( resize_buffer( &ssl->out_buf, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN,
+ &ssl->out_buf_len ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "output buffer resizing failed - out of memory" ) );
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Reallocating out_buf to %d", MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ) );
+ modified = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if( modified )
+ {
+ /* Update pointers here to avoid doing it twice. */
+ mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( ssl );
+ /* Fields below might not be properly updated with record
+ * splitting, so they are manually updated here. */
+ ssl->out_msg = ssl->out_buf + written_out;
+ ssl->in_msg = ssl->in_buf + written_in;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
/* All pointers should exist and can be directly freed without issue */
if( ssl->handshake == NULL ||
@@ -6711,7 +3742,7 @@
/* Initialize structures */
mbedtls_ssl_session_init( ssl->session_negotiate );
- ssl_transform_init( ssl->transform_negotiate );
+ mbedtls_ssl_transform_init( ssl->transform_negotiate );
ssl_handshake_params_init( ssl->handshake );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
@@ -6724,7 +3755,7 @@
else
ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING;
- ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 );
+ mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 );
}
#endif
@@ -6760,78 +3791,6 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
-/* Once ssl->out_hdr as the address of the beginning of the
- * next outgoing record is set, deduce the other pointers.
- *
- * Note: For TLS, we save the implicit record sequence number
- * (entering MAC computation) in the 8 bytes before ssl->out_hdr,
- * and the caller has to make sure there's space for this.
- */
-
-static void ssl_update_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform )
-{
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
- ssl->out_ctr = ssl->out_hdr + 3;
- ssl->out_len = ssl->out_hdr + 11;
- ssl->out_iv = ssl->out_hdr + 13;
- }
- else
-#endif
- {
- ssl->out_ctr = ssl->out_hdr - 8;
- ssl->out_len = ssl->out_hdr + 3;
- ssl->out_iv = ssl->out_hdr + 5;
- }
-
- /* Adjust out_msg to make space for explicit IV, if used. */
- if( transform != NULL &&
- ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
- {
- ssl->out_msg = ssl->out_iv + transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen;
- }
- else
- ssl->out_msg = ssl->out_iv;
-}
-
-/* Once ssl->in_hdr as the address of the beginning of the
- * next incoming record is set, deduce the other pointers.
- *
- * Note: For TLS, we save the implicit record sequence number
- * (entering MAC computation) in the 8 bytes before ssl->in_hdr,
- * and the caller has to make sure there's space for this.
- */
-
-static void ssl_update_in_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform )
-{
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
- ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr + 3;
- ssl->in_len = ssl->in_hdr + 11;
- ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_hdr + 13;
- }
- else
-#endif
- {
- ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr - 8;
- ssl->in_len = ssl->in_hdr + 3;
- ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_hdr + 5;
- }
-
- /* Offset in_msg from in_iv to allow space for explicit IV, if used. */
- if( transform != NULL &&
- ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
- {
- ssl->in_msg = ssl->in_iv + transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen;
- }
- else
- ssl->in_msg = ssl->in_iv;
-}
-
/*
* Initialize an SSL context
*/
@@ -6844,31 +3803,12 @@
* Setup an SSL context
*/
-static void ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- /* Set the incoming and outgoing record pointers. */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
- ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf;
- ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf;
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
- {
- ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf + 8;
- ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf + 8;
- }
-
- /* Derive other internal pointers. */
- ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, NULL /* no transform enabled */ );
- ssl_update_in_pointers ( ssl, NULL /* no transform enabled */ );
-}
-
int mbedtls_ssl_setup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN;
+ size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN;
ssl->conf = conf;
@@ -6879,23 +3819,29 @@
/* Set to NULL in case of an error condition */
ssl->out_buf = NULL;
- ssl->in_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
+ ssl->in_buf_len = in_buf_len;
+#endif
+ ssl->in_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, in_buf_len );
if( ssl->in_buf == NULL )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed", MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed", in_buf_len ) );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
goto error;
}
- ssl->out_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
+ ssl->out_buf_len = out_buf_len;
+#endif
+ ssl->out_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, out_buf_len );
if( ssl->out_buf == NULL )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed", MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed", out_buf_len ) );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
goto error;
}
- ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( ssl );
+ mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( ssl );
if( ( ret = ssl_handshake_init( ssl ) ) != 0 )
goto error;
@@ -6908,6 +3854,10 @@
ssl->conf = NULL;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
+ ssl->in_buf_len = 0;
+ ssl->out_buf_len = 0;
+#endif
ssl->in_buf = NULL;
ssl->out_buf = NULL;
@@ -6933,9 +3883,16 @@
* If partial is non-zero, keep data in the input buffer and client ID.
* (Use when a DTLS client reconnects from the same port.)
*/
-static int ssl_session_reset_int( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial )
+int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
+ size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len;
+ size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len;
+#else
+ size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN;
+ size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN;
+#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
@@ -6945,7 +3902,7 @@
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST;
/* Cancel any possibly running timer */
- ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 );
+ mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE;
@@ -6958,7 +3915,7 @@
ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION;
ssl->in_offt = NULL;
- ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( ssl );
+ mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( ssl );
ssl->in_msgtype = 0;
ssl->in_msglen = 0;
@@ -6967,7 +3924,7 @@
ssl->in_epoch = 0;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
- ssl_dtls_replay_reset( ssl );
+ mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset( ssl );
#endif
ssl->in_hslen = 0;
@@ -6991,14 +3948,14 @@
ssl->session_in = NULL;
ssl->session_out = NULL;
- memset( ssl->out_buf, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN );
+ memset( ssl->out_buf, 0, out_buf_len );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
if( partial == 0 )
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
{
ssl->in_left = 0;
- memset( ssl->in_buf, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN );
+ memset( ssl->in_buf, 0, in_buf_len );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL)
@@ -7054,7 +4011,7 @@
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- return( ssl_session_reset_int( ssl, 0 ) );
+ return( mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( ssl, 0 ) );
}
/*
@@ -7165,7 +4122,7 @@
ssl->f_get_timer = f_get_timer;
/* Make sure we start with no timer running */
- ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 );
+ mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
@@ -7183,7 +4140,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
int mbedtls_ssl_set_session( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( ssl == NULL ||
session == NULL ||
@@ -7193,7 +4150,8 @@
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
- if( ( ret = ssl_session_copy( ssl->session_negotiate, session ) ) != 0 )
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( ssl->session_negotiate,
+ session ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
ssl->handshake->resume = 1;
@@ -7275,7 +4233,29 @@
{
conf->ca_chain = ca_chain;
conf->ca_crl = ca_crl;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
+ /* mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() and mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()
+ * cannot be used together. */
+ conf->f_ca_cb = NULL;
+ conf->p_ca_cb = NULL;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb,
+ void *p_ca_cb )
+{
+ conf->f_ca_cb = f_ca_cb;
+ conf->p_ca_cb = p_ca_cb;
+
+ /* mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() and mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()
+ * cannot be used together. */
+ conf->ca_chain = NULL;
+ conf->ca_crl = NULL;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
@@ -7302,6 +4282,16 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+void mbedtls_ssl_set_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
+ void *p_vrfy )
+{
+ ssl->f_vrfy = f_vrfy;
+ ssl->p_vrfy = p_vrfy;
+}
+#endif
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
/*
* Set EC J-PAKE password for current handshake
@@ -7328,24 +4318,24 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
-int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
- const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len,
- const unsigned char *psk_identity, size_t psk_identity_len )
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
+
+static void ssl_conf_remove_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf )
{
- if( psk == NULL || psk_identity == NULL )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
-
- if( psk_len > MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
-
- /* Identity len will be encoded on two bytes */
- if( ( psk_identity_len >> 16 ) != 0 ||
- psk_identity_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
+ /* Remove reference to existing PSK, if any. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ if( conf->psk_opaque != 0 )
{
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ /* The maintenance of the PSK key slot is the
+ * user's responsibility. */
+ conf->psk_opaque = 0;
}
-
+ /* This and the following branch should never
+ * be taken simultaenously as we maintain the
+ * invariant that raw and opaque PSKs are never
+ * configured simultaneously. As a safeguard,
+ * though, `else` is omitted here. */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
if( conf->psk != NULL )
{
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( conf->psk, conf->psk_len );
@@ -7354,32 +4344,89 @@
conf->psk = NULL;
conf->psk_len = 0;
}
+
+ /* Remove reference to PSK identity, if any. */
if( conf->psk_identity != NULL )
{
mbedtls_free( conf->psk_identity );
conf->psk_identity = NULL;
conf->psk_identity_len = 0;
}
+}
- if( ( conf->psk = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_len ) ) == NULL ||
- ( conf->psk_identity = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_identity_len ) ) == NULL )
+/* This function assumes that PSK identity in the SSL config is unset.
+ * It checks that the provided identity is well-formed and attempts
+ * to make a copy of it in the SSL config.
+ * On failure, the PSK identity in the config remains unset. */
+static int ssl_conf_set_psk_identity( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ unsigned char const *psk_identity,
+ size_t psk_identity_len )
+{
+ /* Identity len will be encoded on two bytes */
+ if( psk_identity == NULL ||
+ ( psk_identity_len >> 16 ) != 0 ||
+ psk_identity_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
{
- mbedtls_free( conf->psk );
- mbedtls_free( conf->psk_identity );
- conf->psk = NULL;
- conf->psk_identity = NULL;
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
- conf->psk_len = psk_len;
- conf->psk_identity_len = psk_identity_len;
+ conf->psk_identity = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_identity_len );
+ if( conf->psk_identity == NULL )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
- memcpy( conf->psk, psk, conf->psk_len );
+ conf->psk_identity_len = psk_identity_len;
memcpy( conf->psk_identity, psk_identity, conf->psk_identity_len );
return( 0 );
}
+int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len,
+ const unsigned char *psk_identity, size_t psk_identity_len )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ /* Remove opaque/raw PSK + PSK Identity */
+ ssl_conf_remove_psk( conf );
+
+ /* Check and set raw PSK */
+ if( psk == NULL )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ if( psk_len == 0 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ if( psk_len > MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ if( ( conf->psk = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_len ) ) == NULL )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
+ conf->psk_len = psk_len;
+ memcpy( conf->psk, psk, conf->psk_len );
+
+ /* Check and set PSK Identity */
+ ret = ssl_conf_set_psk_identity( conf, psk_identity, psk_identity_len );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ ssl_conf_remove_psk( conf );
+
+ return( ret );
+}
+
+static void ssl_remove_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ if( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque != 0 )
+ {
+ ssl->handshake->psk_opaque = 0;
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+ if( ssl->handshake->psk != NULL )
+ {
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->handshake->psk,
+ ssl->handshake->psk_len );
+ mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->psk );
+ ssl->handshake->psk_len = 0;
+ }
+}
+
int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len )
{
@@ -7389,13 +4436,7 @@
if( psk_len > MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
- if( ssl->handshake->psk != NULL )
- {
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->handshake->psk,
- ssl->handshake->psk_len );
- mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->psk );
- ssl->handshake->psk_len = 0;
- }
+ ssl_remove_psk( ssl );
if( ( ssl->handshake->psk = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_len ) ) == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
@@ -7406,6 +4447,42 @@
return( 0 );
}
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ psa_key_handle_t psk_slot,
+ const unsigned char *psk_identity,
+ size_t psk_identity_len )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ /* Clear opaque/raw PSK + PSK Identity, if present. */
+ ssl_conf_remove_psk( conf );
+
+ /* Check and set opaque PSK */
+ if( psk_slot == 0 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ conf->psk_opaque = psk_slot;
+
+ /* Check and set PSK Identity */
+ ret = ssl_conf_set_psk_identity( conf, psk_identity,
+ psk_identity_len );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ ssl_conf_remove_psk( conf );
+
+ return( ret );
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ psa_key_handle_t psk_slot )
+{
+ if( psk_slot == 0 || ssl->handshake == NULL )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ ssl_remove_psk( ssl );
+ ssl->handshake->psk_opaque = psk_slot;
+ return( 0 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
int (*f_psk)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *,
size_t),
@@ -7414,14 +4491,14 @@
conf->f_psk = f_psk;
conf->p_psk = p_psk;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const char *dhm_P, const char *dhm_G )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &conf->dhm_P, 16, dhm_P ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &conf->dhm_G, 16, dhm_G ) ) != 0 )
@@ -7439,7 +4516,7 @@
const unsigned char *dhm_P, size_t P_len,
const unsigned char *dhm_G, size_t G_len )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &conf->dhm_P, dhm_P, P_len ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &conf->dhm_G, dhm_G, G_len ) ) != 0 )
@@ -7454,7 +4531,7 @@
int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_ctx( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm_ctx )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &conf->dhm_P, &dhm_ctx->P ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &conf->dhm_G, &dhm_ctx->G ) ) != 0 )
@@ -7479,7 +4556,7 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
/*
* Set allowed/preferred hashes for handshake signatures
*/
@@ -7488,7 +4565,7 @@
{
conf->sig_hashes = hashes;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
/*
@@ -7719,6 +4796,14 @@
conf->f_export_keys = f_export_keys;
conf->p_export_keys = p_export_keys;
}
+
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_ext_t *f_export_keys_ext,
+ void *p_export_keys )
+{
+ conf->f_export_keys_ext = f_export_keys_ext;
+ conf->p_export_keys = p_export_keys;
+}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
@@ -7761,66 +4846,6 @@
/*
* SSL get accessors
*/
-size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- return( ssl->in_offt == NULL ? 0 : ssl->in_msglen );
-}
-
-int mbedtls_ssl_check_pending( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- /*
- * Case A: We're currently holding back
- * a message for further processing.
- */
-
- if( ssl->keep_current_message == 1 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: record held back for processing" ) );
- return( 1 );
- }
-
- /*
- * Case B: Further records are pending in the current datagram.
- */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
- ssl->in_left > ssl->next_record_offset )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: more records within current datagram" ) );
- return( 1 );
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
-
- /*
- * Case C: A handshake message is being processed.
- */
-
- if( ssl->in_hslen > 0 && ssl->in_hslen < ssl->in_msglen )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: more handshake messages within current record" ) );
- return( 1 );
- }
-
- /*
- * Case D: An application data message is being processed
- */
- if( ssl->in_offt != NULL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: application data record is being processed" ) );
- return( 1 );
- }
-
- /*
- * In all other cases, the rest of the message can be dropped.
- * As in ssl_get_next_record, this needs to be adapted if
- * we implement support for multiple alerts in single records.
- */
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: nothing pending" ) );
- return( 0 );
-}
-
uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
if( ssl->session != NULL )
@@ -7878,61 +4903,43 @@
}
}
-int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
+size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- size_t transform_expansion = 0;
- const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform = ssl->transform_out;
- unsigned block_size;
+ size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
+ size_t read_mfl;
- if( transform == NULL )
- return( (int) mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
- if( ssl->session_out->compression != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
-#endif
-
- switch( mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc ) )
+ /* Use the configured MFL for the client if we're past SERVER_HELLO_DONE */
+ if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT &&
+ ssl->state >= MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE )
{
- case MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM:
- case MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM:
- case MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY:
- case MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM:
- transform_expansion = transform->minlen;
- break;
-
- case MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC:
-
- block_size = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size(
- &transform->cipher_ctx_enc );
-
- /* Expansion due to the addition of the MAC. */
- transform_expansion += transform->maclen;
-
- /* Expansion due to the addition of CBC padding;
- * Theoretically up to 256 bytes, but we never use
- * more than the block size of the underlying cipher. */
- transform_expansion += block_size;
-
- /* For TLS 1.1 or higher, an explicit IV is added
- * after the record header. */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
- if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
- transform_expansion += block_size;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
-
- break;
-
- default:
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ return ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->conf->mfl_code );
}
- return( (int)( mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) + transform_expansion ) );
+ /* Check if a smaller max length was negotiated */
+ if( ssl->session_out != NULL )
+ {
+ read_mfl = ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->session_out->mfl_code );
+ if( read_mfl < max_len )
+ {
+ max_len = read_mfl;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // During a handshake, use the value being negotiated
+ if( ssl->session_negotiate != NULL )
+ {
+ read_mfl = ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code );
+ if( read_mfl < max_len )
+ {
+ max_len = read_mfl;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return( max_len );
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
-size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
size_t max_len;
@@ -7957,10 +4964,17 @@
return( max_len );
}
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+ return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ssl );
+}
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
-static size_t ssl_get_current_mtu( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
/* Return unlimited mtu for client hello messages to avoid fragmentation. */
if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT &&
@@ -7989,16 +5003,16 @@
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
- const size_t mfl = mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( ssl );
+ const size_t mfl = mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ssl );
if( max_len > mfl )
max_len = mfl;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl_get_current_mtu( ssl ) != 0 )
+ if( mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu( ssl ) != 0 )
{
- const size_t mtu = ssl_get_current_mtu( ssl );
+ const size_t mtu = mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu( ssl );
const int ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( ssl );
const size_t overhead = (size_t) ret;
@@ -8030,12 +5044,17 @@
if( ssl == NULL || ssl->session == NULL )
return( NULL );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
return( ssl->session->peer_cert );
+#else
+ return( NULL );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
-int mbedtls_ssl_get_session( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_session *dst )
+int mbedtls_ssl_get_session( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ mbedtls_ssl_session *dst )
{
if( ssl == NULL ||
dst == NULL ||
@@ -8045,10 +5064,577 @@
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
- return( ssl_session_copy( dst, ssl->session ) );
+ return( mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( dst, ssl->session ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
+const mbedtls_ssl_session *mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+ if( ssl == NULL )
+ return( NULL );
+
+ return( ssl->session );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Define ticket header determining Mbed TLS version
+ * and structure of the ticket.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Define bitflag determining compile-time settings influencing
+ * structure of serialized SSL sessions.
+ */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME 1
+#else
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME 0
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT 1
+#else
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT 0
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET 1
+#else
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET 0
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL 1
+#else
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL 0
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC 1
+#else
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC 0
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM 1
+#else
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM 0
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET 1
+#else
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET 0
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME_BIT 0
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT_BIT 1
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET_BIT 2
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL_BIT 3
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC_BIT 4
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM_BIT 5
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET_BIT 6
+
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG \
+ ( (uint16_t) ( \
+ ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME_BIT ) | \
+ ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT_BIT ) | \
+ ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET_BIT ) | \
+ ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL_BIT ) | \
+ ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC_BIT ) | \
+ ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM_BIT ) | \
+ ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET_BIT ) ) )
+
+static unsigned char ssl_serialized_session_header[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR,
+ MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR,
+ MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH,
+ ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG >> 8 ) & 0xFF,
+ ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG >> 0 ) & 0xFF,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Serialize a session in the following format:
+ * (in the presentation language of TLS, RFC 8446 section 3)
+ *
+ * opaque mbedtls_version[3]; // major, minor, patch
+ * opaque session_format[2]; // version-specific 16-bit field determining
+ * // the format of the remaining
+ * // serialized data.
+ *
+ * Note: When updating the format, remember to keep
+ * these version+format bytes.
+ *
+ * // In this version, `session_format` determines
+ * // the setting of those compile-time
+ * // configuration options which influence
+ * // the structure of mbedtls_ssl_session.
+ * uint64 start_time;
+ * uint8 ciphersuite[2]; // defined by the standard
+ * uint8 compression; // 0 or 1
+ * uint8 session_id_len; // at most 32
+ * opaque session_id[32];
+ * opaque master[48]; // fixed length in the standard
+ * uint32 verify_result;
+ * opaque peer_cert<0..2^24-1>; // length 0 means no peer cert
+ * opaque ticket<0..2^24-1>; // length 0 means no ticket
+ * uint32 ticket_lifetime;
+ * uint8 mfl_code; // up to 255 according to standard
+ * uint8 trunc_hmac; // 0 or 1
+ * uint8 encrypt_then_mac; // 0 or 1
+ *
+ * The order is the same as in the definition of the structure, except
+ * verify_result is put before peer_cert so that all mandatory fields come
+ * together in one block.
+ */
+static int ssl_session_save( const mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
+ unsigned char omit_header,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buf_len,
+ size_t *olen )
+{
+ unsigned char *p = buf;
+ size_t used = 0;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+ uint64_t start;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+ size_t cert_len;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
+
+
+ if( !omit_header )
+ {
+ /*
+ * Add version identifier
+ */
+
+ used += sizeof( ssl_serialized_session_header );
+
+ if( used <= buf_len )
+ {
+ memcpy( p, ssl_serialized_session_header,
+ sizeof( ssl_serialized_session_header ) );
+ p += sizeof( ssl_serialized_session_header );
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Time
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+ used += 8;
+
+ if( used <= buf_len )
+ {
+ start = (uint64_t) session->start;
+
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( start >> 56 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( start >> 48 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( start >> 40 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( start >> 32 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( start >> 24 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( start >> 16 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( start >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( start ) & 0xFF );
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */
+
+ /*
+ * Basic mandatory fields
+ */
+ used += 2 /* ciphersuite */
+ + 1 /* compression */
+ + 1 /* id_len */
+ + sizeof( session->id )
+ + sizeof( session->master )
+ + 4; /* verify_result */
+
+ if( used <= buf_len )
+ {
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->ciphersuite >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->ciphersuite ) & 0xFF );
+
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( session->compression & 0xFF );
+
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( session->id_len & 0xFF );
+ memcpy( p, session->id, 32 );
+ p += 32;
+
+ memcpy( p, session->master, 48 );
+ p += 48;
+
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->verify_result >> 24 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->verify_result >> 16 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->verify_result >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->verify_result ) & 0xFF );
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Peer's end-entity certificate
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+ if( session->peer_cert == NULL )
+ cert_len = 0;
+ else
+ cert_len = session->peer_cert->raw.len;
+
+ used += 3 + cert_len;
+
+ if( used <= buf_len )
+ {
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( cert_len >> 16 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( cert_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( cert_len ) & 0xFF );
+
+ if( session->peer_cert != NULL )
+ {
+ memcpy( p, session->peer_cert->raw.p, cert_len );
+ p += cert_len;
+ }
+ }
+#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+ if( session->peer_cert_digest != NULL )
+ {
+ used += 1 /* type */ + 1 /* length */ + session->peer_cert_digest_len;
+ if( used <= buf_len )
+ {
+ *p++ = (unsigned char) session->peer_cert_digest_type;
+ *p++ = (unsigned char) session->peer_cert_digest_len;
+ memcpy( p, session->peer_cert_digest,
+ session->peer_cert_digest_len );
+ p += session->peer_cert_digest_len;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ used += 2;
+ if( used <= buf_len )
+ {
+ *p++ = (unsigned char) MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
+ *p++ = 0;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
+
+ /*
+ * Session ticket if any, plus associated data
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+ used += 3 + session->ticket_len + 4; /* len + ticket + lifetime */
+
+ if( used <= buf_len )
+ {
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->ticket_len >> 16 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->ticket_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->ticket_len ) & 0xFF );
+
+ if( session->ticket != NULL )
+ {
+ memcpy( p, session->ticket, session->ticket_len );
+ p += session->ticket_len;
+ }
+
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->ticket_lifetime >> 24 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->ticket_lifetime >> 16 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->ticket_lifetime >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->ticket_lifetime ) & 0xFF );
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
+
+ /*
+ * Misc extension-related info
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
+ used += 1;
+
+ if( used <= buf_len )
+ *p++ = session->mfl_code;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
+ used += 1;
+
+ if( used <= buf_len )
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->trunc_hmac ) & 0xFF );
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
+ used += 1;
+
+ if( used <= buf_len )
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->encrypt_then_mac ) & 0xFF );
+#endif
+
+ /* Done */
+ *olen = used;
+
+ if( used > buf_len )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Public wrapper for ssl_session_save()
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_session_save( const mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buf_len,
+ size_t *olen )
+{
+ return( ssl_session_save( session, 0, buf, buf_len, olen ) );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Deserialize session, see mbedtls_ssl_session_save() for format.
+ *
+ * This internal version is wrapped by a public function that cleans up in
+ * case of error, and has an extra option omit_header.
+ */
+static int ssl_session_load( mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
+ unsigned char omit_header,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len )
+{
+ const unsigned char *p = buf;
+ const unsigned char * const end = buf + len;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+ uint64_t start;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+ size_t cert_len;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
+
+ if( !omit_header )
+ {
+ /*
+ * Check version identifier
+ */
+
+ if( (size_t)( end - p ) < sizeof( ssl_serialized_session_header ) )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ if( memcmp( p, ssl_serialized_session_header,
+ sizeof( ssl_serialized_session_header ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH );
+ }
+ p += sizeof( ssl_serialized_session_header );
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Time
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+ if( 8 > (size_t)( end - p ) )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ start = ( (uint64_t) p[0] << 56 ) |
+ ( (uint64_t) p[1] << 48 ) |
+ ( (uint64_t) p[2] << 40 ) |
+ ( (uint64_t) p[3] << 32 ) |
+ ( (uint64_t) p[4] << 24 ) |
+ ( (uint64_t) p[5] << 16 ) |
+ ( (uint64_t) p[6] << 8 ) |
+ ( (uint64_t) p[7] );
+ p += 8;
+
+ session->start = (time_t) start;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */
+
+ /*
+ * Basic mandatory fields
+ */
+ if( 2 + 1 + 1 + 32 + 48 + 4 > (size_t)( end - p ) )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ session->ciphersuite = ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1];
+ p += 2;
+
+ session->compression = *p++;
+
+ session->id_len = *p++;
+ memcpy( session->id, p, 32 );
+ p += 32;
+
+ memcpy( session->master, p, 48 );
+ p += 48;
+
+ session->verify_result = ( (uint32_t) p[0] << 24 ) |
+ ( (uint32_t) p[1] << 16 ) |
+ ( (uint32_t) p[2] << 8 ) |
+ ( (uint32_t) p[3] );
+ p += 4;
+
+ /* Immediately clear invalid pointer values that have been read, in case
+ * we exit early before we replaced them with valid ones. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+ session->peer_cert = NULL;
+#else
+ session->peer_cert_digest = NULL;
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+ session->ticket = NULL;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
+
+ /*
+ * Peer certificate
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+ /* Deserialize CRT from the end of the ticket. */
+ if( 3 > (size_t)( end - p ) )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ cert_len = ( p[0] << 16 ) | ( p[1] << 8 ) | p[2];
+ p += 3;
+
+ if( cert_len != 0 )
+ {
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if( cert_len > (size_t)( end - p ) )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ session->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) );
+
+ if( session->peer_cert == NULL )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
+
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_init( session->peer_cert );
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( session->peer_cert,
+ p, cert_len ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( session->peer_cert );
+ mbedtls_free( session->peer_cert );
+ session->peer_cert = NULL;
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ p += cert_len;
+ }
+#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+ /* Deserialize CRT digest from the end of the ticket. */
+ if( 2 > (size_t)( end - p ) )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ session->peer_cert_digest_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) *p++;
+ session->peer_cert_digest_len = (size_t) *p++;
+
+ if( session->peer_cert_digest_len != 0 )
+ {
+ const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info =
+ mbedtls_md_info_from_type( session->peer_cert_digest_type );
+ if( md_info == NULL )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ if( session->peer_cert_digest_len != mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ if( session->peer_cert_digest_len > (size_t)( end - p ) )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ session->peer_cert_digest =
+ mbedtls_calloc( 1, session->peer_cert_digest_len );
+ if( session->peer_cert_digest == NULL )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
+
+ memcpy( session->peer_cert_digest, p,
+ session->peer_cert_digest_len );
+ p += session->peer_cert_digest_len;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
+
+ /*
+ * Session ticket and associated data
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+ if( 3 > (size_t)( end - p ) )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ session->ticket_len = ( p[0] << 16 ) | ( p[1] << 8 ) | p[2];
+ p += 3;
+
+ if( session->ticket_len != 0 )
+ {
+ if( session->ticket_len > (size_t)( end - p ) )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ session->ticket = mbedtls_calloc( 1, session->ticket_len );
+ if( session->ticket == NULL )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
+
+ memcpy( session->ticket, p, session->ticket_len );
+ p += session->ticket_len;
+ }
+
+ if( 4 > (size_t)( end - p ) )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ session->ticket_lifetime = ( (uint32_t) p[0] << 24 ) |
+ ( (uint32_t) p[1] << 16 ) |
+ ( (uint32_t) p[2] << 8 ) |
+ ( (uint32_t) p[3] );
+ p += 4;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
+
+ /*
+ * Misc extension-related info
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
+ if( 1 > (size_t)( end - p ) )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ session->mfl_code = *p++;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
+ if( 1 > (size_t)( end - p ) )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ session->trunc_hmac = *p++;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
+ if( 1 > (size_t)( end - p ) )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ session->encrypt_then_mac = *p++;
+#endif
+
+ /* Done, should have consumed entire buffer */
+ if( p != end )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Deserialize session: public wrapper for error cleaning
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_session_load( mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len )
+{
+ int ret = ssl_session_load( session, 0, buf, len );
+
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ mbedtls_ssl_session_free( session );
+
+ return( ret );
+}
+
/*
* Perform a single step of the SSL handshake
*/
@@ -8103,7 +5689,7 @@
*/
static int ssl_write_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write hello request" ) );
@@ -8132,9 +5718,9 @@
* If the handshake doesn't complete due to waiting for I/O, it will continue
* during the next calls to mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate() or mbedtls_ssl_read() respectively.
*/
-static int ssl_start_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+int mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> renegotiate" ) );
@@ -8206,9 +5792,9 @@
if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
- if( ( ret = ssl_start_renegotiation( ssl ) ) != 0 )
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_start_renegotiation", ret );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
@@ -8224,544 +5810,8 @@
return( ret );
}
-
-/*
- * Check record counters and renegotiate if they're above the limit.
- */
-static int ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- size_t ep_len = ssl_ep_len( ssl );
- int in_ctr_cmp;
- int out_ctr_cmp;
-
- if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ||
- ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING ||
- ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED )
- {
- return( 0 );
- }
-
- in_ctr_cmp = memcmp( ssl->in_ctr + ep_len,
- ssl->conf->renego_period + ep_len, 8 - ep_len );
- out_ctr_cmp = memcmp( ssl->cur_out_ctr + ep_len,
- ssl->conf->renego_period + ep_len, 8 - ep_len );
-
- if( in_ctr_cmp <= 0 && out_ctr_cmp <= 0 )
- {
- return( 0 );
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "record counter limit reached: renegotiate" ) );
- return( mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate( ssl ) );
-}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
-/*
- * Receive application data decrypted from the SSL layer
- */
-int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
-{
- int ret;
- size_t n;
-
- if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> read" ) );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- return( ret );
-
- if( ssl->handshake != NULL &&
- ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING )
- {
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- return( ret );
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- /*
- * Check if renegotiation is necessary and/or handshake is
- * in process. If yes, perform/continue, and fall through
- * if an unexpected packet is received while the client
- * is waiting for the ServerHello.
- *
- * (There is no equivalent to the last condition on
- * the server-side as it is not treated as within
- * a handshake while waiting for the ClientHello
- * after a renegotiation request.)
- */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
- ret = ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( ssl );
- if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO &&
- ret != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
-#endif
-
- if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
- {
- ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl );
- if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO &&
- ret != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
- }
-
- /* Loop as long as no application data record is available */
- while( ssl->in_offt == NULL )
- {
- /* Start timer if not already running */
- if( ssl->f_get_timer != NULL &&
- ssl->f_get_timer( ssl->p_timer ) == -1 )
- {
- ssl_set_timer( ssl, ssl->conf->read_timeout );
- }
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
- {
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF )
- return( 0 );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
-
- if( ssl->in_msglen == 0 &&
- ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA )
- {
- /*
- * OpenSSL sends empty messages to randomize the IV
- */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
- {
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF )
- return( 0 );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
- }
-
- if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received handshake message" ) );
-
- /*
- * - For client-side, expect SERVER_HELLO_REQUEST.
- * - For server-side, expect CLIENT_HELLO.
- * - Fail (TLS) or silently drop record (DTLS) in other cases.
- */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
- if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT &&
- ( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ||
- ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake received (not HelloRequest)" ) );
-
- /* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
- continue;
- }
-#endif
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
- if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
- ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake received (not ClientHello)" ) );
-
- /* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
- continue;
- }
-#endif
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
- /* Determine whether renegotiation attempt should be accepted */
- if( ! ( ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED ||
- ( ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
- ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation ==
- MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) ) )
- {
- /*
- * Accept renegotiation request
- */
-
- /* DTLS clients need to know renego is server-initiated */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
- ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT )
- {
- ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING;
- }
-#endif
- ret = ssl_start_renegotiation( ssl );
- if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO &&
- ret != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_start_renegotiation", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
- {
- /*
- * Refuse renegotiation
- */
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "refusing renegotiation, sending alert" ) );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
- if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
- {
- /* SSLv3 does not have a "no_renegotiation" warning, so
- we send a fatal alert and abort the connection. */
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
- if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 )
- {
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) ) != 0 )
- {
- return( ret );
- }
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 ||
- MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
- }
-
- /* At this point, we don't know whether the renegotiation has been
- * completed or not. The cases to consider are the following:
- * 1) The renegotiation is complete. In this case, no new record
- * has been read yet.
- * 2) The renegotiation is incomplete because the client received
- * an application data record while awaiting the ServerHello.
- * 3) The renegotiation is incomplete because the client received
- * a non-handshake, non-application data message while awaiting
- * the ServerHello.
- * In each of these case, looping will be the proper action:
- * - For 1), the next iteration will read a new record and check
- * if it's application data.
- * - For 2), the loop condition isn't satisfied as application data
- * is present, hence continue is the same as break
- * - For 3), the loop condition is satisfied and read_record
- * will re-deliver the message that was held back by the client
- * when expecting the ServerHello.
- */
- continue;
- }
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
- else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING )
- {
- if( ssl->conf->renego_max_records >= 0 )
- {
- if( ++ssl->renego_records_seen > ssl->conf->renego_max_records )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation requested, "
- "but not honored by client" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
- }
- }
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
-
- /* Fatal and closure alerts handled by mbedtls_ssl_read_record() */
- if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "ignoring non-fatal non-closure alert" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ );
- }
-
- if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad application data message" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
- }
-
- ssl->in_offt = ssl->in_msg;
-
- /* We're going to return something now, cancel timer,
- * except if handshake (renegotiation) is in progress */
- if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
- ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- /* If we requested renego but received AppData, resend HelloRequest.
- * Do it now, after setting in_offt, to avoid taking this branch
- * again if ssl_write_hello_request() returns WANT_WRITE */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
- if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
- ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING )
- {
- if( ( ret = ssl_resend_hello_request( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_resend_hello_request", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
- }
-
- n = ( len < ssl->in_msglen )
- ? len : ssl->in_msglen;
-
- memcpy( buf, ssl->in_offt, n );
- ssl->in_msglen -= n;
-
- if( ssl->in_msglen == 0 )
- {
- /* all bytes consumed */
- ssl->in_offt = NULL;
- ssl->keep_current_message = 0;
- }
- else
- {
- /* more data available */
- ssl->in_offt += n;
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= read" ) );
-
- return( (int) n );
-}
-
-/*
- * Send application data to be encrypted by the SSL layer, taking care of max
- * fragment length and buffer size.
- *
- * According to RFC 5246 Section 6.2.1:
- *
- * Zero-length fragments of Application data MAY be sent as they are
- * potentially useful as a traffic analysis countermeasure.
- *
- * Therefore, it is possible that the input message length is 0 and the
- * corresponding return code is 0 on success.
- */
-static int ssl_write_real( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
-{
- int ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload( ssl );
- const size_t max_len = (size_t) ret;
-
- if( ret < 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
-
- if( len > max_len )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "fragment larger than the (negotiated) "
- "maximum fragment length: %d > %d",
- len, max_len ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
- }
- else
-#endif
- len = max_len;
- }
-
- if( ssl->out_left != 0 )
- {
- /*
- * The user has previously tried to send the data and
- * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE or the message was only partially
- * written. In this case, we expect the high-level write function
- * (e.g. mbedtls_ssl_write()) to be called with the same parameters
- */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flush_output", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
- }
- else
- {
- /*
- * The user is trying to send a message the first time, so we need to
- * copy the data into the internal buffers and setup the data structure
- * to keep track of partial writes
- */
- ssl->out_msglen = len;
- ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA;
- memcpy( ssl->out_msg, buf, len );
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
- }
-
- return( (int) len );
-}
-
-/*
- * Write application data, doing 1/n-1 splitting if necessary.
- *
- * With non-blocking I/O, ssl_write_real() may return WANT_WRITE,
- * then the caller will call us again with the same arguments, so
- * remember whether we already did the split or not.
- */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING)
-static int ssl_write_split( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
-{
- int ret;
-
- if( ssl->conf->cbc_record_splitting ==
- MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED ||
- len <= 1 ||
- ssl->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ||
- mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &ssl->transform_out->cipher_ctx_enc )
- != MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC )
- {
- return( ssl_write_real( ssl, buf, len ) );
- }
-
- if( ssl->split_done == 0 )
- {
- if( ( ret = ssl_write_real( ssl, buf, 1 ) ) <= 0 )
- return( ret );
- ssl->split_done = 1;
- }
-
- if( ( ret = ssl_write_real( ssl, buf + 1, len - 1 ) ) <= 0 )
- return( ret );
- ssl->split_done = 0;
-
- return( ret + 1 );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */
-
-/*
- * Write application data (public-facing wrapper)
- */
-int mbedtls_ssl_write( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
-{
- int ret;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write" ) );
-
- if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
- if( ( ret = ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
-#endif
-
- if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
- {
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
- }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING)
- ret = ssl_write_split( ssl, buf, len );
-#else
- ret = ssl_write_real( ssl, buf, len );
-#endif
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write" ) );
-
- return( ret );
-}
-
-/*
- * Notify the peer that the connection is being closed
- */
-int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- int ret;
-
- if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write close notify" ) );
-
- if( ssl->out_left != 0 )
- return( mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) );
-
- if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
- {
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message", ret );
- return( ret );
- }
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write close notify" ) );
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-void mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform )
-{
- if( transform == NULL )
- return;
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
- deflateEnd( &transform->ctx_deflate );
- inflateEnd( &transform->ctx_inflate );
-#endif
-
- mbedtls_cipher_free( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc );
- mbedtls_cipher_free( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec );
-
- mbedtls_md_free( &transform->md_ctx_enc );
- mbedtls_md_free( &transform->md_ctx_dec );
-
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( transform, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_transform ) );
-}
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
static void ssl_key_cert_free( mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert )
{
@@ -8776,42 +5826,6 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
-
-static void ssl_buffering_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- unsigned offset;
- mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake;
-
- if( hs == NULL )
- return;
-
- ssl_free_buffered_record( ssl );
-
- for( offset = 0; offset < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS; offset++ )
- ssl_buffering_free_slot( ssl, offset );
-}
-
-static void ssl_buffering_free_slot( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- uint8_t slot )
-{
- mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake;
- mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer * const hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[slot];
-
- if( slot >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS )
- return;
-
- if( hs_buf->is_valid == 1 )
- {
- hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered -= hs_buf->data_len;
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( hs_buf->data, hs_buf->data_len );
- mbedtls_free( hs_buf->data );
- memset( hs_buf, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer ) );
- }
-}
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
-
void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
@@ -8834,11 +5848,19 @@
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ psa_hash_abort( &handshake->fin_sha256_psa );
+#else
mbedtls_sha256_free( &handshake->fin_sha256 );
#endif
+#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ psa_hash_abort( &handshake->fin_sha384_psa );
+#else
mbedtls_sha512_free( &handshake->fin_sha512 );
#endif
+#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
@@ -8862,7 +5884,7 @@
mbedtls_free( (void *) handshake->curves );
#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
if( handshake->psk != NULL )
{
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( handshake->psk, handshake->psk_len );
@@ -8889,18 +5911,92 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( &handshake->ecrs_ctx );
+ if( handshake->ecrs_peer_cert != NULL )
+ {
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( handshake->ecrs_peer_cert );
+ mbedtls_free( handshake->ecrs_peer_cert );
+ }
#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+ mbedtls_pk_free( &handshake->peer_pubkey );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
mbedtls_free( handshake->verify_cookie );
- ssl_flight_free( handshake->flight );
- ssl_buffering_free( ssl );
+ mbedtls_ssl_flight_free( handshake->flight );
+ mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free( ssl );
#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C && MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( handshake,
sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params ) );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
+ /* If the buffers are too big - reallocate. Because of the way Mbed TLS
+ * processes datagrams and the fact that a datagram is allowed to have
+ * several records in it, it is possible that the I/O buffers are not
+ * empty at this stage */
+ {
+ int modified = 0;
+ uint32_t buf_len = mbedtls_ssl_get_input_buflen( ssl );
+ size_t written_in = 0;
+ size_t written_out = 0;
+ if( ssl->in_buf != NULL )
+ {
+ written_in = ssl->in_msg - ssl->in_buf;
+ if( ssl->in_buf_len > buf_len && ssl->in_left < buf_len )
+ {
+ written_in = ssl->in_msg - ssl->in_buf;
+ if( resize_buffer( &ssl->in_buf, buf_len, &ssl->in_buf_len ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "input buffer resizing failed - out of memory" ) );
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Reallocating in_buf to %d", buf_len ) );
+ modified = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ buf_len = mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen( ssl );
+ if(ssl->out_buf != NULL )
+ {
+ written_out = ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf;
+ if( ssl->out_buf_len > mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen( ssl ) &&
+ ssl->out_left < buf_len )
+ {
+ if( resize_buffer( &ssl->out_buf, buf_len, &ssl->out_buf_len ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "output buffer resizing failed - out of memory" ) );
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Reallocating out_buf to %d", buf_len ) );
+ modified = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if( modified )
+ {
+ /* Update pointers here to avoid doing it twice. */
+ mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( ssl );
+ /* Fields below might not be properly updated with record
+ * splitting, so they are manually updated here. */
+ ssl->out_msg = ssl->out_buf + written_out;
+ ssl->in_msg = ssl->in_buf + written_in;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
}
void mbedtls_ssl_session_free( mbedtls_ssl_session *session )
@@ -8909,11 +6005,7 @@
return;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
- if( session->peer_cert != NULL )
- {
- mbedtls_x509_crt_free( session->peer_cert );
- mbedtls_free( session->peer_cert );
- }
+ ssl_clear_peer_cert( session );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
@@ -8923,11 +6015,660 @@
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) );
}
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID 1u
+#else
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID 0u
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT)
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT 1u
+#else
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT 0u
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY 1u
+#else
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY 0u
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN 1u
+#else
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN 0u
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
+
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_BIT 0
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT_BIT 1
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY_BIT 2
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN_BIT 3
+
+#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG \
+ ( (uint32_t) ( \
+ ( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID << SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_BIT ) | \
+ ( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT << SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT_BIT ) | \
+ ( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY << SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY_BIT ) | \
+ ( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN << SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN_BIT ) | \
+ 0u ) )
+
+static unsigned char ssl_serialized_context_header[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR,
+ MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR,
+ MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH,
+ ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG >> 8 ) & 0xFF,
+ ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG >> 0 ) & 0xFF,
+ ( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG >> 16 ) & 0xFF,
+ ( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG >> 8 ) & 0xFF,
+ ( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG >> 0 ) & 0xFF,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Serialize a full SSL context
+ *
+ * The format of the serialized data is:
+ * (in the presentation language of TLS, RFC 8446 section 3)
+ *
+ * // header
+ * opaque mbedtls_version[3]; // major, minor, patch
+ * opaque context_format[5]; // version-specific field determining
+ * // the format of the remaining
+ * // serialized data.
+ * Note: When updating the format, remember to keep these
+ * version+format bytes. (We may make their size part of the API.)
+ *
+ * // session sub-structure
+ * opaque session<1..2^32-1>; // see mbedtls_ssl_session_save()
+ * // transform sub-structure
+ * uint8 random[64]; // ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random
+ * uint8 in_cid<0..2^8-1> // Connection ID: expected incoming value
+ * uint8 out_cid<0..2^8-1> // Connection ID: outgoing value to use
+ * // fields from ssl_context
+ * uint32 badmac_seen; // DTLS: number of records with failing MAC
+ * uint64 in_window_top; // DTLS: last validated record seq_num
+ * uint64 in_window; // DTLS: bitmask for replay protection
+ * uint8 disable_datagram_packing; // DTLS: only one record per datagram
+ * uint64 cur_out_ctr; // Record layer: outgoing sequence number
+ * uint16 mtu; // DTLS: path mtu (max outgoing fragment size)
+ * uint8 alpn_chosen<0..2^8-1> // ALPN: negotiated application protocol
+ *
+ * Note that many fields of the ssl_context or sub-structures are not
+ * serialized, as they fall in one of the following categories:
+ *
+ * 1. forced value (eg in_left must be 0)
+ * 2. pointer to dynamically-allocated memory (eg session, transform)
+ * 3. value can be re-derived from other data (eg session keys from MS)
+ * 4. value was temporary (eg content of input buffer)
+ * 5. value will be provided by the user again (eg I/O callbacks and context)
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_context_save( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buf_len,
+ size_t *olen )
+{
+ unsigned char *p = buf;
+ size_t used = 0;
+ size_t session_len;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Enforce usage restrictions, see "return BAD_INPUT_DATA" in
+ * this function's documentation.
+ *
+ * These are due to assumptions/limitations in the implementation. Some of
+ * them are likely to stay (no handshake in progress) some might go away
+ * (only DTLS) but are currently used to simplify the implementation.
+ */
+ /* The initial handshake must be over */
+ if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Initial handshake isn't over" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ }
+ if( ssl->handshake != NULL )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Handshake isn't completed" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ }
+ /* Double-check that sub-structures are indeed ready */
+ if( ssl->transform == NULL || ssl->session == NULL )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Serialised structures aren't ready" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ }
+ /* There must be no pending incoming or outgoing data */
+ if( mbedtls_ssl_check_pending( ssl ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "There is pending incoming data" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ }
+ if( ssl->out_left != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "There is pending outgoing data" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ }
+ /* Protocol must be DLTS, not TLS */
+ if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Only DTLS is supported" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ }
+ /* Version must be 1.2 */
+ if( ssl->major_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Only version 1.2 supported" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ }
+ if( ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Only version 1.2 supported" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ }
+ /* We must be using an AEAD ciphersuite */
+ if( mbedtls_ssl_transform_uses_aead( ssl->transform ) != 1 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Only AEAD ciphersuites supported" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ }
+ /* Renegotiation must not be enabled */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ if( ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Renegotiation must not be enabled" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Version and format identifier
+ */
+ used += sizeof( ssl_serialized_context_header );
+
+ if( used <= buf_len )
+ {
+ memcpy( p, ssl_serialized_context_header,
+ sizeof( ssl_serialized_context_header ) );
+ p += sizeof( ssl_serialized_context_header );
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Session (length + data)
+ */
+ ret = ssl_session_save( ssl->session, 1, NULL, 0, &session_len );
+ if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL )
+ return( ret );
+
+ used += 4 + session_len;
+ if( used <= buf_len )
+ {
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session_len >> 24 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session_len >> 16 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session_len ) & 0xFF );
+
+ ret = ssl_session_save( ssl->session, 1,
+ p, session_len, &session_len );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+
+ p += session_len;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Transform
+ */
+ used += sizeof( ssl->transform->randbytes );
+ if( used <= buf_len )
+ {
+ memcpy( p, ssl->transform->randbytes,
+ sizeof( ssl->transform->randbytes ) );
+ p += sizeof( ssl->transform->randbytes );
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+ used += 2 + ssl->transform->in_cid_len + ssl->transform->out_cid_len;
+ if( used <= buf_len )
+ {
+ *p++ = ssl->transform->in_cid_len;
+ memcpy( p, ssl->transform->in_cid, ssl->transform->in_cid_len );
+ p += ssl->transform->in_cid_len;
+
+ *p++ = ssl->transform->out_cid_len;
+ memcpy( p, ssl->transform->out_cid, ssl->transform->out_cid_len );
+ p += ssl->transform->out_cid_len;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+
+ /*
+ * Saved fields from top-level ssl_context structure
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT)
+ used += 4;
+ if( used <= buf_len )
+ {
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->badmac_seen >> 24 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->badmac_seen >> 16 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->badmac_seen >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->badmac_seen ) & 0xFF );
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
+ used += 16;
+ if( used <= buf_len )
+ {
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window_top >> 56 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window_top >> 48 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window_top >> 40 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window_top >> 32 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window_top >> 24 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window_top >> 16 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window_top >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window_top ) & 0xFF );
+
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window >> 56 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window >> 48 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window >> 40 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window >> 32 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window >> 24 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window >> 16 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_window ) & 0xFF );
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ used += 1;
+ if( used <= buf_len )
+ {
+ *p++ = ssl->disable_datagram_packing;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+
+ used += 8;
+ if( used <= buf_len )
+ {
+ memcpy( p, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8 );
+ p += 8;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ used += 2;
+ if( used <= buf_len )
+ {
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->mtu >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->mtu ) & 0xFF );
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
+ {
+ const uint8_t alpn_len = ssl->alpn_chosen
+ ? (uint8_t) strlen( ssl->alpn_chosen )
+ : 0;
+
+ used += 1 + alpn_len;
+ if( used <= buf_len )
+ {
+ *p++ = alpn_len;
+
+ if( ssl->alpn_chosen != NULL )
+ {
+ memcpy( p, ssl->alpn_chosen, alpn_len );
+ p += alpn_len;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
+
+ /*
+ * Done
+ */
+ *olen = used;
+
+ if( used > buf_len )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "saved context", buf, used );
+
+ return( mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( ssl, 0 ) );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Helper to get TLS 1.2 PRF from ciphersuite
+ * (Duplicates bits of logic from ssl_set_handshake_prfs().)
+ */
+typedef int (*tls_prf_fn)( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen,
+ const char *label,
+ const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen,
+ unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen );
+static tls_prf_fn ssl_tls12prf_from_cs( int ciphersuite_id )
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * const ciphersuite_info =
+ mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( ciphersuite_id );
+
+ if( ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 )
+ return( tls_prf_sha384 );
+#else
+ (void) ciphersuite_id;
+#endif
+ return( tls_prf_sha256 );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Deserialize context, see mbedtls_ssl_context_save() for format.
+ *
+ * This internal version is wrapped by a public function that cleans up in
+ * case of error.
+ */
+static int ssl_context_load( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len )
+{
+ const unsigned char *p = buf;
+ const unsigned char * const end = buf + len;
+ size_t session_len;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ /*
+ * The context should have been freshly setup or reset.
+ * Give the user an error in case of obvious misuse.
+ * (Checking session is useful because it won't be NULL if we're
+ * renegotiating, or if the user mistakenly loaded a session first.)
+ */
+ if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST ||
+ ssl->session != NULL )
+ {
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We can't check that the config matches the initial one, but we can at
+ * least check it matches the requirements for serializing.
+ */
+ if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ||
+ ssl->conf->max_major_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 ||
+ ssl->conf->min_major_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 ||
+ ssl->conf->max_minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ||
+ ssl->conf->min_minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ||
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED ||
+#endif
+ 0 )
+ {
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "context to load", buf, len );
+
+ /*
+ * Check version identifier
+ */
+ if( (size_t)( end - p ) < sizeof( ssl_serialized_context_header ) )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ if( memcmp( p, ssl_serialized_context_header,
+ sizeof( ssl_serialized_context_header ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH );
+ }
+ p += sizeof( ssl_serialized_context_header );
+
+ /*
+ * Session
+ */
+ if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ session_len = ( (size_t) p[0] << 24 ) |
+ ( (size_t) p[1] << 16 ) |
+ ( (size_t) p[2] << 8 ) |
+ ( (size_t) p[3] );
+ p += 4;
+
+ /* This has been allocated by ssl_handshake_init(), called by
+ * by either mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int() or mbedtls_ssl_setup(). */
+ ssl->session = ssl->session_negotiate;
+ ssl->session_in = ssl->session;
+ ssl->session_out = ssl->session;
+ ssl->session_negotiate = NULL;
+
+ if( (size_t)( end - p ) < session_len )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ ret = ssl_session_load( ssl->session, 1, p, session_len );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ p += session_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Transform
+ */
+
+ /* This has been allocated by ssl_handshake_init(), called by
+ * by either mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int() or mbedtls_ssl_setup(). */
+ ssl->transform = ssl->transform_negotiate;
+ ssl->transform_in = ssl->transform;
+ ssl->transform_out = ssl->transform;
+ ssl->transform_negotiate = NULL;
+
+ /* Read random bytes and populate structure */
+ if( (size_t)( end - p ) < sizeof( ssl->transform->randbytes ) )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ ret = ssl_populate_transform( ssl->transform,
+ ssl->session->ciphersuite,
+ ssl->session->master,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
+ ssl->session->encrypt_then_mac,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
+ ssl->session->trunc_hmac,
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
+ ssl->session->compression,
+#endif
+ ssl_tls12prf_from_cs( ssl->session->ciphersuite ),
+ p, /* currently pointing to randbytes */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, /* (D)TLS 1.2 is forced */
+ ssl->conf->endpoint,
+ ssl );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+
+ p += sizeof( ssl->transform->randbytes );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+ /* Read connection IDs and store them */
+ if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 1 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ ssl->transform->in_cid_len = *p++;
+
+ if( (size_t)( end - p ) < ssl->transform->in_cid_len + 1u )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ memcpy( ssl->transform->in_cid, p, ssl->transform->in_cid_len );
+ p += ssl->transform->in_cid_len;
+
+ ssl->transform->out_cid_len = *p++;
+
+ if( (size_t)( end - p ) < ssl->transform->out_cid_len )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ memcpy( ssl->transform->out_cid, p, ssl->transform->out_cid_len );
+ p += ssl->transform->out_cid_len;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+
+ /*
+ * Saved fields from top-level ssl_context structure
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT)
+ if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ ssl->badmac_seen = ( (uint32_t) p[0] << 24 ) |
+ ( (uint32_t) p[1] << 16 ) |
+ ( (uint32_t) p[2] << 8 ) |
+ ( (uint32_t) p[3] );
+ p += 4;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
+ if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 16 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ ssl->in_window_top = ( (uint64_t) p[0] << 56 ) |
+ ( (uint64_t) p[1] << 48 ) |
+ ( (uint64_t) p[2] << 40 ) |
+ ( (uint64_t) p[3] << 32 ) |
+ ( (uint64_t) p[4] << 24 ) |
+ ( (uint64_t) p[5] << 16 ) |
+ ( (uint64_t) p[6] << 8 ) |
+ ( (uint64_t) p[7] );
+ p += 8;
+
+ ssl->in_window = ( (uint64_t) p[0] << 56 ) |
+ ( (uint64_t) p[1] << 48 ) |
+ ( (uint64_t) p[2] << 40 ) |
+ ( (uint64_t) p[3] << 32 ) |
+ ( (uint64_t) p[4] << 24 ) |
+ ( (uint64_t) p[5] << 16 ) |
+ ( (uint64_t) p[6] << 8 ) |
+ ( (uint64_t) p[7] );
+ p += 8;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 1 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ ssl->disable_datagram_packing = *p++;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+
+ if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 8 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ memcpy( ssl->cur_out_ctr, p, 8 );
+ p += 8;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 2 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ ssl->mtu = ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1];
+ p += 2;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
+ {
+ uint8_t alpn_len;
+ const char **cur;
+
+ if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 1 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ alpn_len = *p++;
+
+ if( alpn_len != 0 && ssl->conf->alpn_list != NULL )
+ {
+ /* alpn_chosen should point to an item in the configured list */
+ for( cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++ )
+ {
+ if( strlen( *cur ) == alpn_len &&
+ memcmp( p, cur, alpn_len ) == 0 )
+ {
+ ssl->alpn_chosen = *cur;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* can only happen on conf mismatch */
+ if( alpn_len != 0 && ssl->alpn_chosen == NULL )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ p += alpn_len;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
+
+ /*
+ * Forced fields from top-level ssl_context structure
+ *
+ * Most of them already set to the correct value by mbedtls_ssl_init() and
+ * mbedtls_ssl_reset(), so we only need to set the remaining ones.
+ */
+ ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER;
+
+ ssl->major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3;
+ ssl->minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3;
+
+ /* Adjust pointers for header fields of outgoing records to
+ * the given transform, accounting for explicit IV and CID. */
+ mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ ssl->in_epoch = 1;
+#endif
+
+ /* mbedtls_ssl_reset() leaves the handshake sub-structure allocated,
+ * which we don't want - otherwise we'd end up freeing the wrong transform
+ * by calling mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform()
+ * inappropriately. */
+ if( ssl->handshake != NULL )
+ {
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( ssl );
+ mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake );
+ ssl->handshake = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Done - should have consumed entire buffer
+ */
+ if( p != end )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Deserialize context: public wrapper for error cleaning
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_context_load( mbedtls_ssl_context *context,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len )
+{
+ int ret = ssl_context_load( context, buf, len );
+
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ mbedtls_ssl_free( context );
+
+ return( ret );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */
+
/*
* Free an SSL context
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
+ size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len;
+ size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len;
+#else
+ size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN;
+ size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN;
+#endif
+
if( ssl == NULL )
return;
@@ -8935,14 +6676,16 @@
if( ssl->out_buf != NULL )
{
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->out_buf, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN );
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->out_buf, out_buf_len );
mbedtls_free( ssl->out_buf );
+ ssl->out_buf = NULL;
}
if( ssl->in_buf != NULL )
{
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->in_buf, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN );
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->in_buf, in_buf_len );
mbedtls_free( ssl->in_buf );
+ ssl->in_buf = NULL;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
@@ -9010,7 +6753,7 @@
memset( conf, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_config ) );
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
static int ssl_preset_default_hashes[] = {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512,
@@ -9033,7 +6776,7 @@
0
};
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
static int ssl_preset_suiteb_hashes[] = {
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384,
@@ -9060,7 +6803,7 @@
int endpoint, int transport, int preset )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
#endif
/* Use the functions here so that they are covered in tests,
@@ -9162,7 +6905,7 @@
conf->cert_profile = &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb;
#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
conf->sig_hashes = ssl_preset_suiteb_hashes;
#endif
@@ -9201,7 +6944,7 @@
conf->cert_profile = &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default;
#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
conf->sig_hashes = ssl_preset_default_hashes;
#endif
@@ -9227,7 +6970,7 @@
mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_G );
#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
if( conf->psk != NULL )
{
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( conf->psk, conf->psk_len );
@@ -9302,7 +7045,7 @@
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C && ( MBEDTLS_RSA_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C ) */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
- defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED)
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
/* Find an entry in a signature-hash set matching a given hash algorithm. */
mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set,
@@ -9350,7 +7093,7 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) &&
- MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
/*
* Convert from MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_XXX to MBEDTLS_MD_XXX
@@ -9436,7 +7179,7 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
/*
* Check if a hash proposed by the peer is in our list.
* Return 0 if we're willing to use it, -1 otherwise.
@@ -9455,7 +7198,7 @@
return( -1 );
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
@@ -9548,59 +7291,6 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
-/*
- * Convert version numbers to/from wire format
- * and, for DTLS, to/from TLS equivalent.
- *
- * For TLS this is the identity.
- * For DTLS, use 1's complement (v -> 255 - v, and then map as follows:
- * 1.0 <-> 3.2 (DTLS 1.0 is based on TLS 1.1)
- * 1.x <-> 3.x+1 for x != 0 (DTLS 1.2 based on TLS 1.2)
- */
-void mbedtls_ssl_write_version( int major, int minor, int transport,
- unsigned char ver[2] )
-{
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
- if( minor == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
- --minor; /* DTLS 1.0 stored as TLS 1.1 internally */
-
- ver[0] = (unsigned char)( 255 - ( major - 2 ) );
- ver[1] = (unsigned char)( 255 - ( minor - 1 ) );
- }
- else
-#else
- ((void) transport);
-#endif
- {
- ver[0] = (unsigned char) major;
- ver[1] = (unsigned char) minor;
- }
-}
-
-void mbedtls_ssl_read_version( int *major, int *minor, int transport,
- const unsigned char ver[2] )
-{
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
- *major = 255 - ver[0] + 2;
- *minor = 255 - ver[1] + 1;
-
- if( *minor == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 )
- ++*minor; /* DTLS 1.0 stored as TLS 1.1 internally */
- }
- else
-#else
- ((void) transport);
-#endif
- {
- *major = ver[0];
- *minor = ver[1];
- }
-}
-
int mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int md )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
@@ -9731,6 +7421,70 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen,
+ unsigned char *data, size_t data_len,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
+{
+ psa_status_t status;
+ psa_hash_operation_t hash_operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
+ psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_md( md_alg );
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Perform PSA-based computation of digest of ServerKeyExchange" ) );
+
+ if( ( status = psa_hash_setup( &hash_operation,
+ hash_alg ) ) != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_hash_setup", status );
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if( ( status = psa_hash_update( &hash_operation, ssl->handshake->randbytes,
+ 64 ) ) != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_hash_update", status );
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if( ( status = psa_hash_update( &hash_operation,
+ data, data_len ) ) != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_hash_update", status );
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if( ( status = psa_hash_finish( &hash_operation, hash, MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE,
+ hashlen ) ) != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_hash_finish", status );
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+exit:
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ switch( status )
+ {
+ case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
+ case PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE: /* Intentional fallthrough */
+ case PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY:
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED );
+ default:
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
+ }
+ }
+ return( 0 );
+}
+
+#else
+
int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen,
unsigned char *data, size_t data_len,
@@ -9741,6 +7495,8 @@
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg );
*hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Perform mbedtls-based computation of digest of ServerKeyExchange" ) );
+
mbedtls_md_init( &ctx );
/*
@@ -9785,6 +7541,8 @@
return( ret );
}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */