Squashed commit upgrading to mbedtls-2.28.1
Squash merging branch import/mbedtls-2.28.1
ebf1f6a58089 ("libmbedtls: compile new files added with 2.28.1")
3ffb51b58a54 ("libmbedtls: add SM2 curve")
c425755720b4 ("libmbedtls: mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(): optimize mempool usage")
23493c822a82 ("libmbedtls: mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(): reduce stack usage")
dcdca2348dff ("libmbedtls: mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod() initialize W")
dc2994976958 ("libmbedtls: fix no CRT issue")
c6628873b281 ("libmbedtls: add interfaces in mbedtls for context memory operation")
8acd202d3e55 ("libmedtls: mpi_miller_rabin: increase count limit")
37284e28d5d9 ("libmbedtls: add mbedtls_mpi_init_mempool()")
b499a75f29f3 ("libmbedtls: make mbedtls_mpi_mont*() available")
2080a8c96a5d ("mbedtls: configure mbedtls to reach for config")
e0858334327a ("mbedtls: remove default include/mbedtls/config.h")
dd9688e6b8ce ("Import mbedtls-2.28.1")
Signed-off-by: Jerome Forissier <jerome.forissier@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
diff --git a/lib/libmbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c b/lib/libmbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c
index 1352b49..e47c538 100644
--- a/lib/libmbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c
+++ b/lib/libmbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c
@@ -44,8 +44,8 @@
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include "mbedtls/version.h"
-
-#include "ssl_invasive.h"
+#include "constant_time_internal.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
#include <string.h>
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_parse_record_header( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t len,
@@ -165,11 +166,16 @@
static void ssl_buffering_free_slot( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
uint8_t slot );
static void ssl_free_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_load_buffered_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_load_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_buffer_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_buffer_future_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_record const *rec );
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
static size_t ssl_get_maximum_datagram_size( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
@@ -187,6 +193,7 @@
return( out_buf_len );
}
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
{
size_t const bytes_written = ssl->out_left;
@@ -203,6 +210,7 @@
return( (int) ( mtu - bytes_written ) );
}
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
@@ -254,6 +262,7 @@
* Double the retransmit timeout value, within the allowed range,
* returning -1 if the maximum value has already been reached.
*/
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_double_retransmit_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
uint32_t new_timeout;
@@ -353,6 +362,7 @@
* - A negative error code if `max_len` didn't offer enough space
* for the expansion.
*/
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_build_inner_plaintext( unsigned char *content,
size_t *content_size,
size_t remaining,
@@ -380,6 +390,7 @@
/* This function parses a (D)TLSInnerPlaintext structure.
* See ssl_build_inner_plaintext() for details. */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_parse_inner_plaintext( unsigned char const *content,
size_t *content_size,
uint8_t *rec_type )
@@ -454,15 +465,13 @@
*cur = rec->cid_len;
cur++;
- cur[0] = ( rec->data_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF;
- cur[1] = ( rec->data_len >> 0 ) & 0xFF;
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( rec->data_len, cur, 0 );
cur += 2;
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
{
- cur[0] = ( rec->data_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF;
- cur[1] = ( rec->data_len >> 0 ) & 0xFF;
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( rec->data_len, cur, 0 );
cur += 2;
}
@@ -476,17 +485,19 @@
/*
* SSLv3.0 MAC functions
*/
-static void ssl_mac( mbedtls_md_context_t *md_ctx,
- const unsigned char *secret,
- const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
- const unsigned char *ctr, int type,
- unsigned char out[SSL3_MAC_MAX_BYTES] )
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_mac( mbedtls_md_context_t *md_ctx,
+ const unsigned char *secret,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
+ const unsigned char *ctr, int type,
+ unsigned char out[SSL3_MAC_MAX_BYTES] )
{
unsigned char header[11];
unsigned char padding[48];
int padlen;
int md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_ctx->md_info );
int md_type = mbedtls_md_get_type( md_ctx->md_info );
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
/* Only MD5 and SHA-1 supported */
if( md_type == MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 )
@@ -495,30 +506,54 @@
padlen = 40;
memcpy( header, ctr, 8 );
- header[ 8] = (unsigned char) type;
- header[ 9] = (unsigned char)( len >> 8 );
- header[10] = (unsigned char)( len );
+ header[8] = (unsigned char) type;
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( len, header, 9);
memset( padding, 0x36, padlen );
- mbedtls_md_starts( md_ctx );
- mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, secret, md_size );
- mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, padding, padlen );
- mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, header, 11 );
- mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, buf, len );
- mbedtls_md_finish( md_ctx, out );
+ ret = mbedtls_md_starts( md_ctx );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+ ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, secret, md_size );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+ ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, padding, padlen );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+ ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, header, 11 );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+ ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, buf, len );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+ ret = mbedtls_md_finish( md_ctx, out );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return( ret );
memset( padding, 0x5C, padlen );
- mbedtls_md_starts( md_ctx );
- mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, secret, md_size );
- mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, padding, padlen );
- mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, out, md_size );
- mbedtls_md_finish( md_ctx, out );
+ ret = mbedtls_md_starts( md_ctx );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+ ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, secret, md_size );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+ ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, padding, padlen );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+ ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, out, md_size );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+ ret = mbedtls_md_finish( md_ctx, out );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+
+ return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_transform_aead_dynamic_iv_is_explicit(
mbedtls_ssl_transform const *transform )
{
@@ -717,9 +752,17 @@
if( transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
{
unsigned char mac[SSL3_MAC_MAX_BYTES];
- ssl_mac( &transform->md_ctx_enc, transform->mac_enc,
- data, rec->data_len, rec->ctr, rec->type, mac );
- memcpy( data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen );
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ ret = ssl_mac( &transform->md_ctx_enc, transform->mac_enc,
+ data, rec->data_len, rec->ctr, rec->type, mac );
+ if( ret == 0 )
+ memcpy( data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen );
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac, transform->maclen );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_mac", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
}
else
#endif
@@ -728,18 +771,35 @@
if( transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 )
{
unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec,
transform->minor_ver );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc, add_data,
- add_data_len );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc,
- data, rec->data_len );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &transform->md_ctx_enc, mac );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &transform->md_ctx_enc );
+ ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc,
+ add_data, add_data_len );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled;
+ ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc,
+ data, rec->data_len );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled;
+ ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &transform->md_ctx_enc, mac );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled;
+ ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &transform->md_ctx_enc );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled;
memcpy( data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen );
+
+ hmac_failed_etm_disabled:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac, transform->maclen );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_hmac_xxx", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
}
else
#endif
@@ -1012,18 +1072,34 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "MAC'd meta-data", add_data,
add_data_len );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc, add_data,
- add_data_len );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc,
- data, rec->data_len );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &transform->md_ctx_enc, mac );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &transform->md_ctx_enc );
+ ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc, add_data,
+ add_data_len );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled;
+ ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc,
+ data, rec->data_len );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled;
+ ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &transform->md_ctx_enc, mac );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled;
+ ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &transform->md_ctx_enc );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled;
memcpy( data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen );
rec->data_len += transform->maclen;
post_avail -= transform->maclen;
auth_done++;
+
+ hmac_failed_etm_enabled:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac, transform->maclen );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "HMAC calculation failed", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
}
@@ -1046,242 +1122,6 @@
return( 0 );
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC)
-/*
- * Turn a bit into a mask:
- * - if bit == 1, return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (size_t) -1
- * - if bit == 0, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0
- *
- * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
- * with bit operations using masks.
- *
- * This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
- * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
- */
-static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit( size_t bit )
-{
- /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
- * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( push )
-#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
-#endif
- return -bit;
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( pop )
-#endif
-}
-
-/*
- * Constant-flow mask generation for "less than" comparison:
- * - if x < y, return all bits 1, that is (size_t) -1
- * - otherwise, return all bits 0, that is 0
- *
- * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
- * with bit operations using masks.
- *
- * This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
- * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
- */
-static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_lt( size_t x, size_t y )
-{
- /* This has the most significant bit set if and only if x < y */
- const size_t sub = x - y;
-
- /* sub1 = (x < y) ? 1 : 0 */
- const size_t sub1 = sub >> ( sizeof( sub ) * 8 - 1 );
-
- /* mask = (x < y) ? 0xff... : 0x00... */
- const size_t mask = mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit( sub1 );
-
- return( mask );
-}
-
-/*
- * Constant-flow mask generation for "greater or equal" comparison:
- * - if x >= y, return all bits 1, that is (size_t) -1
- * - otherwise, return all bits 0, that is 0
- *
- * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
- * with bit operations using masks.
- *
- * This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
- * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
- */
-static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_ge( size_t x, size_t y )
-{
- return( ~mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_lt( x, y ) );
-}
-
-/*
- * Constant-flow boolean "equal" comparison:
- * return x == y
- *
- * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
- * with bit operations - it can be used in conjunction with
- * mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit().
- *
- * This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
- * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
- */
-static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq( size_t x, size_t y )
-{
- /* diff = 0 if x == y, non-zero otherwise */
- const size_t diff = x ^ y;
-
- /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
- * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( push )
-#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
-#endif
-
- /* diff_msb's most significant bit is equal to x != y */
- const size_t diff_msb = ( diff | -diff );
-
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( pop )
-#endif
-
- /* diff1 = (x != y) ? 1 : 0 */
- const size_t diff1 = diff_msb >> ( sizeof( diff_msb ) * 8 - 1 );
-
- return( 1 ^ diff1 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Constant-flow conditional memcpy:
- * - if c1 == c2, equivalent to memcpy(dst, src, len),
- * - otherwise, a no-op,
- * but with execution flow independent of the values of c1 and c2.
- *
- * This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
- * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
- */
-static void mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq( unsigned char *dst,
- const unsigned char *src,
- size_t len,
- size_t c1, size_t c2 )
-{
- /* mask = c1 == c2 ? 0xff : 0x00 */
- const size_t equal = mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq( c1, c2 );
- const unsigned char mask = (unsigned char) mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit( equal );
-
- /* dst[i] = c1 == c2 ? src[i] : dst[i] */
- for( size_t i = 0; i < len; i++ )
- dst[i] = ( src[i] & mask ) | ( dst[i] & ~mask );
-}
-
-/*
- * Compute HMAC of variable-length data with constant flow.
- *
- * Only works with MD-5, SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-384.
- * (Otherwise, computation of block_size needs to be adapted.)
- */
-MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac(
- mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx,
- const unsigned char *add_data, size_t add_data_len,
- const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len_secret,
- size_t min_data_len, size_t max_data_len,
- unsigned char *output )
-{
- /*
- * This function breaks the HMAC abstraction and uses the md_clone()
- * extension to the MD API in order to get constant-flow behaviour.
- *
- * HMAC(msg) is defined as HASH(okey + HASH(ikey + msg)) where + means
- * concatenation, and okey/ikey are the XOR of the key with some fixed bit
- * patterns (see RFC 2104, sec. 2), which are stored in ctx->hmac_ctx.
- *
- * We'll first compute inner_hash = HASH(ikey + msg) by hashing up to
- * minlen, then cloning the context, and for each byte up to maxlen
- * finishing up the hash computation, keeping only the correct result.
- *
- * Then we only need to compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) and we're done.
- */
- const mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type( ctx->md_info );
- /* TLS 1.0-1.2 only support SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1, MD-5,
- * all of which have the same block size except SHA-384. */
- const size_t block_size = md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ? 128 : 64;
- const unsigned char * const ikey = ctx->hmac_ctx;
- const unsigned char * const okey = ikey + block_size;
- const size_t hash_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_info );
-
- unsigned char aux_out[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
- mbedtls_md_context_t aux;
- size_t offset;
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-
- mbedtls_md_init( &aux );
-
-#define MD_CHK( func_call ) \
- do { \
- ret = (func_call); \
- if( ret != 0 ) \
- goto cleanup; \
- } while( 0 )
-
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_setup( &aux, ctx->md_info, 0 ) );
-
- /* After hmac_start() of hmac_reset(), ikey has already been hashed,
- * so we can start directly with the message */
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, add_data, add_data_len ) );
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, data, min_data_len ) );
-
- /* For each possible length, compute the hash up to that point */
- for( offset = min_data_len; offset <= max_data_len; offset++ )
- {
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_clone( &aux, ctx ) );
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( &aux, aux_out ) );
- /* Keep only the correct inner_hash in the output buffer */
- mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq( output, aux_out, hash_size,
- offset, data_len_secret );
-
- if( offset < max_data_len )
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, data + offset, 1 ) );
- }
-
- /* The context needs to finish() before it starts() again */
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, aux_out ) );
-
- /* Now compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) */
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) );
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, okey, block_size ) );
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, output, hash_size ) );
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, output ) );
-
- /* Done, get ready for next time */
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( ctx ) );
-
-#undef MD_CHK
-
-cleanup:
- mbedtls_md_free( &aux );
- return( ret );
-}
-
-/*
- * Constant-flow memcpy from variable position in buffer.
- * - functionally equivalent to memcpy(dst, src + offset_secret, len)
- * - but with execution flow independent from the value of offset_secret.
- */
-MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE void mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset(
- unsigned char *dst,
- const unsigned char *src_base,
- size_t offset_secret,
- size_t offset_min, size_t offset_max,
- size_t len )
-{
- size_t offset;
-
- for( offset = offset_min; offset <= offset_max; offset++ )
- {
- mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq( dst, src_base + offset, len,
- offset, offset_secret );
- }
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */
-
int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
mbedtls_record *rec )
@@ -1418,7 +1258,7 @@
add_data, add_data_len );
/* Because of the check above, we know that there are
- * explicit_iv_len Bytes preceeding data, and taglen
+ * explicit_iv_len Bytes preceding data, and taglen
* bytes following data + data_len. This justifies
* the debug message and the invocation of
* mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() below. */
@@ -1521,7 +1361,7 @@
*
* Afterwards, we know that data + data_len is followed by at
* least maclen Bytes, which justifies the call to
- * mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp() below.
+ * mbedtls_ct_memcmp() below.
*
* Further, we still know that data_len > minlen */
rec->data_len -= transform->maclen;
@@ -1531,12 +1371,20 @@
/* Calculate expected MAC. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "MAC'd meta-data", add_data,
add_data_len );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_dec, add_data,
- add_data_len );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_dec,
+ ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_dec, add_data,
+ add_data_len );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled;
+ ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_dec,
data, rec->data_len );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &transform->md_ctx_dec, mac_expect );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &transform->md_ctx_dec );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled;
+ ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &transform->md_ctx_dec, mac_expect );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled;
+ ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &transform->md_ctx_dec );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", data + rec->data_len,
transform->maclen );
@@ -1544,13 +1392,23 @@
transform->maclen );
/* Compare expected MAC with MAC at the end of the record. */
- if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( data + rec->data_len, mac_expect,
- transform->maclen ) != 0 )
+ if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( data + rec->data_len, mac_expect,
+ transform->maclen ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC;
+ goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled;
}
auth_done++;
+
+ hmac_failed_etm_enabled:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac_expect, transform->maclen );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC )
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_hmac_xxx", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
@@ -1623,7 +1481,7 @@
if( auth_done == 1 )
{
- const size_t mask = mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_ge(
+ const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge(
rec->data_len,
padlen + 1 );
correct &= mask;
@@ -1643,7 +1501,7 @@
}
#endif
- const size_t mask = mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_ge(
+ const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge(
rec->data_len,
transform->maclen + padlen + 1 );
correct &= mask;
@@ -1699,18 +1557,18 @@
/* pad_count += (idx >= padding_idx) &&
* (check[idx] == padlen - 1);
*/
- const size_t mask = mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_ge( idx, padding_idx );
- const size_t equal = mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq( check[idx],
- padlen - 1 );
+ const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge( idx, padding_idx );
+ const size_t equal = mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( check[idx],
+ padlen - 1 );
pad_count += mask & equal;
}
- correct &= mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq( pad_count, padlen );
+ correct &= mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( pad_count, padlen );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
if( padlen > 0 && correct == 0 )
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad padding byte detected" ) );
#endif
- padlen &= mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit( correct );
+ padlen &= mbedtls_ct_size_mask( correct );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
@@ -1745,8 +1603,8 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
if( auth_done == 0 )
{
- unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
- unsigned char mac_peer[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
+ unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD] = { 0 };
+ unsigned char mac_peer[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD] = { 0 };
/* If the initial value of padlen was such that
* data_len < maclen + padlen + 1, then padlen
@@ -1768,11 +1626,16 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
if( transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
{
- ssl_mac( &transform->md_ctx_dec,
- transform->mac_dec,
- data, rec->data_len,
- rec->ctr, rec->type,
- mac_expect );
+ ret = ssl_mac( &transform->md_ctx_dec,
+ transform->mac_dec,
+ data, rec->data_len,
+ rec->ctr, rec->type,
+ mac_expect );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_mac", ret );
+ goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled;
+ }
memcpy( mac_peer, data + rec->data_len, transform->maclen );
}
else
@@ -1794,20 +1657,20 @@
const size_t max_len = rec->data_len + padlen;
const size_t min_len = ( max_len > 256 ) ? max_len - 256 : 0;
- ret = mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac( &transform->md_ctx_dec,
- add_data, add_data_len,
- data, rec->data_len, min_len, max_len,
- mac_expect );
+ ret = mbedtls_ct_hmac( &transform->md_ctx_dec,
+ add_data, add_data_len,
+ data, rec->data_len, min_len, max_len,
+ mac_expect );
if( ret != 0 )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac", ret );
- return( ret );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ct_hmac", ret );
+ goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled;
}
- mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( mac_peer, data,
- rec->data_len,
- min_len, max_len,
- transform->maclen );
+ mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset( mac_peer, data,
+ rec->data_len,
+ min_len, max_len,
+ transform->maclen );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
@@ -1822,8 +1685,8 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", mac_peer, transform->maclen );
#endif
- if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( mac_peer, mac_expect,
- transform->maclen ) != 0 )
+ if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( mac_peer, mac_expect,
+ transform->maclen ) != 0 )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) );
@@ -1831,6 +1694,12 @@
correct = 0;
}
auth_done++;
+
+ hmac_failed_etm_disabled:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac_peer, transform->maclen );
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac_expect, transform->maclen );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return( ret );
}
/*
@@ -1882,6 +1751,7 @@
/*
* Compression/decompression functions
*/
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_compress_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
@@ -1934,6 +1804,7 @@
return( 0 );
}
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_decompress_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
@@ -2293,6 +2164,7 @@
/*
* Append current handshake message to current outgoing flight
*/
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_flight_append( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *msg;
@@ -2359,6 +2231,7 @@
/*
* Swap transform_out and out_ctr with the alternative ones
*/
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_swap_epochs( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
mbedtls_ssl_transform *tmp_transform;
@@ -2526,13 +2399,13 @@
* Handshake headers: type(1) len(3) seq(2) f_off(3) f_len(3) */
memcpy( ssl->out_msg, cur->p, 6 );
- ssl->out_msg[6] = ( ( frag_off >> 16 ) & 0xff );
- ssl->out_msg[7] = ( ( frag_off >> 8 ) & 0xff );
- ssl->out_msg[8] = ( ( frag_off ) & 0xff );
+ ssl->out_msg[6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( frag_off );
+ ssl->out_msg[7] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( frag_off );
+ ssl->out_msg[8] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( frag_off );
- ssl->out_msg[ 9] = ( ( cur_hs_frag_len >> 16 ) & 0xff );
- ssl->out_msg[10] = ( ( cur_hs_frag_len >> 8 ) & 0xff );
- ssl->out_msg[11] = ( ( cur_hs_frag_len ) & 0xff );
+ ssl->out_msg[ 9] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( cur_hs_frag_len );
+ ssl->out_msg[10] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( cur_hs_frag_len );
+ ssl->out_msg[11] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( cur_hs_frag_len );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "handshake header", ssl->out_msg, 12 );
@@ -2729,9 +2602,9 @@
*/
if( ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{
- ssl->out_msg[1] = (unsigned char)( hs_len >> 16 );
- ssl->out_msg[2] = (unsigned char)( hs_len >> 8 );
- ssl->out_msg[3] = (unsigned char)( hs_len );
+ ssl->out_msg[1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( hs_len );
+ ssl->out_msg[2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( hs_len );
+ ssl->out_msg[3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( hs_len );
/*
* DTLS has additional fields in the Handshake layer,
@@ -2759,8 +2632,7 @@
/* Write message_seq and update it, except for HelloRequest */
if( hs_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST )
{
- ssl->out_msg[4] = ( ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq >> 8 ) & 0xFF;
- ssl->out_msg[5] = ( ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq ) & 0xFF;
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq, ssl->out_msg, 4 );
++( ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq );
}
else
@@ -2874,8 +2746,7 @@
ssl->conf->transport, ssl->out_hdr + 1 );
memcpy( ssl->out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8 );
- ssl->out_len[0] = (unsigned char)( len >> 8 );
- ssl->out_len[1] = (unsigned char)( len );
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( len, ssl->out_len, 0);
if( ssl->transform_out != NULL )
{
@@ -2915,8 +2786,7 @@
memcpy( ssl->out_cid, rec.cid, rec.cid_len );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
ssl->out_msglen = len = rec.data_len;
- ssl->out_len[0] = (unsigned char)( rec.data_len >> 8 );
- ssl->out_len[1] = (unsigned char)( rec.data_len );
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( rec.data_len, ssl->out_len, 0 );
}
protected_record_size = len + mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len( ssl );
@@ -3004,6 +2874,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->in_hslen ||
@@ -3029,6 +2900,7 @@
ssl->in_msg[8] );
}
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_check_hs_header( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
{
uint32_t msg_len, frag_off, frag_len;
@@ -3095,6 +2967,7 @@
/*
* Check that bitmask is full
*/
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_bitmask_check( unsigned char *mask, size_t len )
{
size_t i;
@@ -3294,6 +3167,7 @@
( (uint64_t) buf[5] ) );
}
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_record_replay_check( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t *record_in_ctr )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
@@ -3376,8 +3250,8 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
/*
- * Without any SSL context, check if a datagram looks like a ClientHello with
- * a valid cookie, and if it doesn't, generate a HelloVerifyRequest message.
+ * Check if a datagram looks like a ClientHello with a valid cookie,
+ * and if it doesn't, generate a HelloVerifyRequest message.
* Both input and output include full DTLS headers.
*
* - if cookie is valid, return 0
@@ -3386,10 +3260,10 @@
* return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED
* - otherwise return a specific error code
*/
-static int ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie(
- mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t *f_cookie_write,
- mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t *f_cookie_check,
- void *p_cookie,
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie(
+ mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len,
const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len,
unsigned char *obuf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen )
@@ -3423,26 +3297,53 @@
*
* Minimum length is 61 bytes.
*/
- if( in_len < 61 ||
- in[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ||
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "check cookie: in_len=%u",
+ (unsigned) in_len ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "cli_id", cli_id, cli_id_len );
+ if( in_len < 61 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "check cookie: record too short" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
+ }
+ if( in[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ||
in[3] != 0 || in[4] != 0 ||
in[19] != 0 || in[20] != 0 || in[21] != 0 )
{
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "check cookie: not a good ClientHello" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( " type=%u epoch=%u fragment_offset=%u",
+ in[0],
+ (unsigned) in[3] << 8 | in[4],
+ (unsigned) in[19] << 16 | in[20] << 8 | in[21] ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
sid_len = in[59];
- if( sid_len > in_len - 61 )
+ if( 59 + 1 + sid_len + 1 > in_len )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "check cookie: sid_len=%u > %u",
+ (unsigned) sid_len,
+ (unsigned) in_len - 61 ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
+ }
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "sid received from network",
+ in + 60, sid_len );
cookie_len = in[60 + sid_len];
- if( cookie_len > in_len - 60 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
-
- if( f_cookie_check( p_cookie, in + sid_len + 61, cookie_len,
- cli_id, cli_id_len ) == 0 )
+ if( 59 + 1 + sid_len + 1 + cookie_len > in_len )
{
- /* Valid cookie */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "check cookie: cookie_len=%u > %u",
+ (unsigned) cookie_len,
+ (unsigned) ( in_len - sid_len - 61 ) ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "cookie received from network",
+ in + sid_len + 61, cookie_len );
+ if( ssl->conf->f_cookie_check( ssl->conf->p_cookie,
+ in + sid_len + 61, cookie_len,
+ cli_id, cli_id_len ) == 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "check cookie: valid" ) );
return( 0 );
}
@@ -3477,8 +3378,9 @@
/* Generate and write actual cookie */
p = obuf + 28;
- if( f_cookie_write( p_cookie,
- &p, obuf + buf_len, cli_id, cli_id_len ) != 0 )
+ if( ssl->conf->f_cookie_write( ssl->conf->p_cookie,
+ &p, obuf + buf_len,
+ cli_id, cli_id_len ) != 0 )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
@@ -3488,12 +3390,11 @@
/* Go back and fill length fields */
obuf[27] = (unsigned char)( *olen - 28 );
- obuf[14] = obuf[22] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 25 ) >> 16 );
- obuf[15] = obuf[23] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 25 ) >> 8 );
- obuf[16] = obuf[24] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 25 ) );
+ obuf[14] = obuf[22] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( *olen - 25 );
+ obuf[15] = obuf[23] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( *olen - 25 );
+ obuf[16] = obuf[24] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( *olen - 25 );
- obuf[11] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 13 ) >> 8 );
- obuf[12] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 13 ) );
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *olen - 13, obuf, 11 );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED );
}
@@ -3518,6 +3419,7 @@
* includes the case of MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT and of unexpected
* errors, and is the right thing to do in both cases).
*/
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_handle_possible_reconnect( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
@@ -3533,15 +3435,13 @@
return( 0 );
}
- ret = ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie(
- ssl->conf->f_cookie_write,
- ssl->conf->f_cookie_check,
- ssl->conf->p_cookie,
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie(
+ ssl,
ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len,
ssl->in_buf, ssl->in_left,
ssl->out_buf, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, &len );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie", ret );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie", ret );
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED )
{
@@ -3575,6 +3475,7 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_check_record_type( uint8_t record_type )
{
if( record_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
@@ -3607,6 +3508,7 @@
* Point 2 is needed when the peer is resending, and we have already received
* the first record from a datagram but are still waiting for the others.
*/
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_parse_record_header( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t len,
@@ -3719,7 +3621,6 @@
/*
* Parse and validate record version
*/
-
rec->ver[0] = buf[ rec_hdr_version_offset + 0 ];
rec->ver[1] = buf[ rec_hdr_version_offset + 1 ];
mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &major_ver, &minor_ver,
@@ -3728,16 +3629,19 @@
if( major_ver != ssl->major_ver )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "major version mismatch" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "major version mismatch: got %u, expected %u",
+ (unsigned) major_ver,
+ (unsigned) ssl->major_ver ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
}
if( minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "minor version mismatch" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "minor version mismatch: got %u, expected max %u",
+ (unsigned) minor_ver,
+ (unsigned) ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
}
-
/*
* Parse/Copy record sequence number.
*/
@@ -3840,6 +3744,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_check_client_reconnect( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
unsigned int rec_epoch = ( ssl->in_ctr[0] << 8 ) | ssl->in_ctr[1];
@@ -3869,6 +3774,7 @@
/*
* If applicable, decrypt record content
*/
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_prepare_record_content( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_record *rec )
{
@@ -4002,7 +3908,7 @@
/* Check actual (decrypted) record content length against
* configured maximum. */
- if( ssl->in_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN )
+ if( rec->data_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
@@ -4020,8 +3926,11 @@
*/
/* Helper functions for mbedtls_ssl_read_record(). */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_consume_current_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_get_next_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_record_is_in_progress( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
int mbedtls_ssl_read_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
@@ -4109,6 +4018,7 @@
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
if( ssl->in_left > ssl->next_record_offset )
@@ -4117,6 +4027,7 @@
return( 0 );
}
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_load_buffered_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake;
@@ -4214,6 +4125,7 @@
return( ret );
}
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_buffer_make_space( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
size_t desired )
{
@@ -4256,6 +4168,7 @@
return( -1 );
}
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_buffer_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = 0;
@@ -4460,6 +4373,7 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_consume_current_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
/*
@@ -4547,6 +4461,7 @@
return( 0 );
}
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_record_is_in_progress( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
if( ssl->in_msglen > 0 )
@@ -4573,6 +4488,7 @@
}
}
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_load_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake;
@@ -4630,6 +4546,7 @@
return( 0 );
}
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_buffer_future_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_record const *rec )
{
@@ -4688,6 +4605,7 @@
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_get_next_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
@@ -4891,8 +4809,7 @@
ssl->in_hdr[0] = rec.type;
ssl->in_msg = rec.buf + rec.data_offset;
ssl->in_msglen = rec.data_len;
- ssl->in_len[0] = (unsigned char)( rec.data_len >> 8 );
- ssl->in_len[1] = (unsigned char)( rec.data_len );
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( rec.data_len, ssl->in_len, 0 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
if( ssl->transform_in != NULL &&
@@ -5067,6 +4984,9 @@
if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ if( ssl->out_left != 0 )
+ return( mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) );
+
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> send alert message" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "send alert level=%u message=%u", level, message ));
@@ -5436,6 +5356,7 @@
/*
* Check record counters and renegotiate if they're above the limit.
*/
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
size_t ep_len = mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl );
@@ -5786,6 +5707,7 @@
* Therefore, it is possible that the input message length is 0 and the
* corresponding return code is 0 on success.
*/
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_write_real( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
{
@@ -5857,6 +5779,7 @@
* remember whether we already did the split or not.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_write_split( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
{
@@ -5939,9 +5862,6 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write close notify" ) );
- if( ssl->out_left != 0 )
- return( mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) );
-
if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,